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 Although the airline industry has drastically changed since its deregulation in 
1978, publically available sources of data have remained nearly the same. In the U.S., 
most researchers and decision-makers rely on government data that contains highly 
aggregated price information (e.g., average quarterly prices). However, aggregate data 
can hide important market behavior. With the emergence of online distribution channels, 
there is a new opportunity to model air travel demand using detailed price information.    
 This dissertation uses online prices and seat maps to build a dataset of daily prices 
and bookings at the flight-level. Several research contributions are made, all related to 
leveraging online data to better understand airline pricing and product strategies, and how 
these strategies impact customers, as well as the industry in general. One major 
contribution is the finding that the recent product debundling trend in the U.S. airline 
industry has diluted revenues to the U.S. Airport and Airways Trust Fund by at least five 
percent.  
 Additionally, several new behavioral insights are found for one debundling trend 
that has been widely adopted by U.S. airlines: seat reservation fees. Customers are found 
to be between 2 and 3.3 times more likely to purchase premium coach seats (with extra 
legroom and early boarding privileges) when there are no regular coach window or aisle 
seats that can be reserved for free, suggesting that the ability of airlines to charge seat 
fees is strongly tied to load factors. Model results are used to explore optimal seat fees 
and find that an optimal static fee could increase revenues by 8 percent, whereas optimal 
dynamic fees could increase revenues by 10.2 percent.  
 xii
 xiii
 Another major contribution is in modeling daily bookings and estimating price 
elasticities using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression without correcting for price 
endogeneity and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, which corrects for 
endogeneity. Results highlight the importance of correcting for price endogeneity (which 
is not often done in air travel applications). In particular, models that do not correct for 
endogeneity find inelastic demand estimates whereas models that do correct for 
endogeneity find elastic demand estimates. This is important, as pricing 
recommendations differ for inelastic and elastic models. A set of instrumental variables 
are found to pass validity tests and can be used to correct for price endogeneity in future 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
Since deregulation (which occurred in the United States in 1978), the airline industry has 
faced a large number of changes. Competition has been transformed by low cost carriers 
(LCCs) that typically offer lower prices than legacy carriers. Between 2000 and 2008, the 
number of domestic passengers served by LCCs grew at an average annual rate of 11 
percent, whereas during this same time period many legacy carriers experienced 
declining figures. Also during this time period, LCCs increased their weekly flight 
departures and cities served by 60 percent. Traditionally, LCCs mainly targeted price-
sensitive leisure passengers. However, LCCs are beginning to target business passengers 
by flying in heavily traveled business routes (Steenland, 2008).   
 In addition to increased competition from LCCs, the internet has also transformed 
the airline industry, leading to pricing transparency. Online travel agents such as 
Expedia®, Orbitz®, and Travelocity® make it easy for customers to search the prices of 
multiple airlines across multiple departure dates. Customers can quickly search for and 
purchase the lowest possible fare. In fact, 60 percent of leisure travelers report that they 
purchase the lowest fare they can find (Harteveldt et al., 2004; PhoCusWright, 2004). An 
increasing number of purchases are being made through the internet. For example, in 
1998, approximately one percent of domestic leisure bookings were sold through the 
internet, but by 2005 the percentage of domestic leisure bookings made online had 
increased to 35 percent (Brunger and Perelli, 2008). 
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 The growth of LCCs combined with the increased transparency of airfares has 
led, at least in part, to lower average prices in the airline industry. Airlines have not been 
able to increase fares at a rate that keeps up with inflation. In the first 30 years after 
passenger deregulation, domestic airline prices fell 41.2 percent in real terms (ATA, 
2010).  
 In addition to increased competition from low cost carriers and increased use of 
the internet as a major distribution channel, airlines also faced a series of financial 
challenges in the first decade of the 21st century, including unprecedented fuel costs, 
continued security threats post 9/11, health outbreaks (SARS, H1N1), economic 
recessions, and the global financial crisis. Due to the numerous industry changes and 
financial challenges, airlines have struggled to remain profitable. Between 2000 and 
2010, the seven largest U.S. network carriers1 collectively lost $35.1 billion (U.S. DOT, 
2010), and four of these carriers went into bankruptcy2. As a result, widespread industry 
consolidation has taken place, as five major mergers/acquisitions3 involving nine carriers 
were initiated between 2005 and 2012. 
 In response to the financial challenges in the first decade of the 21st century, 
airlines began debundling services that were once included in the base price of a ticket, 
including new fees for checked baggage, seat reservations, and food. Additionally, the 






1 Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways. 
2 Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways filed for bankruptcy. 
3 Mergers/acquisitions took place between America West and US Airways in 2005; Delta and Northwest in 
2008; Continental and United in 2010; Southwest and AirTran in 2011; US Airways and American in 2012. 
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cost of existing ancillary services were increased, including fees for services such as 
redeeming mileage award tickets, exchanging tickets, and checking pets. Revenues from 
ancillary fees have rapidly increased in the past few years. From 2007-2011 ancillary 
revenues reported by U.S. carriers with operating revenues over $20 million grew from 
$3.6 billion to $9.8 billion (U.S. DOT, 2012), and similar trends are observed worldwide. 
Ancillary services provide an important revenue source that can help carriers achieve 
profitability.  For example, in 2011 JetBlue reported a net profit of $86 million and seat 
fee revenues of more than $120 million (JetBlue Airways, 2011).  
 Although the airline industry has drastically changed since its deregulation, and 
especially within the last decade, publically available sources of data have not changed. 
Most researchers and decision-makers currently rely on government datasets to answer 
questions about airline pricing, demand and competition. These government data sources 
provide highly aggregated data. For example, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s 
Origin and Destination Survey Databank 1A/1B (which contains a 10% random sample 
of tickets sold in the U.S.) provides information on average quarterly market-level prices 
by airline. However, airlines are constantly changing prices in response to demand, often 
many times per day.  
 The lack of disaggregate data sources has hindered the ability to fully understand 
or to even explore many relevant questions. For example, how do mergers (and/or the 
degree of competition) impact airline prices? What factors related to seat reservation fees 
impact customer purchasing behavior? Will the debundling trend dilute revenues to the 
U.S. Airport and Airways Trust Fund? How do daily flight prices (and competitor 
prices/promotions) influence daily demand? 
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 With the emergence of online booking, there is a new opportunity to collect 
detailed data. Several firms, such as QL2® and Infare Solutions collect pricing data from 
online and from other channels and sell this data to airlines. In turn, airlines use this 
information to inform their day-to-day pricing and revenue management decisions. 
Airline websites can be used to compare airlines’ product offerings and fee policies for 
ancillary services, which provides important insights into how different carriers are 
approaching ancillary revenues. Airline websites can also be used to track the prices of 
multiple airlines over the booking horizon, which provides insights into airlines’ 
competitive pricing strategies across different market structures (such as monopolies 
versus more competitive markets). Airline websites can also provide insights into how 
different airlines respond when a competitor drops or increases prices. Further, airline 
websites can be used to track online seat maps. By looking at the daily changes of 
“reserved” vs. “available” seats displayed to customers on online seat maps, an estimate 
for daily flight-level bookings (a measure of demand) can be captured. By leveraging the 
internet, disaggregate databases can be used to explore research questions at a finer level 
of detail. 
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
There are four main research objectives of this dissertation. Each objective is related to 
leveraging online data to better understand airline pricing and product strategies, and how 
these strategies impact customers, as well as the industry in general.  
 The first research objective is to study the relationship between airline prices and 
competitive market structures (such as monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies both with 
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and without low cost carrier competition). With so much recent industry consolidation, it 
is important to understand how competition among air carriers impacts prices offered to 
customers, as this relationship will directly impact the formation of future policies 
associated with competition policy (anti-trust), deregulation, and mergers. As part of this 
objective, airline pricing is analyzed using a dataset of disaggregate online pricing data 
for 62 markets across a range of different market structure types.  
 The second objective is to identify and review product debundling trends that 
have recently occurred in the U.S. airline industry. Information pertaining to carriers’ 
products is obtained from airline websites and implications of multiple sources of 
ancillary fees (related to ticketing refunds and exchanges, checked baggage, on-board 
pets, preferred and/or advanced seating assignments, frequent flyer ticket redemptions, 
and day of departure standby policies) are discussed. Part of this objective is to better 
understand how product offerings are changing, and to better understand how these 
trends may potentially impact the industry, such as diluting revenues to the U.S. Airport 
and Airways Trust Fund and impacting other system performance objectives (such as 
minimizing the number of misconnecting passengers). 
  The third objective focuses on one debundling trend that has been widely adopted 
by U.S. airlines: seat reservation fees. The objective is to investigate factors that 
influence airline customers’ premium coach seat purchases and to estimate revenue 
impacts of different seat pricing strategies. Using a database of online prices and seat 
map displays collected from JetBlue’s website, a binary logit model is used to estimate 
the probability of purchasing a premium coach seat with extra legroom, given that a 
ticket was purchased. Variables included in the analysis include the amount of the seat 
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fee, how far in advance the ticket is purchased, the number of passengers traveling 
together, and load factors (as revealed through seat map displays).  The model results are 
used to estimate revenue impacts associated with different pricing structures, such as 
dynamically pricing seats as a function of time until flight departure. 
 The fourth, and final, objective has two interrelated parts. The first piece of the 
objective is to determine whether it is possible to use online prices and seat maps to build 
detailed flight-level models of daily bookings. However, within the airline industry, most 
demand studies have failed to address price endogeneity and have assumed that prices are 
exogenous, which contradicts basic economic theory of supply and demand4. Failing to 
address price endogeneity can lead to models with biased coefficient estimates, which 
can be misleading when making policy decisions. Therefore, price endogeneity is an 
important methodological consideration that must be addressed. The second piece of the 
objective is to correct for price endogeneity in the demand model by finding a valid set of 
instrumental variables that can be used with instrumental variable estimation methods, 
such as two-stage least squares regression. Instrumented variable methods allow for 
consistent parameter estimation when an endogenous variable is present. Price elasticities 
can then be estimated across different dimensions of the data, including advanced 
purchase ranges.     






4 Price endogeneity will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter 5. Basically, price is endogenous when 
price influences demand, but demand also influences price. We know that airlines use revenue management 
strategies that set prices in response to changes in demand, indicating that prices should be endogenous. 
Assuming that price is exogenous assumes that demand does not influence price, which is not the case in 
most economic models of supply and demand. 
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1.3. Major Contributions 
There are several major contributions of this dissertation. Perhaps most importantly from 
a public policy perspective, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of disaggregate 
data that describe individual airline behavior and prices. Much public policy discussion 
and analysis relies on average market values that can hide important market behavior. 
With the advent of internet-based ticketing, a powerful tool now exists that can be used to 
understand some of the finer detail of airline markets and competition.  This enhances the 
ability of regulators, government officials, academics and airlines to better understand 
issues related to fares and customer service and to make more informed decisions and/or 
policies. 
 Another major contribution is in respect to the recent product debundling trends 
that have occurred in the U.S. airline industry. Specifically, we estimate that the 
debundling phenomenon has diluted revenues to the U.S. Airport and Airways Trust 
Fund (AATF) by at least five percent. This is important as the AATF finances 
investments in the airport and airway system. The AATF was established as a source of 
funding that would increase concurrently with the use of the system, and assure timely 
and long-term commitments to capacity increases. The finding that debundling has 
diluted revenues to the AATF means that policy-makers may need to consider taxing 
ancillary fees in the future in order to maintain the viability of the fund. 
 Another major contribution provides several new behavioral insights into seat 
reservation fees. Seat fees are currently causing tensions among customers, regulatory 
agencies, and airlines. Customers and regulatory agencies are focusing on the importance 
of fee transparency and fairness, but airlines want to add complexity to further 
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differentiate fees across customer groups (e.g., by blocking premium seats for preferred 
customers) so as to capture more of the consumer surplus. We find that customers are 
between 2 and 3.3 times more likely to purchase premium coach seats (with extra 
legroom and early boarding privileges) when there are no regular coach window or aisle 
seats that can be reserved for free, suggesting that the ability of airlines to charge seat 
fees is strongly tied to load factors. In an environment in which load factors are high, the 
airlines’ ability to generate revenues from seat fees is strong. However, in the future if 
load factors decrease, we would expect that the incremental revenues generated from seat 
fee reservations would also decrease, which is something that airlines should consider 
before investing in reconfigurations of airplane seats. We also find that customers who 
purchase tickets closer to the departure date are willing to pay higher seat fees. We use 
these model results to show that JetBlue’s seat fees are currently underpriced in many 
markets; an optimal static fee would increase revenues by 8 percent whereas optimal 
dynamic fees would increase revenues by 10.2 percent. In addition, if JetBlue were to 
leave their seat fees unchanged and instead blocked certain rows of seats for premier 
customers, they could potentially increase revenues by 12.8%.  This finding underscores 
the importance of ensuring customers are not inadvertently misled into purchasing 
premium seats by seat map displays that block seats for premier customers. 
 Another major contribution is in modeling daily bookings and estimating airfare 
price elasticities using daily online prices and seat maps from airline websites. Using this 
data, we estimate airfare price elasticity using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
without correcting for price endogeneity and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
which corrects for endogeneity. Results show the importance of correcting for price 
 8
endogeneity.  In particular, models that do not correct for endogeneity find inelastic 
demand estimates whereas models that do correct for endogeneity find elastic demand 
estimates.  This is important, as pricing recommendations differ for inelastic and elastic 
models. Further, a set of instruments are found to pass validity tests and can be used in 
future models of daily flight-level demand. To our knowledge, this is the first time online 
seat maps have been used to estimate price elasticities, and this is also one of the first 
studies to correct for price endogeneity in models of airline demand.  
 
1.4. Dissertation Structure 
The chapters of this dissertation are written in journal format. Each chapter begins with 
an abstract, followed by background and motivation for the research, a discussion of 
methodologies used, and main findings. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of 
implications (for public policy, customers, and/or airlines), future research directions, and 
a list of referenced literature.     
 Chapter 2 explores competitive airline pricing policies in markets with different 
types of competitive market structures using a dataset of online prices from 2007. This 
chapter was published in Transportation Research Record as part of the Airport 
Cooperative Research Program’s Graduate Research Award Program on Public-Sector 
Aviation Issues (Mumbower and Garrow, 2010).  
 Chapter 3 reviews product debundling trends that were quickly being 
implemented in the airline industry in 2009-2010 (Garrow, Hotle and Mumbower, 2012). 
Chapter 4 focuses on one popular debundling trend, seat reservation fees, and models 
airline customers' premium coach seat purchases using a database of online prices and 
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seat maps collected from JetBlue’s website in 2010. Revenue implications for optimal 
pricing strategies are further explored (Mumbower, Garrow and Newman, 2013).  
 Chapter 5 reviews the concept of price endogeneity in demand models, discusses 
endogeneity bias, and explains how instrumental variable methods can be used to correct 
for price endogeneity. Chapter 6 uses the methods discussed in Chapter 5 to correct for 
price endogeneity in linear models of disaggregate flight-level demand. Price elasticities 
are then estimated across several dimensions of the data, including different advance 
purchase ranges.   
 This dissertation also includes Appendix A, which provides more detailed 
information about an online dataset of competitor prices that was compiled using 
automated web client robots. This dataset was used to formulate the set of instrumental 
variables used to correct for endogeneity in the demand models of Chapter 6. We hope to 
address research gaps by making this dataset publically available for other researchers to 
use (Mumbower and Garrow, 2013). The dataset contains pricing information over a four 
week booking horizon for 42 U.S. markets and 21 departure dates in September of 2010, 
which amounts to over 228,000 price observations. 
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CHAPTER 2: COMPETITIVE AIRLINE PRICING POLICIES 
 
Mumbower, S. and Garrow, L.A. (2010) Using online data to explore competitive airline 
pricing policies: A case study approach. Transportation Research Record: 
Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2184, 1-12. 
 
2.1. Abstract 
Since the mid 2000’s, the airline industry has seen volatile fuel prices, a record number of 
carriers ending service, and a merger between two major airlines. In a time of such 
turmoil in the industry it is increasingly important to understand the relationship between 
airline consolidation and competitive pricing policies, as this relationship will directly 
impact the formation of future airline policies associated with competition policy (anti-
trust), deregulation, and mergers. However, there is a lack of consensus about market 
concentration and its influence on airfares, mainly due to data limitations of past 
research. Given the emergence of online booking engines, there is a new opportunity to 
collect detailed fare data. This project uses disaggregate, online airfare data to study the 
relationship between market concentration and pricing policies. The dataset includes 62 
markets that cover a broad range of market structures. A case study approach is used to 
analyze the data. Using disaggregate fare data, this study finds low price dispersion can 
be associated with both low and high levels of market concentration. As the day of 
departure approaches, price dispersion is seen to either increase or decrease, depending 
on the specific market. Additionally, peak and off-peak periods demonstrate differing 
pricing strategies. Also, markets with codeshares are shown to sometimes exhibit 
unusually high price dispersion. 
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2.2. Background 
Since its deregulation in 1978, the airline industry has seen a large number of changes. 
Low cost carriers (LCCs) have penetrated the market and generally offer lower prices 
than legacy carriers, mainly due to their significantly lower operating costs5. Between 
2000 and 2008, the number of domestic passengers served by LCCs grew at an average 
annual rate of 11 percent, while during this same time period many legacy carriers 
experienced declining figures. Also during this time period, LCCs increased their weekly 
departures and cities served by 60 percent. In the third quarter of 2007, Southwest 
Airlines (the largest LCC) alone carried more domestic passengers than any other airline. 
Although LCCs traditionally target leisure passengers, this has even begun to change. 
More and more, LCCs are starting to target business passengers by flying in heavily 
traveled business routes. It is apparent that competition in the airline industry has been 
transformed by LCCs. (Steenland, 2008)     
 In addition to LCCs, the internet has also transformed the airline industry. On-line 
travel agents such as Expedia®, Orbitz®, and Travelocity® make it convenient for 
customers to search the prices of multiple airlines across multiple departure dates. 
Customers can find and purchase the lowest possible fare in a matter of minutes. In fact, 
60 percent of leisure travelers purchase the lowest fare they can find (Harteveldt et al., 
2004; PhoCusWright, 2004). In a May 2008 testimony to the House Committee on 






5 See a book by Cento (2000) for detailed information about the differences between the business models of 
legacy carriers and LCCs. 
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Transportation and Infrastructure (Subcommittee on Aviation) about the impact of the 
Delta and Northwest merger, Former President and CEO of Northwest Airlines, Doug 
Steenland, refers to the internet as a “transparency revolution” and goes on to state that 
online travel agencies “…have provided enormous benefits to consumers and have 
increased the price-competitiveness of the airline industry. In fact, there are few 
businesses in which there is as much pricing transparency.” (Steenland, 2008)     
 The growth of LCCs combined with the increased transparency of airfares has 
led, at least in part, to lower average prices in the airline industry. Between 1995 and 
2004, the prices that passengers paid for tickets declined by more than 20 percent after 
adjusting for inflation6 (Borenstein, 2005). While decreased prices are good for 
consumers, its implications on airlines are quite the opposite. Airline operating costs have 
increased dramatically over the last few years, but airlines have not been able to increase 
fares to match rising costs. In the first quarter of 2009, U.S. network carriers reported a 
total operating loss of $867 million, which was the sixth consecutive quarterly loss 
(Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2009). Between 2002 and 2008, four major carriers 
filed for bankruptcy protection (Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, and 
US Airways). In addition, ATA Airlines, Skybus Airlines, and Aloha Airlines filed for 
bankruptcy and ended service. Frontier Airlines has also filed for bankruptcy but has not 






6 It should be noted that during this time period, the airline industry faced an economic slowdown in 2000, 
along with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
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ended service, and in 2008 Delta and Northwest merged in an effort to become more 
financially stable.  
 
2.3. Price Dispersion Literature 
With the current state of the airline industry, it is not surprising that there has been a great 
deal of interest in studying the effect of airline consolidation on airfares. In the past, 
many researchers have studied how market structure affects the dispersion of airfares, 
often called price dispersion. Price dispersion has been defined in many ways by different 
researchers and is specific to the unit of observation of analysis. However, price 
dispersion can generally be thought of as the difference between an airline’s highest and 
lowest fares in a market. The interest in price dispersion of airfares was sparked when 
Borenstein (1989) used government data sources to show that there is a negative 
relationship between market concentration and price dispersion, meaning that as a route 
becomes more dominated by one airline and moves closer towards monopoly the price 
dispersion decreases . More specifically, he found that as a route moves closer towards a 
monopoly, an air carrier’s low-end fares increase while high-end fares decrease, thus 
decreasing the overall dispersion of prices (while increasing average prices). Over the 
next several years, other researchers also used U.S. government data sources to study this 
relationship empirically, with findings that supported the negative relationship between 
market concentration and price dispersion (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Hayes and Ross, 
1998; Verlinda and Lane, 2004). A theoretical model also supported this relationship by 
Dana (1999). These researchers also found many other factors that influence the 
dispersion of prices. For instance, it has been shown that price dispersion increases with 
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increased airport dominance (Borenstein and Rose, 1994), airport congestion (Borenstein 
and Rose, 1994), and internet search for airfares (Verlinda and Lane, 2004). These 
researchers also found that price dispersion decreases with increased frequency of flights 
on a route (Borenstein and Rose, 1994), higher levels of tourist traffic (Borenstein and 
Rose, 1994), and competition from Southwest (Hayes and Ross, 1998).   
 The negative relationship between market concentration and price dispersion has 
been contradicted, however, in at least two more recent studies that use the same 
government data sources and analyze the data differently. In past studies, the modeling 
approach was to take millions of available records and aggregate them into one unique 
observation by carrier-route for each quarter. In doing this, these records would be 
aggregated to a few thousand records that were used for analysis. However, Verlinda 
(2005) used one quarter of the government data to demonstrate that the data could be 
analyzed disaggregately without collapsing the data into average carrier-route 
observations. In doing so, a positive relationship between market concentration and price 
dispersion is found. Another study using government data also finds a positive 
relationship between market concentration and price dispersion, although the change in 
relation is attributed not to the aggregated method of analysis, but to omitted-variable 
bias present in other studies, which the authors correct for using an instrumental variables 
approach (Gerardi and Shapiro; 2007). 
 Yet another conflicting finding is that the relationship between market 
concentration and price dispersion is not strictly positive or negative, but is non-
monotonic, inverse U-shaped (Liu and Serfes, 2006). The authors of this study provide a 
theoretical model, as well as an empirical model using government data sources, to 
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demonstrate the non-monotonic relationship. In this model, an increase in market 
concentration when the market is already competitive will result in higher price 
dispersion while an increase in market concentration when the market is already 
concentrated enough will result in lower price dispersion. 
 As seen from this literature, there are many conflicting theories related to airline 
price dispersion, and the method of analysis greatly influences the findings. One reason 
why there are so many conflicting theories of price dispersion is the data that is being 
used. Government data sources for airfares are considered aggregate data in that they 
summarize and/or randomly sample a small portion of all tickets sold. However, with the 
widespread use of the internet for booking tickets, there is an opportunity to collect much 
more detailed and disaggregate data. The use of disaggregate data can be used to resolve 
some of these conflicting theories. To date, there have been three studies of price 
dispersion using disaggregate data. However, two of these studies are for international 
markets that are not comparable to U.S. domestic markets (Bilotkach, 2005; Giaume and 
Guillou, 2004). The other study was analyzed on 12 routes and found a negative 
relationship between market concentration and price dispersion (Stavins, 2001). It is also 
important to point out that ticket observations used in the price dispersion literature differ 
across studies; some studies observe actual ticket purchases, while other studies observe 
offered tickets that may or may not have actually been purchased.  
 Table 2.1 provides a summary of the price dispersion literature and includes 
information about: the relationship between market concentration and price dispersion, 
whether the data used was aggregate or disaggregate, the data source and time period, the 
number of airlines and routes, the total number of observations, and other relevant notes 
 17
 18
about the data. As seen in the table, there have been few studies that use disaggregate 
data to study price dispersion, and these disaggregate studies are limited in the sense that 
they observe a small number of markets with a limited number of observations. There 
remains a research need to model the relationship between price dispersion and market 
concentration in a broad range of U.S. markets by using disaggregate data.  
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Data Used in Price Dispersion Literature 
















Data Notes  
and/or  
Limitations 
Borenstein (1989)  Negative No DB1A:1987Q3, SSD 9 1,508 --- Airline-route observations 
Borenstein & Rose (1994)  Negative No DB1A:1986Q2, OAG® 11 521 1,020 Airline-route observations 
Hayes & Ross (1998)  Negative No DB1A:1990Q1-1992Q4, T100 15 973 14,652 Airline-route-year-quarter obs. 
Stavins (2001)   Negative Yes OAG® (electronic version): 
9/28/1995
--- 12 5,804 Offered tickets observations 
Giaune & Guillou (2004) Negative Yes Amadeus System  
(a Global CRS) 
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20  2,592 Ticket observations; 
Nice, France to Europe markets; 
LCCs not included; 
1 Departure Date: 10/16/02;  
4 DFD: 22, 14, 7, 1 day(s)  
Verlinda & Lane (2004)   Negative No DB1B:1998Q1-2002Q2, 
OAG®  
--- 25 --- Average fare by market-year-
quarter-restriction type obs; 
do not observe fares by airline or 
airport, but by city market 
Bilotkach (2005)  
 
N/A - fares aimed 
at business are 
more dispersed 
than leisure 
Yes Travelocity® website: 
3/5/2002- 4/ 23/2002 
 
7 3 499 Offered tickets observations; 
London-New York market; 
2 DFD/2 Day Stay; 
2 DFD/10 Day Stay; 
30 DFD/10 Day Stay 
Verlinda (2005)  Positive No DB1A/B:2000Q1, T100, 
OAG®  
14 1,428 773,811 Ticket observations; 
LCCs and Southwest included; 
Disaggregate analysis approach 
Liu & Serfes (2006) Non-monotonic 
(inverse U) 
No DB1A: Q2 of odd years 1991-
1999, T100  
--- 946 7,104 Airline-route-year-quarter obs. 
Gerardi & Shapiro (2007) Positive 
 
No DB1B:1993Q1-2006Q3, T100 9 2,752 82,855 Airline-route-year-quarter obs.  
LCCs not included 
This study (2009)  Yes Airlines’ websites: 
11/15/2007-12/15/2007 
12 62 108,632 LCCs and Southwest included; 
Codeshares represented 
CRS = Computer Reservation System; DB1A/1B = U.S. DOT’s Origin and Destination Survey Databank 1A/1B, a 10% random sample of all tickets sold in the 
U.S., includes market and pricing data; DFD = days from flight departure; LCC = Low Cost Carrier; OAG® = Official Airline Guide; Q = Quarter; T100 = 
Domestic Segment Data, gives information on capacity and frequency of service, published monthly; SSD = U.S. DOT’s Service Segment Data, data on airline 




Given the data limitations of past studies that used disaggregate data to study airfares, the 
goal of this paper is to study how certain characteristics of a market affect airfares by 
using a larger sample of U.S. domestic markets that cover a broad range of market 
structures. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the dataset used in this study represents 
the largest and most comprehensive disaggregate airline pricing database used to research 
airfares thus far.  
 
2.4.1. Data 
The data was collected in the fall of 2007 in collaboration with QL2® Software, one of 
the major U.S. companies that collects competitive pricing and product information from 
websites. In order to obtain data for Southwest Airlines, additional webbots were written 
by an academic team at Georgia Tech in order to supplement the data provided by QL2®. 
The data collected consists of prices for more than 100 U.S. markets for one month of 
departure dates, which were selected to represent periods of peak and off-peak demands 
(i.e., Thanksgiving and early December 2007, respectively). Round-trip and one-way 
fares were recorded daily for at least 30 days prior to flight departure. Nonstop fares were 
obtained from each airline’s website, while nonstop and connecting fares were obtained 
from at least one major online travel agency (Orbitz®, Travelocity® or Expedia®). For an 
especially detailed explanation of the data collection methodology and compilation, as 
well as a more specific account of the dataset, the reader is referred to (Pope, Garrow, et 
al., 2009). 
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 A subset of the aforementioned dataset was chosen for data analysis in order to 
represent a wide variety of interesting market competition structures and airline 
competition effects, such as monopolies, duopolies, and competitive markets broken 
down into subcategories representing whether the markets have multi-airport effects 
and/or LCC presence. In defining these categories of market structures, only airlines that 
fly nonstop in a market were considered, thus all observations for connecting flights were 
eliminated. This is in following with the methodology of a number of other researchers 
(for example, Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Bilotkach, 2005; Bilotkach et al., 2006; 
Gerardi and Shapiro, 2007; Giaume and Guillou, 2004; Liu and Serfes, 2006; Verlinda, 
2005; Verlinda and Lane, 2004) and is done for two reasons. Firstly, this ensures that the 
analysis is somewhat comparable to those of past studies. Secondly, eliminating 
connecting tickets makes the analysis far less complicated. This is due to the fact that 
connecting tickets represent significantly different qualities of service than direct tickets 
and controlling for the cost differences would be more complex. Additionally, only the 
lowest fares are included in the observations, which is also comparable to the 
methodology of other researchers (Bilotkach and Pejcinovska, 2007; Mentzer, 2000; Pels 
and Rietveld, 2004). Using the lowest observed fare controls for vertical price 
differentiation. Vertical price differentiation is the difference in prices due to the differing 
qualities of tickets (such as restricted vs. non-restricted tickets). By controlling for 
vertical differentiation, the analysis focuses on horizontal price differentiation, which is 
defined as the difference in prices due to the varying tastes of customers (such as brand 
preference, aircraft preference, etc). By focusing on the horizontal price differentiation, 
the analysis can capture the competitive impacts associated with price dispersion. 
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 The final dataset that was used in this study consists of 108,632 observations for 
62 airport-to-airport markets and 12 airlines. Each observation represents the lowest 
nonstop, round-trip fare that was offered by each airline flying nonstop in the market on 
the date that the website was queried and for each specific day of flight departure, 
assuming a one night stay. The major7 airlines (with airline code) included are: American 
Airlines (AA), Alaska Airlines (AS), Continental Airlines (CO), Delta Air Lines (DL), 
Northwest Airlines (NW), United Airlines (UA), and US Airways (US), and the LCCs 
included are: Air Tran Airways (FL), Frontier Airlines (F9), JetBlue Airways (B6), Spirit 
Airlines (NK) and Southwest Airlines (WN). In addition, several codeshares are also 
represented and are denoted by the code of the marketing carrier followed by the code of 
the operating carrier in parenthesis. The codeshares represented include: AA (AS), AS 
(AA), NW (AS), UA (US), and US (UA).  Table 2.2 lists the airports included in the 
dataset, along with the airport codes used throughout this paper. 
  






7 These airlines are network carriers, which are referred to as “major” carriers throughout the rest of the 
paper. 
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Table 2.2: Airport Codes and Names 
Airport 
Code Name of Airport, City and State 
ATL Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia 
BOS Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts 
BWI Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, Baltimore, Maryland 
COS  City of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport, Colorado Springs, Colorado 
DAL Dallas Love Field Airport, Dallas, Texas 
DCA Ronald Regan Washington National Airport, Washington D.C. 
DEN Denver International Airport, Denver, Colorado 
DFW Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas 
DSM Des Moines International Airport, Des Moines, Iowa 
DTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Detroit, Michigan 
EWR Newark Liberty International Airport, Newark, New Jersey 
FLL Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
FNT Bishop International Airport, Flint, Michigan 
GSO Piedmont Triad International Airport, Greensboro,  North Carolina 
GTF Great Falls International Airport, Great Falls, Montana 
HOU William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, Texas 
IAD Washington Dulles International Airport, Washington D.C. 
IAH George Bush Intercontinental Airport, Houston, Texas 
ICT Wichita Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 
IND  Indianapolis International Airport, Indianapolis, Indiana 
JFK John F. Kennedy International, New York City, New York 
LAS McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada 
LAX Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California 
LGA La Guardia Airport, New York City, New York 
MCO Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida 
MDW Chicago Midway International Airport, Chicago, Illinois 
MEM Memphis International Airport, Memphis, Tennessee 
MHT Manchester-Boston Regional Airport, Manchester, New Hampshire 
MIA Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida 
MSP Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport, Minneapolis, Minnesota  
OAK Oakland International, Oakland, California 
OMA Eppley Airfield Airport, Omaha, Nebraska 
ORD Chicago O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois 
PDX Portland International Airport, Portland, Oregon 
PHL Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
PVD Theodore Francis Green State Airport, Providence, Rhode Island 
SFO San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California 
STL Lambert-St. Louis International Airport, St. Louis, Missouri 
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2.4.2. Analysis of Data 
When analyzing the data, it was apparent that any level of aggregation only served to 
hide some of the most interesting observations in the dataset. Airline pricing policies in 
the dataset vary greatly by airline, market, peak/off peak time periods, and the number of 
days from departure. Thus, it was inappropriate to analyze the data in a way that would 
aggregate some of these important variables. Because of this, a case study approach was 
taken instead of a regression type approach. 
 An additional challenge that was encountered was determining which measure to 
use for price dispersion. Four measures of price dispersion were investigated. These 
included the standard deviation of fares, the coefficient of variation (standard deviation 
normalized by the mean), the range of fares (the difference between the highest and 
lowest fares), and the interquartile range (the difference between the 75th and 25th 
percentile fares). Each price dispersion measure gave different results about the 
magnitude of price dispersion in the market. Table 2.3 lists the 62 markets (denoted by 
the three letters of the origin airport followed by the three letters of the destination 
airport) used in this analysis, along with the airlines that fly nonstop in each market. 
Table 2.3 also includes the mean, standard deviation (SD), interquartile range (IQR), 
coefficient of variation (CV), and range for each market as reference. 
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Table 2.3: Markets, Airlines, and Summary Statistics 
Market Airlines Mean SD IQR CV Range Roundtrip Miles 
ATLEWR CO, DL, FL $299 $117 $128 0.39 $526 1,490 
ATLICT DL, FL $294 $115 $164 0.39 $682 1,554 
ATLJFK DL $332 $138 $147 0.42 $546 1,520 
ATLLGA AA, DL, FL $309 $122 $135 0.39 $576 1,522 
ATLOMA DL $1,046 $308 $100 0.29 $1,240 1,640 
BOSBWI DL, FL $225 $125 $216 0.56 $682 736 
BOSDCA AA, DL, US, UA (US) $417 $186 $273 0.45 $1,093 796 
BOSIAD UA, B6, US (UA) $261 $83 $100 0.32 $1,100 822 
BOSMCO DL, FL, B6 $310 $136 $174 0.44 $830 2,240 
BWIDFW AA $375 $168 $140 0.45 $944 2,420 
BWIPVD WN $126 $32 $15 0.25 $130 652 
DALHOU WN $128 $33 $43 0.26 $136 478 
DCADFW AA, US  $379 $180 $167 0.47 $1,110 2,380 
DENGTF UA $723 $168 $88 0.23 $995 1,246 
DENOAK UA, WN $288 $118 $226 0.41 $597 1,908 
DENSFO UA, F9, US (UA) $377 $121 $172 0.32 $525 1,930 
DFWCOS AA $307 $87 $118 0.28 $426 1,184 
DFWHOU AA $192 $51 $53 0.27 $344 496 
DFWIAH AA,CO $159 $48 $62 0.3 $206 450 
DTWBWI NW, WN $159 $68 $51 0.43 $465 816 
DTWDCA NW, US  $224 $118 $79 0.53 $866 810 
DTWIAD NW, UA $243 $116 $52 0.48 $840 766 
EWRDFW AA, CO $560 $366 $333 0.65 $1,390 2,740 
EWRDTW CO, NW $666 $219 $341 0.33 $860 972 
EWRFLL CO, B6 $223 $99 $130 0.44 $465 2,140 
EWRMCO CO, B6 $235 $101 $160 0.43 $440 1,876 
FNTLAS FL $266 $72 $79 0.27 $350 3,460 
IADDFW UA, AA $430 $204 $224 0.47 $1,076 2,340 
IAHDSM CO $921 $257 $284 0.28 $930 1,606 
INDEWR CO $628 $201 $361 0.32 $681 1,282 
INDJFK DL $440 $203 $270 0.46 $886 1,324 
INDLGA NW, US  $362 $157 $147 0.43 $920 1,314 
JFKDFW AA, DL $538 $357 $339 0.66 $1,497 2,780 
JFKDTW DL, NW $348 $150 $110 0.43 $900 1,014 
JFKFLL DL, B6 $253 $96 $80 0.38 $625 2,140 
JFKMCO DL, B6 $252 $96 $80 0.38 $1,180 1,890 
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Table 2.3: Markets, Airlines, and Summary Statistics (Continued) 
Market Airlines Mean SD IQR CV Range Roundtrip Miles 
LASLAX AA, AS (AA), DL, NW, UA, US, WN $180 $76 $80 0.42 $636 472 
LAXDEN AA, F9, AS (AA), UA, DL, US (UA) $333 $104 $67 0.31 $1,042 1,720 
LGADFW AA $537 $370 $309 0.69 $1,518 2,780 
LGADTW AA, NW, NK $302 $144 $106 0.48 $1,016 1,000 
LGAFLL AA, DL, NK, B6 $290 $177 $150 0.61 $1,329 2,160 
MDWDTW NW, WN $146 $42 $56 0.29 $302 454 
MDWEWR CO $324 $128 $140 0.4 $651 1,416 
MDWMIA FL $253 $114 $120 0.45 $610 2,360 
MEMGSO NW $675 $296 $622 0.44 $1,052 1,136 
MHTBWI WN $144 $37 $50 0.26 $130 752 
MIADCA AA $338 $208 $115 0.62 $1,108 1,842 
MIAIAD AA, UA $411 $248 $378 0.6 $1,268 1,846 
MSPMDW NW, FL $143 $45 $40 0.31 $268 696 
MSPORD AA, NW, UA, US (UA) $166 $105 $50 0.63 $1,409 666 
ORDDTW UA, NW, AA, US (UA) $167 $48 $55 0.29 $292 468 
ORDEWR AA, UA, CO $306 $98 $84 0.32 $557 1,434 
ORDJFK AA, DL, B6 $264 $114 $75 0.43 $810 1,474 
ORDLGA AA, UA $273 $95 $110 0.35 $628 1,462 
ORDMIA AA, UA, US (UA) $362 $198 $210 0.55 $1,041 2,400 
PDXSFO AA (AS), AS, NW(AS), UA, US (UA) $276 $89 $92 0.32 $1,056 1,102 
PHLMCO FL, US, UA (US), WN $250 $101 $83 0.4 $788 1,726 
PHLMHT UA (US), WN, US $197 $138 $83 0.7 $961 576 
PHLPVD UA (US), WN, US $210 $154 $99 0.73 $664 472 
STLEWR AA, CO $521 $320 $337 0.61 $1,284 1,738 
STLJFK AA, DL $562 $334 $400 0.59 $1,466 1,778 




2.5. Case Studies 
In order to investigate the effect of market structure on airfares, the sample of 62 markets 
was grouped according to the specific type of market structure that was observed on the 
route. Table 2.4 lists each of the market types (monopoly, duopoly and competitive), 
along with subcategories for each. The table discusses some of the results that were found 
for each market structure with respect to the general pricing strategies observed in the 
market, the specific carrier pricing strategies that seemed to stand out, and the degree of 
price dispersion observed. The table shows that pricing within a market is greatly 
influenced by many different characteristics of the market, including the presence of a 
LCC, the presence of multi-airport effects, leisure and business mix of passengers, 
temporal effects as the day of departure approaches, advance purchase (AP) restrictions, 
and the influence of demand (as exemplified in differences in pricing strategies between 
peak and non-peak periods). For space considerations, only the most interesting market 
structures and characteristics are chosen for detailed analysis. These sections are 
discussed in detail below. 
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Market Structure on Pricing Strategies and Price Dispersion 
Markets and Structure General Pricing Strategies Carrier Strategies Price Dispersion (PD) 
1.  Monopoly Markets (Only One Carrier Flies Nonstop) 
1a. One Major 





Generally exhibit the 
highest mean fares of 
all 62 markets. Mean 
fares have drastic 
increase as departure 
approaches for most 
markets. 
PD differs by carrier: 
increases for some 
markets and decreases 
for others as departure 
approaches.  
Has some of the 
highest standard 
deviations and lowest 
CV out of all markets 
(except DFWCOS, a 
leisure market with low 
PD). 
1b. One Major 











Mean fares similar to 
mean fares of 
duopolies with no LCC 
and similar round-trip 
distance. 
AP restrictions 
apparent for most 
markets and carriers. 
AA’s pricing out of 
LGADFW demonstrates 
the clearest AP 
restrictions. 
Mid to high PD out of 
the 62 markets (except 
DFWHOU, which is 
short-haul with low 
PD, and LGADFW, 
which has highest PD 
out of all markets).   
Peak/off-peak trends 
vary greatly. 




Flat prices as departure 
approaches. Mean fares 
tend to be lowest out of 




WN pricing curves are 
flat as departure 
approaches. FL pricing 
curves are more 
dynamic.  
PD tends to be the 
lowest out of the 62 
markets and stays 
relatively constant or 
decreases slightly as 
departure approaches. 
2. Duopolies (Two Carriers Fly Nonstop) 
2a. Two Major 









Has some of the lowest 
and highest means out 
of the 62 markets. 
Round-trip mileage 
seems to play a role, 
but not always: 
EWRDTW has highest 
mean of this group, but 
has one of the lower 
round-trip mileages. 
AP restrictions 
apparent. AA and CO 
have most clear AP 
restrictions, UA and 
US have flatter pricing. 
DL exhibits dynamic 
pricing, but AP not as 
apparent.   
PD varies significantly 
by market, ranging 
from especially low 
(DFWIAH, PDXSFO, 




2b. One Major 








Mean fares tend to be 
lower than mean fares 
of duopolies without 
LCC competition. 
AP restrictions 
apparent in almost 
every market, for every 
carrier, including LCCs 
WN, B6, FL and F9. 
Mid to low PD. PD 
trend seems to 
correspond with AP 
restrictions. PD trends 
vary greatly in 
peak/off-peak for 
BOSIAD, JFKMCO, and 
PHLMHT. 




Table 2.4: The Effect of Market Structure on Pricing Strategies and Price Dispersion 
(Continued) 
Markets and Structure General Pricing Strategies Carrier Strategies Price Dispersion (PD) 
3. Competitive Markets (Two or More Carriers Fly Nonstop) 
3a. Three Major 
Carriers (No LCC): 
BOSDCA, MSPORD, 
ORDDTW, ORDEWR 
Flat pricing as 
departure approaches 
for most markets. Low 
mean fares in MSPORD 
and ORDDTW. Mid to 
high mean fares for 
other markets. 
Pricing strategies are 
similar across airlines 
within each market, 
with the exception of 
US (UA) codeshare in 
MSPORD. 
PD low for most 
markets, except 
MSPORD. The US 
(UA) codeshare in 
MSPORD has an 
especially high PD. 
3b. Two or More 





Mid to low mean fares 
out of 62 markets. 
Similar pricing 
strategies across 
airlines within a 
market. DL has 
dynamic pricing in 
LAXDEN. 
Mid PD for most 
markets, except 
LASLAX which is a 
short-haul market with 
low PD.   
3c. One Major 
Carrier, Two LCCs: 
BOSMCO, PHLMCO 
Mid mean fares out of 
the 62 markets.  
Similar pricing 
strategies across 
airlines within each 
market. DL is more 
dynamic. 
Mid PD. PD trends are 
similar for peak/off-
peak periods and are 
rather flat as departure 
approaches.  




2.5.1. The Case of Advance Purchase Restrictions 
Evidence of advance purchase price restrictions was found in several markets in the 
sample. Here we compare two markets that both originate at Lambert-St. Louis 
International Airport in St. Louis, Missouri. The market from St. Louis to Newark 
Liberty International Airport in Newark, New Jersey (STLEWR) has a step-like trend as 
the day of departure approaches, indicating that prices change in increments as the day of 
the flight departure nears. Figure 2.1 demonstrates price dispersion for each airline as the 
range of fares (defined as the difference between the maximum and minimum lowest 
daily nonstop airfares observed for each carrier for the set of departure dates) as the day 
of departure approaches8. The peak and off-peak periods have been separated to illustrate 
how demand influences price dispersion. For this market, the off-peak period for both 
AA and CO have a step-like trend, indicating the presence of advance purchase 
restrictions. This implies that the airlines are trying to distinguish between business and 
leisure customers. However, a step-like movement of prices is less obvious for the peak 
period in this market, as the movement of prices is more dynamic.  On the other hand, the 
market from St. Louis to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City 
(STLJFK) has advance purchase requirements that are not as obvious in either the peak or 
off-peak periods. 
 






8 In all of the following figures, price dispersion is defined in the same way: as the range of fares (i.e., the 
difference between the maximum and minimum lowest daily nonstop airfares observed for each carrier for 




Figure 2.1: Price Dispersion by Market, Airline, Peak/Off-Peak for Two Markets with 














1 5 10 15 20 25 30
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 1 5 10 15 20 25 30
STLEWR_AA, offpeak STLEWR_AA, peak STLEWR_CO, offpeak
STLEWR_CO, peak STLJFK_AA, offpeak STLJFK_AA, peak




















2.5.2. The Case of Business vs. Leisure Markets 
Differences between pricing in business and leisure markets were observed in the data. 
Chicago to New York markets represent a predominately business route and includes 
ORDEWR, ORDJFK, and ORDLGA. New York to Florida markets represent 
predominately leisure routes and include EWRFLL, EWRMCO, JFKFLL, and JFKMCO. 
The Chicago to New York and New York to Florida markets were chosen for analysis 
due to the similar round-trip distances across the markets, as well as the presence of a 
LCC (JetBlue) in the markets. In comparing the business and leisure routes, the overall 
means of each market are similar, with the business routes exhibiting slightly higher 
average prices (as shown in the “Mean” column of Table 2.3). The overall price 
dispersions of both the business and leisure routes are also quite similar (as shown in the 
SD, IQR, CV, And Range columns of Table 2.3). The main difference between the 
business and leisure routes is the different pricing trends observed during the peak and 
off-peak periods, which is demonstrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 (note that both figures 
have the same Y-axis scale for comparison purposes). Figure 2.2 shows that in the 
business markets, the peak pricing is dynamic and is different than the flatter pricing 
observed in the off-peak period. On the other hand, Figure 2.3 shows that in the leisure 
markets, the peak pricing is less dynamic and is similar to the flat pricing observed during 
the off-peak period. An additional observation is that when looking at the carrier-level 
effects, JetBlue seems to demonstrate less dynamic pricing than the major carriers (AA, 
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2.5.3. The Case of Codeshare Markets 
In the sample of 62 markets, codeshares were represented for 12 markets. In some of 
these markets, the marketing carrier seemed to mimic the pricing strategies of the 
operating carrier. However, there were two extreme cases where this was not the case. 
When comparing MSPORD and ORDDTW, the markets look similar. Both markets have 
the same nonstop competitors (AA, NW, and UA) and also have the same codesharing 
airline (US sells fares on flights that UA operates). Additionally, they are both hub-to-
hub, short-haul flights with similar round-trip mileage. Further, mean prices in these 
markets are almost identical ($166 and $167, as shown in Table 2.3). However, the level 
of price dispersion for these two markets differs dramatically, where MSPORD has low 
price dispersion and ORDDTW has high price dispersion. Upon further investigation of 
these markets, it is apparent that the codeshare in MSPORD is driving the high price 
dispersion. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the price dispersion of each airline as the day of 
departure approaches. All airlines exhibit flat pricing with low price dispersion, except 
the codeshare in MSPORD, which is significantly higher than the other airlines.  
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 A similar phenomenon is also found in the PDXSFO market. In this market the 
pricing strategies of AS and its codeshares with both AA and NW (AA and NW sell fares 
on flights that AS operates) all exhibit similar pricing and means. However, UA and its 
codeshare with US (US sells fares on flights that UA operates) exhibit extremely 
different pricing strategies. The mean prices for the US/UA codeshare are four times 
higher than the mean prices for all other flights in the market, including the UA flights. 
One reason for this high price could be due to the underlying revenue management 
system. That is, instead of showing “no availability” for a codeshare partner, the system 
displays a fare that is significantly higher than the fares of the operating carrier, 
effectively shutting off codeshare sales.    
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2.5.4. The Case of Monopoly Markets 
In the sample of 62 markets, three types of monopoly markets existed:  
 1a. One major carrier flies nonstop in the market with no apparent multi-airport effects,  
    1b. One major carrier flies nonstop in the market with observable multi-airport effects, 
    1c. One LCC flies nonstop in the market.  
Each type of monopoly exhibits different price dispersions, average prices, and carrier 
pricing strategies. What is interesting is that out of all of the different market structures, 
the two most extreme cases on both sides of the spectrum are both monopoly cases. More 
specifically, monopolies with one major carrier and no multi-airport effects exhibit the 
highest fares and highest price dispersion out of the entire sample, while monopolies with 
a LCC exhibit the lowest prices and lowest price dispersion out of the entire sample. 
 Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 demonstrate price dispersion as the day of departure 
approaches for each type of monopoly (holding the scale of the Y-axis the same across 
the three figures for comparison). In these figures, the peak and off-peak periods have 
been separated in order to demonstrate how demand influences price dispersion. In 
monopolies with one major carrier and no multi-airport effects, price dispersion is often 
different for the peak and off-peak periods. For example, price dispersion in the 
ATLOMA market for the off-peak period increases as the day of departure approaches, 
but in the peak period the price dispersion decreases down to zero for the last two days 
before flight departure, so that there is only one price offered. This could be the influence 
of advance purchase restrictions. On the other hand, the price dispersion in the DENGTF 
market for the off-peak period decreases to nearly zero as the day of departure 
approaches, but in the peak period the price dispersion increases as the day of departure 
approaches.  
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 In monopolies with one major carrier and multi-airport effects (type 1a), the mean 
fares are often lower than those of major carrier monopolies without multi-airport effects 
(type 1b), as seen in Table 2.3. The price dispersions of these types of monopolies can 
also be different for the peak and off-peak periods, as exemplified in BWIDFW, 
INDEWR, and especially STLLGA. One interesting observation is the extremely low and 
flat price dispersion of DFWHOU as the day of departure approaches. One thing that 
could influence this is the fact that DFWHOU is a short-haul market with a round-trip 
distance much shorter that the other markets in this category of monopoly; DFW is a hub 
for Southwest, and it is also one of Southwest’s original routes. Another interesting 
market is LGADFW which actually has the highest price dispersion out of all 62 markets 
in the dataset.  In this market, advance purchase requirements are apparent for both peak 
and off-peak periods.  
 Finally, in monopolies with a LCC as the only nonstop competitor (type 1c), both 
price dispersion and the average fares are significantly lower than the major carrier 
monopolies, and are also lower than most of the other markets in the sample of 62 
markets. For the most part, the price dispersion as the day of departure approaches stays 
flat or decreases slightly for both peak and off-peak periods. This type of pricing seems to 
be an anomaly for a monopoly market where higher average prices could be charged. 
BWIPVD, DALHOU, MHTBWI are all short-haul markets flown by Southwest and 
exhibit extremely flat pricing. The flat pricing on these markets could be due to 
Southwest’s business model, or could also be due to the fact that they are all short-haul 
markets. FNTLAS and MDWMIA are long-haul markets flown by Air Tran. In these two 
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markets, the average prices are higher and the price dispersion is more dynamic as the 




Figure 2.5: Price Dispersion by Market, Airline, Peak/Off-Peak for Major Carrier 
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Figure 2.7: Price Dispersion by Market, Airline, Peak/Off-Peak for Low Cost Carrier 
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2.5.5. The Case of Competitive Markets with Two Low Cost Carriers 
Head-to-head competition by two nonstop LCCs within a market occurs rarely in the U.S. 
and primarily occurs in leisure markets (mainly to Florida destinations). Data was 
collected for BOSMCO and PHLMCO, which are both leisure markets to Orlando. When 
comparing these two markets to all of the other markets in the sample, the overall price 
dispersion tends to be towards the middle of the sample. The price dispersion and means 
of these two markets are similar to those of competitive markets with two or more major 
carriers and one LCC. Figure 2.8 illustrates that as the day of departure approaches, the 
price dispersion tends to be rather flat for both the peak and off-peak periods, especially 
for the LCCs. The pricing trends are more dynamic for the major carriers, DL and US. In 
41 
 
these two markets, the peak and off-peak periods exhibit similar pricing trends. This 
observation is similar to the findings of the business vs. leisure case study, which found 
that in the leisure market the peak pricing was less dynamic and was similar to the pricing 
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2.6. Implications for Public Policy 
In this study, observations were made using disaggregate data on a sample of 62 markets 
that cover a broad range of market structures. Some of the most important points that 
were shown include the following:  
• Low price dispersion can be associated with both low and high market 
concentration, depending on the characteristics of the market. This finding 
contrasts with the findings of past research on price dispersion. 
• When a low cost carrier is the only airline competing nonstop on a route, the 
monopoly route functions differently than a monopoly with a major carrier. Even 
in a monopoly situation, low cost carriers (especially Southwest) demonstrate flat 
pricing and price dispersion as the day of departure approaches.  
• As the day of departure approaches, price dispersion can either increase or 
decrease.  
• Peak and off-peak periods often demonstrate different pricing strategies, 
highlighting the importance of jointly examining price and demand. 
• Major carriers tend to exhibit more dynamic pricing strategies than those of low 
cost carriers, suggesting the former are targeting both business and leisure 
customers. 
• Markets with codeshares (specifically codeshares between US and UA) 
sometimes exhibit unusually high price dispersion on the airline that is selling 
tickets for a flight operated by another airline.  
The results of this study could be used to support analysis of mergers and acquisitions, 




competition and the assessment of consumer welfare benefits. For example, this paper 
has shown that there are certain instances when monopoly routes exhibit lower price 
dispersion and lower average prices than competitive routes, as is the case of monopoly 
routes with one nonstop low cost carrier. These differences in monopoly routes highlight 
the importance of understanding price dispersion at the detailed, disaggregate level when 
analyzing the impact of future mergers and acquisitions. 
 Perhaps most importantly from a public policy perspective, this paper shows the 
importance of disaggregate data that describe individual airline behavior. Much public 
policy discussion and analysis relies on average market values that can hide important 
market behavior. With the advent of internet-based ticketing, a powerful tool now exists 
that can be used to understand some of the finer detail of airline markets and competition. 
 
2.7. Future Research 
In future research efforts, there is a need for disaggregate demand data in order to link 
pricing strategies with demand as the day of departure approaches. This could be 
accomplished by pulling seat maps off of the internet while collecting airfares online. 
There is also an obvious need for more research, at the disaggregate level, on how 
codesharing affects pricing within a market. As more and more airlines begin to use 
codeshares, understanding the impacts on the market will become more important. There 
is also a need to link price dispersion to individual revenue management practices of 
airlines, as there appears to be evidence of more price dispersion in airlines with complex 
revenue management systems. Additionally, in future research efforts, it would be helpful 




were actually purchased. In doing this, market sizes, carrier shares and average fares for 
each carrier could also be obtained from the ticket sample. 
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CHAPTER 3: PRODUCT DEBUNDLING 
 
Garrow, L.A., Hotle, S. and Mumbower, S. (2012) Assessment of product debundling 
trends in the U.S. airline industry: Customer service and public policy 




This paper reviews product debundling trends that have occurred in the U.S. airline 
industry. Multiple sources of ancillary fees related to ticketing refunds and exchanges, 
checked baggage, on-board pets, preferred and/or advanced seating assignments, frequent 
flyer ticket redemptions, and day of departure standby policies are reviewed. Despite the 
fact that both low cost and network carriers stress the importance of future ancillary fees 
in their investor reports, our assessment suggests that these fees will be more broadly 
adopted by low cost carriers. We anticipate that many network carriers will eliminate 
ancillary fees, particularly as they begin to recognize how these fees can impact other 
system performance objectives such as minimizing the number of misconnecting 
passengers. We estimate that the debundling phenomenon has diluted revenues to the 






3.2. Introduction  
The airline industry is fiercely competitive. Since deregulation (which in the United 
States occurred in 1978), the airline industry has faced a series of financial challenges 
and has struggled to maintain profitability. For example, according to the Air Transport 
Association, in the first 30 years after passenger deregulation, domestic airline prices fell 
41.2 percent in real terms (2010). Numerous factors have contributed to this decrease, 
most notably the increased market penetration of low cost carriers combined with the 
increased use of the internet as a major distribution channel (which makes it easier for 
customers to find the lowest fares). For example, in 1998, approximately one percent of 
domestic leisure flight tickets were sold through the internet. In 2005, this number was 35 
percent (Brunger and Perelli, 2008). 
 The first decade of the 21st century was especially challenging for major U.S. 
airlines. Faced with increased market penetration of low cost carriers, unprecedented fuel 
costs, continued security threats post 9/11, health outbreaks (SARS, H1N1), economic 
recessions, and the global financial crisis, it is no surprise that in the first decade of the 
21st century, the seven largest U.S. network carriers (Alaska, American, Continental, 
Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways) collectively lost $35.1 billion (U.S. DOT, 
2010). We define largest using total number of passengers carried in 2006. However, the 
seven largest low cost carriers (AirTran, American West, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, 
Southwest, and Spirit) earned $4.9 billion; and the seven largest regional carriers 
(American Eagle, Atlantic Southeast, Comair, ExpressJet, Mesa, Pinnacle, and SkyWest) 
earned $5.3 billion during this time period. This decade also saw customer satisfaction 




long security lines (Carpenter, 2008). From 2001-2005, four out of the seven largest 
network carriers went into bankruptcy (Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways); and 
from 2005-2011, eight major U.S. carriers went through mergers/acquisitions (America 
West and US Airways in 2005; Delta and Northwest in 2008; Continental and United in 
2010; Southwest and AirTran in 2011). 
 These statistics need to be viewed with some caution, however, as they only paint 
a portion of the full story of the structural market changes that have happened over the 
past decade. That is, although it is true that from 2000-2009, the total domestic available 
seat miles (ASMs) by U.S. passenger carriers dropped by 2.7 percent, it is important to 
recognize that domestic ASMs fell by 7.2 percent whereas international ASMs grew by 
12.1 percent (U.S. DOT, 2010). Further, network carriers – Alaska, American, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways – moved much of their capacity 
from domestic to international markets, reducing their domestic capacity by 23.8 percent 
and increasing their international capacity by 7.4 percent. In contrast, low cost carriers – 
AirTran, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, and Spirit – increased their domestic capacity by 
103 percent and began to provide international service9 (U.S. DOT, 2010). As of 2009, 
the major network carriers concentrated 62.8 percent of their ASMs in domestic markets 
(compared to 70.4 percent in 2000), whereas the low cost carriers concentrated 96.5 
percent of their ASMs in domestic markets (compared to 99.1 percent in 2000) (U.S. 






9 The other two major low cost carriers noted earlier – ATA Airlines and America West – are not included 




DOT, 2010). Consequently, as of 2009, Southwest became the largest domestic U.S. 
carrier in terms of total passengers (Southwest Airlines, 2009a). 
 The last decade in particular has been one of the most dynamic periods in airline 
history, with 2008 being especially challenging due to major economic events occurring 
outside the airline industry that raised costs and reduced demand. During 2008, oil prices 
soared to more than $130/barrel (CNN, 2010); and the global economic crisis hit, 
dropping the Dow Jones market value by 33.8 percent, the third worst calendar year 
performance on record (2002, the fifteenth worst calendar year performance on record, 
experienced a loss of approximately 18 percent) (Seeking Alpha, 2009). Further, major 
airlines had implemented many cost-cutting and revenue-generating measures during the 
early 2000s as part of their bankruptcy restructuring and merger processes. However, the 
large market penetration of the internet, combined with low cost carrier competition, 
hindered the ability to raise fares to a level that could overcome the “perfect storm” that 
emerged in 2008: soaring fuel costs followed immediately by plummeting demand. 
Consequently, “2009 proved to be the worst year on record for U.S. airlines, in terms of 
year-over-year revenue declines” (Southwest Airlines, 2009b). 
 In times of crisis, though, innovation often occurs. In the authors’ opinion, 2009 
represents one of the fastest and most wide-spread (and bumpiest) implementations of 
new ancillary revenue streams in airline history. That is, new ancillary revenue sources, 
including checked baggage, seat reservation fees, and food for sale were introduced in the 
late 2000s. In addition, many existing ancillary fees, including fees for redeeming 




domestic and international ticketing exchange fees, on-board checked pet fees, and 
unaccompanied minor fees were increased. 
  This paper reviews the debundling trends that are occurring in the U.S. airline 
market and discusses potential policy and customer service implications. 
 
3.3. Methodology 
Several sources of data were used for this analysis. Information pertaining to carriers’ 
products was obtained from airline websites, carriers’ contracts of carriage, and 
reservation agents during the last two weeks of May, 2010. All mainline carriers serving 
destinations predominately in the continental United States with annual operating 
revenues exceeding $1 billion were included in the analysis. Using these criteria, 
Hawaiian Airlines as well as American Eagle and SkyWest were excluded from the 
analysis. An additional low cost carrier, Virgin America, was also included in the 
analysis in order to examine the product differentiation strategies of a relatively new 
carrier operating under the low cost model10.  
 In gathering information, discrepancies were found within the same airline 
website. When these discrepancies were identified, they were resolved by calling airline 
ticketing agents. In several cases, we were able to further clarify the underlying 
motivations driving the debundling trends through interviews with airline managers. 






10 Spirit Airlines is another smaller low cost carrier that was considered for analysis, but was ultimately 




These interviews underscored the importance of examining current and historic 
debundling trends in the context of prevailing market conditions. Thus, when interpreting 
these trends, it was often helpful to include information pertaining to carriers not included 
in the detailed product assessment analysis. 
   Due to the many changes carriers are making to their fee structures, it is possible 
that some of the information obtained from the websites will change rapidly. 
Nonetheless, a comparative analysis based on this information provides important 
insights into how different carriers are approaching ancillary revenues and, consequently, 
enables one to infer likely policy and customer service implications. 
 
3.4. U.S. Airline Market Characteristics  
Before describing how carriers have debundled their products, it is useful to review the 
current structure of the U.S. airline industry, particularly as it relates to airlines’ customer 
segmentation strategies. Table 3.1 illustrates key differences among major and low cost 
carriers. The first six airlines in the table represent major legacy network carriers (sorted 
by size) that serve a wide range of both domestic and international destinations. All of 
these carriers participate in well-established alliances that enable them to further increase 
the number of destinations they can serve. These major carriers also tend to have a 
moderate number of other airline partners that further enhance their networks. Due to the 
fact that these partnerships frequently change, it is difficult to pinpoint a precise estimate 
of the number of non-alliance partners from information provided on the carriers’ 




 It is important to note that the four largest network carriers use a round-trip 
pricing strategy whereas the two smallest network carriers use a one-way pricing 
strategy. Round-trip pricing enables carriers to segment the market through offering 
lower prices to (predominately price-sensitive leisure) customers who travel over a 
Saturday and/or spend more than two days at a destination. Travelers who do not meet 
these criteria are more likely to be time-sensitive business travelers who are willing to 
pay more for their airline tickets. One-way pricing occurs when customers receive 
separate price quotes for their departing and returning itineraries. It is interesting to 
observe that the two smallest network carriers, US Airways and Alaska Airlines, despite 
their “legacy” characteristics, use one-way prices. It is also clear that when the United-
Continental merger is complete, US Airways will be in a unique (and possibly difficult) 
position – substantially smaller than the network carriers with a pricing structure that 
mimics low cost carriers (which is better for targeting leisure customers), yet with a 
strong international presence (which is better for targeting business customers). 
 
Table 3.1: U.S. Airline Characteristics 











Network Carriers        
     Delta 368 66 6206 SkyTeam (10+) 5+ Round-trip  
     American 250 40 3400 Oneworld (10+) 10+ Round-trip  
     United 230 25 3300 Star (25+) 5+ Round-trip  
     Continental  269 55 2700 Star (25+) 5++ Round-trip  
     US Airways 205 31 3134 Star (25+) 5+ One-way  
     Alaska 61 1 297 None 10+ One-way  
Low Cost Carriers        
     Southwest 69 1 3300 None 1a One-way  
     AirTran 71 5 700 None 1b One-way  
     JetBlue 61 11 650 None <5 One-way  
     Frontier 73 3 350 None <5 One-way  
     Virgin America 8 2 94 None <5 One-way  
a Southwest is finalizing an agreement with Volaris to serve Mex arkets in 2010. ican m




 The next four carriers in the table (Southwest, AirTran, JetBlue, and Frontier) 
represent large low cost carriers. A smaller low cost carrier, Virgin America, is also 
included to illustrate how some new entry carriers operating under the low cost model are 
attempting to differentiate themselves from Southwest Airlines. The first thing to notice 
is that Southwest Airlines dominates the low cost carrier market, and in fact has a greater 
number of daily flights than US Airways and Alaska Airlines. None of the low cost 
carriers are part of international alliances, and the number of international destinations 
served is small. This is because the equipment types typically operated by the low cost 
carriers can only fly short distances without refueling, which effectively limits the 
international markets that can be served to destinations in Canada, Central America, and 
the Caribbean. Interestingly, the number of destinations served by the four largest low 
cost carriers is approximately the same, which implies the key difference among these 
carriers is flight frequency. The low cost carriers differ in the number of non-alliance 
partners, with the two largest – Southwest and AirTran – leaning towards being 
independent (although partners within Canada and Mexico are seen as highly valuable).  
The different mix of business and leisure customers served by these airlines is also 
clearly observed by comparing their frequent flyer programs. Table 3.2 summarizes the 
different flyer categories among those carriers in Table 3.1 that provide one or more elite 
levels (those carriers not shown have only one flyer category). The number of tiers, 
yearly qualification criteria (expressed as a minimum number of flight segments and/or 
qualification miles), and bonus mileage percentages are shown. Clearly, network carriers 
are targeting business customers and are designing their programs such that the most elite 






level of memberships is by invitation only, and the specific qualification criteria are not 
public. The top elite level among the low cost carriers is equivalent to the second elite tier 
of the network carriers. 
 In the context of the recent debundling phenomena, the design of elite tiers is 
particularly relevant, as higher elite levels represent customers who travel more 
frequently (and typically generate a large percentage of a carrier’s revenues). Further, 
network carriers that serve a large number of domestic and international destinations are 
better able to attract these frequent travelers. This is often accomplished through 
corporate volume agreements in which a carrier offers a discount to a corporation in 
exchange for the corporation directing a minimum number of trips to the carrier. Due to 
the presence of these high-valued customers and the ability of network carriers to attract a 
larger proportion of these customers, network and low cost carriers have adopted 
different debundling strategies. Specifically, as seen in the next section, many of these 
elite customers are exempted from paying fees.  
 
 
Table 3.2: Frequent Flyer Elite Membership Tiers, Yearly Qualifications, and Bonus Miles Percentages 
 Tier 1 Seg Miles Bonus Tier 2 Seg Miles Bonus Tier 3 Seg Miles Bonus Tier 4 Seg Miles Bonus 
Unitedd Premier 30 25K 25% Premier 
Executive 




Continental Silver 30 25K 25% Gold 60 50K 100% Platinum 90 75K 100% Presidential 
Platinum 
Not availablec 
Delta Silver 30 25K 25% Gold 60 50K 100% Platinum 100 75K 100% Diamond 140 125K 125% 
US Airways Silver 30 25K 25% Gold 60 50K 50% Platinum 90 75K 75% Chairman 120 100K 100% 
American Gold 30 25K 25% Platinum 60 50K 100% Executive 
Platinum 
100 100K 100%     
Alaska MVP 30 20K 50% MVP 
Gold 
60 40K 100%         
Frontier Ascent 20 15K 25%a Summit 30 25K 50%         
AirTran A+ 
Rewards 
25b -- n No  e             
a Bonus is also driven by fare class; 150% of miles for Classic Plus fares, 125% of miles for Classic fares and 100% of miles flown for Summit members. 
b Can also qualify by flying 10 segments in 90 days. 
c Program for Presidential Platinum Elites on Continental announced on 1/1/10 and appears to include minimum travel spend criteria in addition to Platinum 
status. No additional benefits for Presidential noted on website. 
d United also has a lower Premier level called “Premier Associate” that can be designated or nominated through marketing, promotions, etc. The benefits of this 
are priority check-in/boarding and access to Economy Plus. 
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3.5. Rapid Debundling 
This section reviews how airlines have created ancillary sources of revenue through 
debundling their products. Before reviewing these ancillary sources of revenue, it is 
helpful to distinguish between new and established fees and look at the definition of 
“new” in the context of a specific carrier, Southwest. 
 Table 3.3 summarizes major sources of ancillary revenues that have been 
collected through fees. The fees are organized into three main categories. The first 
category includes those fees that are the most established (and that customers typically 
expect to pay for). Some of these fees, most notably ticket exchange fees, are well 
established and existed before deregulation. On-board pet fees, unaccompanied minor 
fees, and day of departure standby fees are other examples of fees that are well-
established within the U.S. airline industry. 
 The second category represents fees for services that used to be free to consumers. 
These include fees for making ticket changes through an agent, fees for redeeming 
mileage award tickets, checked baggage fees, seat reservation fees, and food for sale. 
Given these fees were once “free” to customers (in the sense that they were bundled into 
the ticket price), one would expect these fees to generate the majority of customer 
complaints. These are also the fees that would likely have the most difficulty surviving in 
the long-term. 
 The final category represents those fees that were imposed on newly introduced 
services such as live TV, personal movies, and on-board amenity packs. On-board food 
purchases can also be grouped into this category, as they represent the introduction of 
new product offerings distinct from the free meals that were eliminated for the majority 
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of domestic flights. Given these fees were introduced at the same time as the new 
services, airlines did not set customers’ expectations that these services would be free. 
Thus, we would expect that customer reactions to these fees would not be as negative as 
the reaction to the fees imposed on services that used to be free.  
 
Table 3.3: Overview of Major Fees and Southwest’s Approach to “New” Fees 
Fee Southwest’s Implementation 
Most established  
     Ticket exchange  
     Day of departure standby Established fee: difference between fare purchased 
and fare available on the day of departure 
     On-board pets New fee 
     Unaccompanied minor New fee 
Fees for services that used to be free  
     Agent-assisted ticketing  
     Mileage redemption  
     Baggage  
     Seat reservation New – early check-in/first boarding zone 
     Food-for-sale  
Fees on newly introduced services  
     In-flight entertainment   
     On-board amenity packages  
 
 
 It is interesting to examine these fees in the context of Southwest’s approach to 
establishing “new” sources of ancillary revenues. A clear pattern emerges when looking 
at where and how Southwest has introduced “new” fees – namely, all fees introduced 
have been implemented at the same time as a new service is introduced. In the context of 
on-board pets and unaccompanied minors, these fees were already well-established 
within the industry, which made it more likely Southwest customers would be willing to 
accept these fees when it rolled out these “new” services to its customers.  In the context 
of seat reservation fees, Southwest also introduced a new service –online early check-in– 




does not have assigned seating, this fee essentially provides customers with the ability to 
secure premium aisle and window seats. 
 The importance of these new revenue streams introduced in 2009 by Southwest 
Airlines is obvious. Southeast posted a net income of $99 million in 2009 (Southwest 
Airlines, 2009b). To put this in context, Southwest’s Early Bird Check-in generated $15 
million in four months and P.A.W.S. (Pets Are Welcome on Southwest) transported 
60,000 pets in the first seven months, generating $5 million (Southwest Airlines, 2009b). 
An Unaccompanied Minor program was also implemented in 2009 (Southwest Airlines, 
2010a). 
 These examples highlight the breadth of “old” and “new” fees that airlines have 
looked to as a potential source of increasing revenues. The examination of Southwest’s 
introduction on new fees also sheds light on the strategy it has used to introduce fees 
without distancing its customers – explicitly tying the introduction of a fee to a new 
service offering. The remainder of this section examines three of the key sources of 
ancillary revenue in depth: ticket exchange fees, baggage fees, and seat reservation fees. 
 
3.5.1. Ticket Exchange Fees 
Since 2008, there has been a rapid debundling of products and services that used to be 
included in the base fare (defined as the portion of the fare that ties directly to airlines’ 
operating revenues, i.e., the base fare excludes taxes and fees imposed by the 
government). One of the most well-recognized and established fees involves ticket 
exchanges. Table 3.4 summarizes current domestic exchange fees. In some cases, 




call center, airport agent, or city ticket office. For example, in the case of Alaska Airlines 
and Virgin America, the domestic exchange fee is $75 if the exchange is made online, 
$100 otherwise. The $25 additional surcharge is higher than the $15 “standard” fee for 
booking a ticket through a call center, which may be due to the added complexity and 
time that is typically associated with processing an exchange.  
Table 3.4 also highlights a trend that will be seen across most implementations of 
ancillary fees: the predominant use of waivers for elite members and/or those customers 
purchasing higher fares. We will return to this point in our discussion of a U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) Proposed Ruling that seeks to have carriers 
customize websites to perform “all inclusive” searches, as fee exemptions linked to fares 
and/or status may create substantial implementation difficulties. 
 
Table 3.4: Ticketing/Agent Assisted Fees and Exchange Fees 
 Ticketing/Agent 
Assisted Fees 




Network Carriers    
     Delta $20 ($35) Diamond, Platinum, Gold $150 
     American $20 ($30) Executive Platinum $150 
     United $25 ($30) 1K, Global Services $150 
     Continental $25 Platinum $150 
     US Airways $25 ($35) Preferred $150 
     Alaska $15 ($25) None $75/$100b 
Low Cost Carriers    
     Southwest N/A N/A N/A 
     AirTran $15 Elites $75a 
     JetBlue $15 None $100 
     Frontier $25 Elites 
Classic/Classic Plus fares 
$50 Classic fares 
$100 Economy fares 
     Virgin Am. $15 None $75/$100c 
KEY: Call center fee (airport agent/city ticket office fee). 
aOnly business fares are refundable. Elites purchasing Y, B, M fares receive free exchanges/refunds. 
bSome web tickets may not be exchanged. If fee applies, charge is $75 online, $100 otherwise. 





Although carriers were not required to report exchange and cancellation fees until 
the late 2000s, three major network carriers (Alaska, United, and Northwest) and two low 
cost carriers (Frontier and JetBlue) have reported these revenues annually from 2000-
2009. The trends in exchange and cancellation fees for these network and low cost 
carriers are shown in Figure 3.1.  In general, ticketing fees expressed as a percent of total 
operating revenue have increased during the last decade across (non-Southwest) LCC 
















































Figure 3.1: Exchange and Cancellation Revenues as Percentage of Total Operating Revenue 
 
 
Historically, Southwest Airlines has not charged customers fees to exchange their 
tickets; i.e., customers who desire to make a change pay only the applicable difference in 




for Southwest shown in Figure 3.2 (the fares shown represent the lowest one-way fares 
Southwest offered for flights departing on Monday, November 19, 2007, from Las Vegas 
to Los Angeles). For ease of interpretation, assume this price curve applies to all flights 
and departure dates Southwest offers from Las Vegas to Los Angeles. Next, assume a 
customer purchases a departing flight 21 days in advance of flight departure (for $54), 
but the day the flight departs becomes ill and cannot travel. The customer rebooks the 
outbound flight for the next day, but is now purchasing a ticket one day in advance of 
departure when the prevailing fare is $104. The customer does not pay a “fee” to 
exchange the ticket for the different departure date but must pay the difference between 
the 21-day advance purchase fare and the one-day advance purchase fare ($104-$54 = 
$50). Thus, although Southwest does not charge a fee for the ability to change a ticket (as 
many U.S. carriers do for their low-yield coach tickets), Southwest is likely to gain 
additional revenues when passengers need to change their tickets near the flight 
departure. However, U.S. carriers do not explicitly report the additional revenue 
generated due to these “fare differences” to the U.S. DOT, making it impossible to 
compare how this source of ticketing revenue differs across carriers. 
The discussion of ticketing exchange and cancellation fees is an example of how 
U.S. carriers have looked to increase ancillary revenues through increasing established 
fees. Further, given Southwest has historically not charged fees for customers to 
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Figure 3.2: Southwest’s One-Way Pricing from Las Vegas to Los Angeles 
 
 
3.5.2. Baggage Fees 
Whereas ticketing exchange and refund fees represent a more established source of 
ancillary revenues, in the past 24 to 36 months many new ancillary fees were also 
implemented. One of the largest sources of revenue was derived from the implementation 
of checked-baggage fees. 
 Although the majority of U.S. airlines implemented fees for the first checked bag 
in 2008, two major low cost airlines – Southwest and JetBlue – elected not to charge fees. 
Specifically, as of June, 2010, Southwest did not charge for the first two checked bags of 
standard size and weight, and JetBlue did not charge for the first checked bag of standard 




 Expressed as a percentage of operating income, baggage fees for overweight, 
oversized, and/or extra bags remained relatively constant on Southwest, modestly 
increasing from 0.21 percent to 0.26 percent from 2007 to 2009. However, among all 
U.S. passenger airlines, baggage fees more than quadrupled, from 0.55 percent to 2.4 
percent of operating income, over this same time period. The reliance on baggage fees as 
a source of revenue is particularly striking among the low cost carriers (excluding 
Southwest and JetBlue). For example, in 2009, baggage fees represented an equivalent of 
between 5.0 percent - 6.7 percent of the operating revenues for AirTran, Frontier, Spirit, 
and Sun Country. In contrast, among the major U.S. airlines (Alaska, American, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, and United), baggage fees grew from a baseline of 0.3-0.6 
percent of operating revenue in 2007 to 1.6-2.4 percent in 2009. JetBlue, which 
implemented a one-free bag checked policy, falls more in line with the growth seen 
among the major carriers, showing a growth from 0.5 percent of operating revenue in 
2007 to 2.0 percent in 2009. US Airways also experienced faster-than-usual growth 
compared to the major airlines, growing from 0.3 percent of operating revenue in 2007 to 
4.0 percent in 2009 (U.S. DOT, 2010). 
 Although it is relatively easy to quantify revenue gained by those carriers who 
introduced baggage fees, it is not easy to quantify revenue and market share shifts due to 
the customers’ decision to travel on Southwest and/or JetBlue, which did not implement 
fees for the first checked bag. Southwest Airlines noted that in 2009, that “we launched 
an aggressive television advertising campaign to affirm that Bags Fly Free only on 
Southwest [and] experienced a domestic market share shift worth close to a billion 




analysis from independent data sources. However, if we believe Southwest Airlines’ 
analysis, then debundling baggage fees from the price of the ticket may have created 
value for the industry as a whole. That is, unlike many other product implementations, 
such as “wifi” service where one carrier may see a short-lived first-mover market share 
advantage before all other carriers match service, the way in which carriers implemented 
baggage fees reflect a unique market segmentation. Whereas Southwest Airlines reported 
that it may have shifted an equivalent of $1 billion in passenger revenues from the other 
carriers in 2009, other U.S. carriers collectively generated $2 billion in incremental 
baggage revenues (U.S. DOT, 2010); i.e., a net benefit of approximately $1 billion 
appears to have been generated through baggage fees for the U.S. airline industry as a 
whole. Even if Southwest’s analysis is overstated, what is clear is that it has not been 
willing to charge customers fees for services that at one time were offered for free or 
bundled in the ticket price. In the case of baggage fees, Southwest would likely be able to 
generate additional short-term revenues in excess of $1 billion a year by matching other 
carriers’ baggage fee policies. However, it does not appear willing to implement a 
baggage fee due to longer-term revenue impacts associated with losing repeat customers 
to other airlines and/or of losing its unique brand identity. 
 There is another point that is particularly interesting in the context of baggage 
fees, namely how quickly these fees were rolled out – and how quickly they were 
increased and matched by competitors as airlines began to recognize their potential for 
revenue generation. Table 3.5 shows one-way checked baggage and pet fees for several 
major U.S. carriers as of June 1, 2010, and Table 3.6 shows changes that occurred from 




carriers (Delta, American, United, Continental, US Airways) have aligned their first and 
second checked baggage fees; whereas there is variability among the low cost carriers (in 
terms of how they position themselves in the market; that is most likely to compete 
against the generous baggage policies of JetBlue and Southwest). What is most 
interesting in Table 3.6 (and can be seen throughout other implementations of ancillary 
fees) is that due to the speed in which these fees were rolled out to the market, it appears 
that technology and/or human resource constraints were encountered and limited pre-
market testing was conducted. For example, in the case of checked baggage fees, it 
appears that Continental initially charged for checked-bags when customers checked in 
online, but not at the airport; note the $0 fare for airport check-in in Table 3.6 
(Continental, 2010b).  
 
Table 3.5: One-Way Checked Baggage and Pet Fees as of June 1, 2010 
Checked bag 1st 2nd 3rd 4th-5th 6th-10th On-board Pet Checked Pet 
Network Carriers         
     Delta $25 ($23) $35 ($32) $125 $200 $200 $125 $200 
     American $25 $35 $100 $100 $200 $100 $150 
     United $25 ($23) $35 ($32) $100 $100 $200 $150 $250 
     Continental $25 ($23) $35 ($32) $100 $100 $100 $125 $149+ 
     US Airways $25 ($23) $35 ($32) $100 $100 $100 $100 N/A 
     Alaska $15 $25 $50 $100 $100 $100 $100 
Low Cost Carriers        
     Southwesta None None $50 $50 $50 $75 N/A 
     AirTran $15 $25 $50 $50 $50 $69 N/A 
     JetBlue None $30 $75 $75 $75 $100 N/A 
     Frontier $20 $30 $50 $50 $50 $75 $150 
     Virgin America $25 $15 $25 $25 $25 $100 N/A 
KEY: Airport check-in fee (online check-in fee/discount, if applicable). 







Table 3.6: Representative Changes to Checked Baggage Fees  
 Time Period 1st bag  2nd bag 
Delta Ticketed after 1/5/10 for travel on/after 1/12/10 $25 ($23) $35 ($32) 
 Ticketed 7/15/10-1/4/10 $20 ($15) $30 ($25) 
 Travel after 12/5/08 (to ticketing 7/14/10) $15 $25 
 Ticketing prior to 11/5/08 for travel on/after 12/5/08 $0 $50 
American Ticketed after 2/1/10 $25 $35 
 Ticketed 8/14/09-1/31/10 $20 $30 
 Ticketed before 8/14/09 $15 $25 
Continental Ticketed after 1/9/10 $25 ($23) $35 ($32) 
 Ticketed 10/2/09 – 1/8/10 $10 ($18) $25 ($23) 
 Ticketed 7/21/09 – 10/1/09 $0   ($15) $0   ($25) 
US Airways Ticketed after 1/18/10 $25 ($23) $35 ($32) 
 Ticketed 8/26/09 – 1/17/10 $25 ($20) $35 ($30) 
 Ticketed before 8/26/09 $20 ($15) $30 ($25) 
Virgin America Ticketed after 2/12/10 for travel on/after 3/1/10 $25 $25 
 Ticketed 8/21/09-2/11/10 $20 $20 
 Ticketed prior to 8/20/09 $15 $15 
KEY: Airport check-in fee (online check-in fee/discount, if applicable). 
 
3.5.3. Seat Fees 
Although the implementation of baggage fees and associated alignment of fees across 
carriers was relatively simple, the same is not true for seat reservation fees. Table 3.7 
summarizes U.S. carriers’ seat fees and characteristics associated with seats that are sold 
to a broad customer base and/or set aside for premium customers. All low cost carriers 
and the majority of network carriers have some form of seat pricing, although it is 
interesting to examine how airlines distinguish among coach seats and create a “unique” 
product for which they can charge additional fees. Historically, seats with extra leg room 
were used to create a unique coach product that was offered to customers for a premium 
price. However, as of June 2010, only one network carrier (United) offered extra legroom 
in coach, and only three low cost carriers (JetBlue, Frontier, and Virgin America) 
differentiated coach products using available leg room. However, all low cost carriers 
charged seat fees (or a variant of seat fees, in the case of Southwest) as did three of the 




through defining preferred seating areas. These areas typically include exit rows, 
bulkhead rows, and aisle and window seats near the front of the aircraft. These preferred 
seating areas often have early boarding privileges. Ironically, by imposing checked-
baggage fees, airlines were able to create a more valuable coach product linked to 
boarding zones, i.e., those customers who board the aircraft earlier have better access to 
overhead space for securing their carry-on luggage. 
 
 









Preferred seat  
Accessc 
Network Carriers 
  Delta Noa No No Yes Elites 
  American No No No Yes Elites 
Y,B, Fares 
  United Yes ($9-$49) Yes Yes Yes Elites 
All others at check-in ($) 
  Continental Yes (varies) No Yes Yes Elites 
All at check-in ($) 
  US Airways Yes ($5-$15) No Yes  Yes General frequent flyers 
All at check-in ($) 
  Alaska No No No Yes Elites  
Low Cost Carriers 
  Southwest $10 early check-inb No Yesb N/A N/A 
  AirTran Yes (6-$20) 
 
No Yes Yes All ($) 
 
  JetBlue Yes ($9-$75) Yes Yes Yes All ($) 
  Frontier Yes ($15-$25) Yes Yes Yes Elites 
Higher yield coach fares ($) 
All others at check-in ($) 
  Virgin Am Yes ($35-$110) Yes Yes Yes All ($) 
a Delta implemented seat pricing in 10/08 as part of the Northwest-Delta merger, but discontinued the 
practice shortly thereafter. 
b Southwest charges $10 for early check-in (up to 36 hours in advance of flight) which has a high 
probability of boarding with first group. 








 Unlike baggage fees, there is more variability across carriers’ implementation of 
seat fees. Although all network and low cost carriers have preferred seating areas, they 
differ in which customers they make these seats available to, and which customers they 
charge to access these seats. For network carriers serving a large loyal elite customer 
base, such as Delta and American, it may not be advantageous to charge for these 
preferred seats. In addition, unlike low cost carriers that typically have one or two fleet 
types, network carriers typically have many fleet types. As a result, many network 
carriers have developed demand-driven dispatch policies to swap aircraft close to 
departure in order to better match unexpected fluctuations in demand. Implementation of 
seat pricing policies in which the number of seats for sale differs across aircraft may 
reduce network carriers’ flexibility in reassigning customers to different seats as part of 
demand-driven dispatch policies. 
 Seat fees, reflected in the “seats for sale” column of Table 3.7, are often 
dependent on the purchased fare and/or the customer’s status in the carrier’s frequent 
flyer program. For some airlines, the seats for sale do not represent physical differences 
from other seats in coach (namely extra leg room) but rather are tied to boarding 
privileges or the ability to reserve a seat prior to check-in. For example, AirTran charges 
a $6 seat reservation fee for any “non-preferred” seat that customers purchase in a 
discount fare class; “preferred” exit and seats in the front of coach are sold for $13-$20, 
and no differentiation is made for fare class or membership status. Three of the remaining 
low cost carriers in the table – Southwest, JetBlue, and Virgin America – charge for 
preferred seating (or the equivalent preferred boarding in the case of Southwest); only 




boarding privileges). The remaining carrier in the table, Frontier, has a distinct preferred 
seating plan compared to the other low cost carriers. Unlike AirTran, it does not allow 
advance seat reservations for a fee at the time of booking on economy fares; that is, these 
customers have no option but to wait until check-in for their seat assignments. Similar to 
JetBlue and Virgin America, Frontier does sell preferred seats, but it differentiates by 
fare, status, and time of booking: elites receive these seats free of charge, customers 
purchasing higher-yield coach fares may purchase these seats at the time of booking, and 
all other customers may purchase these seats at check-in. Among the network carriers, 
more variability in seat fees can be observed. Delta, American, and Alaska Airlines do 
not charge seat fees but do provide preferred seating access to elite members and/or 
premium coach fare customers at no charge. In contrast, United, Continental, and US 
Airways charge seat fees and differentiate these fees by fare class, customer status, and/or 
time until departure. 
 
3.6. Discussion of Policy and Customer Service Implications 
New ancillary fees may result in a decrease in customer satisfaction. Although no surveys 
are available that measure customer responses to these new fees, it would not be 
surprising to find that customer satisfaction levels have dropped since these new fees 
were introduced – particularly those fees related to baggage fees and seat reservation fees 
that represent add-on charges to customers that used to be “free” or bundled in the base 
fare. The fact that the U.S. DOT has issued a Proposed Ruling discussing these fees is a 




and possible regulatory intervention. This section reviews three main policy and customer 
service implications associated with the debundling phenomena.  
 
3.6.1. Enhancing Customer Protections 
The comparison of baggage and seat reservation fees in Section 4 illustrates the 
complexity of pricing that is emerging in the market, and underscores the fact that the 
choices facing air travelers today are much different than the choices they faced 30 years 
ago after deregulation. Looking ahead, the U.S. federal government may also play a large 
role in shaping the future of the airline industry, particularly as it relates to the 
distribution and presentation of “choices” to consumers. Specifically, on June 8, 2010, 
the U.S. DOT issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on enhancing airline passenger 
protections; one of these proposed rules would require carriers to notify consumers of 
optional fees related to air transportation and of increased baggage fees (Federal Register, 
2010). Specifically, the U.S. DOT states: 
We also seek comment on the costs and benefits of requiring that two prices be 
provided in certain airfare advertising – the full fare, including all mandatory 
charges, as well as that full fare plus the cost of baggage charges that 
traditionally have been included in the price of the ticket, if these prices differ. 
… Should the Department require carriers to include in the second price all 
services that traditionally have been included in the price of the ticket such as 
obtaining seat assignments in advance? … In the alternative, the Department is 
considering requiring sellers of air transportation to display on their Web sites 




passenger when a prospective passenger conducts a query for a particular 
itinerary. In other words, passengers would be able to conduct queries for their 
specific needs (e.g., airfare and two checked bags, airfare, one checked bag and 
extra leg room). … Proposed section 399.85(c) would require carriers that have 
a Web site accessible to the general public to disclose all fees for optional 
service to consumers through a prominent link on their homepage that leads 
directly to a listing of those fees. Optional services include but are not limited to 
the cost of a carry-on bag, checking baggage, advance seat assignments, in-
flight food and beverage service, in-flight entertainment, blankets, pillows, or 
other comfort items, and fees for seat upgrades.  
 What is most interesting about the Proposed Ruling is the focus on regulating 
how information is displayed to consumers, and even how consumers should be able to 
interact with the website. Given that ancillary fees paid by a consumer are often tied to 
different fares and/or frequent flyer status, providing a customized search option will be 
challenging for airlines to implement as suggested in the Proposed Ruling. One 
implementation model that may be viable is that used by United in the context of its 
preferred Economy Plus seating. The ability to reserve an Economy Plus seat on United 
can only be done online if customers first log in to the website using their frequent flyer 
account. Through logging on, United is basically able to tailor seat selections to each 
customer. However, United also indirectly benefits from encouraging customers to log in 
at the beginning of the search process (versus when a ticket is ultimately purchased) in 
the sense that it can unobtrusively observe the sequence of screens across a single or 




1996; Moe and Fader, 2004; Montgomery et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2010), this can provide 
valuable marketing information. Thus, the Proposed Ruling and expressed desire by the 
DOT to dictate how customers can search for information needs to be viewed in a 
broader context, one that examines the potential benefits and disadvantages associated 
with: (1) customizing information to each individual; while, (2) providing new 
opportunities for carriers to customize marketing information. The ability to track 
individuals during their online search process may also raise new privacy concerns that 
need to be addressed.  
 From a research perspective, the impact of menu display and search options on 
customer choice is not a well understood area. It is an area that major carriers are just 
now beginning to investigate – particularly the trade-off between making low fares 
“transparent” for price-sensitive customers to stimulate demand without cannibalizing 
revenues for time-sensitive customers11. For example, Delta was recently testing the 
placement of its low fare search option, a “my dates are flexible” option on its home 
webpage. In one design, the “my dates are flexible” option appears prominently on its 
webpage; while in a second design, this option was still on the homepage, but was hidden 
in the sense it could be accessed only by first clicking the “more booking options” tab.  In 
late 2009, Continental Airlines completely revamped its website, making low cost fare 
comparisons from the home page and default returns less obvious. Continental has 






11 See Brunger (2010) for a discussion that challenges one of the commonly-held beliefs in the industry 
related to internet transparency and revenues. Brunger offers that increase fare transparency has not 




recently implemented an advanced low fare search option, which is unique from other 
search engines in that it is customized to Continental’s round-trip pricing philosophy 
(which imposes minimum stay requirements on fares for certain days of the week); but 
this feature is not prominently displayed on its home page and can only be accessed by 
performing an “advanced search option” query and clicking on the “my dates are 
flexible” option. This example further highlights the dynamic nature of the U.S. airline 
market, and the many open research questions that remain to be investigated in this area. 
It also brings to light another issue: the need to understand how seemingly isolated 
changes (such as website displays) may cause unintended consequences for other 
decision support systems (in this case, revenue management and demand predictions). 
 
3.6.2. Airport and Airway Trust Fund 
The debundling trend also has potential implications for government revenue sources, 
most notably the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF). The tax structure associated 
with the AATF has undergone several major changes since deregulation. Karlsson (2006) 
provides a historical review of these changes. Today, the current aviation excise tax 
structure is based on the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Public Law 105-35. The three 
largest components of the AATF are a domestic passenger ticket tax (7.5 percent of the 
ticket price), a domestic flight segment tax (set at $3.70 for 2010), and an international 
arrival and departure tax (set at $16.10 for 2010). According to a Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) presentation, in FY 2004, 51.5 percent of the excise taxes were 
levied through the passenger tax, 18.2 percent from the passenger segment tax, and 16.1 




from other passenger and fuel taxes (Federal Aviation Administration, 2005; Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2010a). These percentages have remained relatively constant 
across the years, i.e., the total receipts for the AATF from these three excise taxes has 
ranged from 72 percent in 1999 to 69 percent in 2006 (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2010b). It is interesting to note that these funds have remained relatively constant despite 
the underlying structural changes in the U.S. airline market. Part of the reason is likely 
due to the mix of fees from domestic and international passengers, which helped the 
AATF protect itself against the shift towards international markets seen by network 
carriers.  
 However, as carriers shift towards a combination of a base fare (that is subject to 
the 7.5 percent domestic passenger ticket tax) and add-on services (that are not subject to 
this tax), it is logical that the AATF will lose revenues. For example, in 2009, U.S. 
domestic carriers collected $2.37 billion in reservation change fees (U.S. DOT, 2010). 
Assuming these fees could have been collected through the base fare, this represents a 
potential loss of $177 million for the AATF. In 2009, U.S. domestic carriers collected 
$2.72 billion in baggage fees, which represents an additional potential loss of $204 
million for the AATF. Finally, in the last quarter of 2009, airlines collected $736 million 
in baggage fees, $564 million in reservation change fees, and $611 million from other 
ancillary fees “such as pet transportation fees and frequent flier award program fees” 
(Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2010). Thus, in terms of “other” ancillary fees we 
estimate an additional potential loss of $183 million for the AATF. Given the total 
estimated tax receipts for the AATF were $11.282 billion (Federal Aviation 




are noteworthy, particularly if the trend towards debundling continues in the U.S. 
domestic air market. However, unlike the European Union, in which the percentage of 
ancillary fees on low cost carriers can exceed 20 percent of the total revenues generated 
(May 2010), the U.S. is in an unique position in that it has one dominant low cost carrier, 
Southwest Airlines, that fundamentally does not believe in charging fees. This unique 
market structure will likely buffer the AATF against dramatic revenue leakage due to 
ancillary revenue generation. 
 
3.6.3. Integration across Airline Systems 
Several examples have been provided to illustrate how implementation of ancillary fees 
(which seeks to generate additional revenue for a carrier) may actually lead to revenue 
loss or unintended consequences in performance metrics in other parts of the airline 
business. These examples include the recent elimination of close-in-ticketing fees by 
Delta and United (which one may assume is due to long-term lost revenue by customers) 
and elimination of seat fees by Delta (which from its online blog discussion, one can infer 
was due to complaints from its premier customers). The discussion of customizing 
carriers’ websites to help customers find lower fares also falls under this category, as it 
likely improves the number of tickets sold but decreases yield and possibly total 
operating revenue. 
 Indeed, the implementation of ancillary fees can have many subtle unintended 
consequences that are difficult for carriers to quantify. As an example, consider day of 
departure standby fees. Many carriers charge fees to standby for other flights on the day 




unconfirmed standby fees. Confirmed standby fees apply when a gate agent can 
automatically rebook a passenger and confirm a seat on an alternate flight. With one 
exception, confirmed standby fees range from $25-$75 for the carriers shown in Table 
3.1. Southwest Airlines is the only exception in that it does not charge standby fees per 
se, just the difference between the purchased fare and the current fare. Confirmed standby 
fees are marketed to consumers in lieu of the much higher exchange fees. As seen with 
the baggage and ticketing exchange fees, many exemptions apply based on the purchased 
fare class and/or elite membership status. 
 In contrast to confirmed standby fees, unconfirmed standby fees apply if the gate 
agent cannot confirm a seat on a desired flight and/or if the airline permits passengers to 
standby even though a seat can be confirmed. Only a few carriers permit unconfirmed 
standby for flights at no fee (e.g., US Airways, AirTran, JetBlue, and Virgin America). 
Further, in the case of JetBlue and Virgin America, their free unconfirmed standby 
policies are restricted to a subset of flights, i.e., customers must pay a confirmed standby 
fee if they board flights that depart outside the designated free standby time window. 
 Similar to the previous discussion of baggage fees, there have been many changes 
implemented in these fees during the past 12-24 months. Some carriers have made their 
policies stricter, e.g., American recently changed its unconfirmed standby policy (such 
that it is not permitted except for tickets purchased with miles). In contrast, other carriers 
have relaxed their policies, e.g., as of April 2010, United now permits confirmed 
standbys on all flights on the day of departure; previously this was restricted to those 
flights departing within three hours of the original ticketed flight. Similarly, AirTran 




its standby fee from $75 per reservation to a per-person charge of $50 with discounts 
and/or waivers for elite members. 
 It is interesting to think about the impact of these standby fees, which restricts the 
movement of passengers across flights from an operational perspective. Discouraging 
passengers from standing by for earlier flights may lead to misconnections (if the flights 
the passengers are on are delayed) or lost opportunities to accommodate other disrupted 
passengers. That is, the ability to leave earlier than planned essentially provides an extra 
buffer of time for connecting passengers and helps shift demand to earlier flights, 
providing more seats later in the day for disrupted passengers. Further, these buffers may 
actually be quite worthwhile from financial and customer service perspectives. For 
example, a study by Bratu and Barnhart (2002), based on a major U.S. carrier’s data from 
2000 shows that approximately 30 percent of its flight legs were delayed and 3.5 percent 
cancelled, resulting in approximately 4 percent of all passengers being disrupted (2 
percent were connecting passengers). From the carrier’s perspective, Clarke and Smith 
(1999) estimate that “the financial impact of irregularities on the daily operations of a 
single major U.S. domestic carrier may exceed $440 million per annum in lost revenue, 
crew overtime pay, and passenger hospitality costs” (Lan, Clarke and Barnhart, 2006). 
This example highlights the difficulties connected to quantifying all short-term and long-
term financial costs associated with implementing new ancillary fees and helps explain 
why, in some cases, carriers may implement new fees, but then eliminate them as the full 
system-level effects are become clearer. In the case of standby fees, it would be 
interesting for a carrier such as American that recently implemented a “no free 




experienced by disrupted passengers increased. If so, one may assume that American will 
revert back to its more generous standby policy (following the lead of similar changes 
recently implemented by AirTran and Continental). 
 
 
3.7. Looking Ahead 
An examination of ancillary fees reveals that all carriers – including Southwest Airlines – 
have implemented new fees over the past few years. How carriers have elected to 
implement these fees, though, varies. Network carriers that have a more loyal repeat 
customer base are more likely to establish fees while simultaneously creating an elaborate 
system of fee waivers for their premier customers. Given premier customers typically 
represent a large percentage of a carrier’s ticketing revenue, it seems unlikely that carriers 
would decide to start charging these customers fees in the future. Exempting premier 
customers from ancillary fees can be viewed as a way by which carriers can add value to 
their frequent flyer programs and encourage repeat business. 
 The analysis of Southwest’s implementation of fees is particularly enlightening 
and helps explain why the debundling trends seen in the United States are distinct from 
those in Europe and other parts of the world. Southwest is a powerful domestic marketing 
force, but it is a carrier that historically has had a strong philosophy of not charging for 
fees that were once bundled into its base fare. Southwest also places a high priority on its 
brand and maintaining long-term repeat customer business. Through its recent merger 
with AirTran, Southwest should be able to further expand its domestic market share as 
well as begin to expand to international markets. As Southwest grows, U.S. carriers may 




It will be particularly interesting to see, after Southwest completes its merger with 
AirTran, how much additional pricing pressure Southwest is able to put on Delta out of 
Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson airport. If a major carrier such as Delta revokes baggage 
fees, all other major carriers will likely do the same. This highlights the importance of 
viewing the short-term and long-term consequences of ancillary fees in terms of existing 
market competition. For example, although the events of 2008 and 2009 led to rapid 
debundling, one of the benefits has been that many airlines did well financially in 2010. 
However, if demand for air travel starts to outpace available supply, one would expect 
airlines to start dropping or eliminating fees as they compete to win these additional 
customers. 
 Viewing changes through the lens of current market positions also provides 
insights into why similar campaigns have failed in the past, and which ancillary revenue 
sources are likely to survive moving forward. One example of a campaign that “failed” is 
American Airline’s promotion of extra leg room throughout coach in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. American invested millions of dollars in retrofitting its planes to offer more 
legroom, but it operated these aircraft primarily on short-haul domestic flights, many of 
which were facing increasing pricing pressure from Southwest. Consequently, customers 
were not willing to pay for extra leg room on short flights. In contrast, Delta recently 
announced that it was adding legroom in coach – but to serve customers in their long-
haul international markets. These international markets currently face less price 
competition, and extra legroom in this context is more valuable to consumers (suggesting 
they are more willing to pay). However, as with American’s experience, if market 




and/or offer better products on these markets, then Delta’s long-term ability to charge a 
premium for these seats will be diminished. 
 What is clear from this discussion is that the debundling phenomena in the United 
States has been rapid and is still in transition. In the long term, it would not be surprising 
if low cost carriers competing with Southwest Airlines adopted a wider range of ancillary 
fees, whereas network carriers followed the trends of Delta and United and eliminated 
many of the fees that were recently introduced for services that once were perceived to be 
free to consumers. For example, when Delta merged with Northwest, it initially adopted 
Northwest’s practice of charging for preferred seats (Delta Air Lines, 2008); however, 
due to backlash from its premium customer base, these fees were quickly eliminated. 
Similarly, United used to charge for close-in ticketing fees for those customers redeeming 
frequent flyer miles (i.e., fees that were charged if customers redeemed their miles for 
tickets within 21 days of departure), but recently eliminated these fees. Delta also 
adopted a similar policy as of June 3, 2010 (Delta Air Lines, 2010). Both of these 
examples suggest that adoption of ancillary fees is still dynamic. The two major sources 
of revenue generation – baggage and seat fees – will likely be the longest surviving fees. 
However, as the U.S. market returns to healthier economic times, even these fees may 








Looking ahead, the “ancillary revenue” phenomenon is likely to continue in the U.S. 
market among low cost and network carriers. Numerous airlines are reporting the 
importance of ancillary fees in their investor reports and/or listing generation of these 
fees as a top priority (e.g., see AirTran Holdings Inc., 2009). In its March 26, 2010, 
presentation to Barclay Capital High Yield Bond and Syndicated Loan Conference, 
Continental stated that one of its five top priorities in 2010 was to “increase ancillary 
revenues through customer choice” (Continental 2010a; Continental 2010b). Continental 
elaborated, stating that it plans to grow these ancillary revenue streams through product 
debundling (baggage fees, booking fees, in-flight amenities) and product enhancements 
including day-of-departure upgrades, preferred coach seating, premium wines and 
liquors, PetSafe and “many others to come” (Continental, 2010a). 
 What will be interesting to see is whether future ancillary revenue enhancements 
follow the trends seen with baggage fees (in which clear market segmentation quickly 
emerged); or if technological, customer acceptance, market competition, and other 
constraints will hinder airlines’ ability to universally adopt ancillary fees (as in the case 
of seat pricing). What is clear, however, is that the debundling phenomena has arrived in 
the United States, and the full implications of debundling have yet to be realized but will 
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CHAPTER 4: PREMIUM COACH SEAT PURCHASING BEHAVIOR 
 
Mumbower, S., Garrow, L.A. and Newman, J.P. (2013) Investigating airline customers' 
premium coach seat purchases and implications for optimal pricing strategies. 
Working paper, Georgia Institute of Technology. 
 
4.1. Abstract 
We investigate factors that influence airline customers’ purchases of premium coach 
seats using a database of online prices and seat map displays collected from JetBlue’s 
website. Results show that multiple factors influence purchasing behavior; these factors 
include the amount of the seat fee, how far in advance the ticket is purchased, the number 
of passengers traveling together, and load factors (as revealed through seat map displays).  
We find that customers are between 2 and 3.3 times more likely to purchase premium 
coach seats (with extra legroom and early boarding privileges) when there are no regular 
coach window or aisle seats that can be reserved for free. In addition, we find that 
customers who purchase tickets closer to the departure date are less price elastic and are 
willing to pay higher seat fees. We use these model results to show that JetBlue’s seat 
fees are currently underpriced in many markets; an optimal static fee would increase 
revenues by 8% whereas optimal dynamic fees would increase revenues by 10.2%. In 
addition, if JetBlue were to leave their seat fees unchanged and instead blocked certain 
rows of seats for premier customers, they could potentially increase revenues by 12.8%.  
This finding underscores the importance of ensuring customers are not inadvertently 





4.2. Introduction  
 
Over the course of the last decade, airlines have experienced numerous financial 
challenges, including ballooning costs and intense competition. Many of these challenges 
came to a head around 2008, when oil prices soared to more than $130 a barrel (Clifford, 
2008) and the global economic crisis hit, dropping the Dow Jones market value by 33.8% 
(the third worst calendar year performance on record) and triggering a worldwide 
slowdown in economic activity, including air travel (Seeking Alpha, 2009). Many major 
airlines had already implemented significant cost-cutting strategies during the early 
2000’s as part of their bankruptcy restructuring and merger processes, limiting their 
ability to cut expenses, and the deep market penetration of the Internet, combined with 
low cost carrier competition, hindered the ability to raise fares. Consequently, “2009 
proved to be the worst year on record for U.S. airlines, in terms of year-over-year revenue 
declines” (Southwest Airlines, 2009). 
 In response, many airlines sought to increase revenues without increasing fares by 
creating new ancillary revenue sources, such as fees for checked baggage, on-board food, 
and seat reservations and upgrades. These services were once bundled into the base price 
of a ticket, but airlines began to price them separately.  In addition, airlines increased the 
cost of existing ancillary services, including fees for redeeming mileage award tickets, 
exchanging tickets, and checking pets. Moreover, rather than being a temporary solution 
to help get airlines through a rough year, these fees have become a permanent fixture of 
the air travel marketplace. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, revenues 
from ancillary fees have rapidly increased in the past few years: for U.S. carriers with 




five years, from $3.6 billion in 2007 to $9.8 billion in 2011 (U.S. DOT, 2012). Similar 
trends are observed worldwide. A recent report sponsored by Amadeus and IdeaWorks 
that represents a broader set of airlines and more comprehensive set of ancillary fees 
finds that in 2007, 23 airlines posted ancillary revenues of $2.45 billion and in 2011, 50 
airlines reported revenues of $22.64 billion (Sorensen and Lucas, 2012). 
 Ancillary revenue streams are important to airlines, sometimes turning a loss-
making carrier into a profitable one. That was more or less the case for JetBlue in 2011, 
which reported a net profit of $86 million and seat fee revenues of more than $120 
million (JetBlue Airways, 2011). For some carriers, ancillary revenues can represent a 
major portion of overall revenues. In the U.S., Spirit Air is notorious for its extremely 
low base fares and “optional” fees for services such as booking online or by phone, 
printing a boarding pass at the airport, and carrying on luggage; in 2011, Spirit earned 
33.2% of its revenue from these fees. Major carriers such as United/Continental (13.9%), 
Alaska (14.1%), and American (8.8%) earned a notable percentage of revenue from 
ancillary fees as well (Sorensen and Lucas, 2012). Given that the margins on the ancillary 
services are generally quite large, these fees in many cases represent most or all of the 
carrier’s operating profit.   
 Despite the prevalence and growing importance of ancillary fees, few studies have 
examined the direct impact these fees have had on customers’ purchasing behavior, let 
alone the secondary effects of these fees. For example, when airlines began charging for 
checked baggage, the amount of carry-on luggage increased. As a result, demand for 
overhead bin space often exceeded what was available. This ultimately led to higher 




overhead space. Thus, it appears that by introducing new fees for checked baggage, 
airlines were also able to begin charging more for seats with early boarding privileges. 
Similarly, as aircraft load factors increase, passengers realize the likelihood of having an 
empty seat next to them drops, and the value of a premium seat with extra personal space 
increases.  
 Airline operators continue to search for ways to increase ancillary revenues, 
without negatively impacting sales of basic tickets so much as to cancel out these revenue 
gains. A principle avenue for achieving such increases is through making fees for 
ancillary products more complex and differentiating fees across customer groups (e.g., by 
reserving or blocking premium seats for premier customers).  
 On the other hand, customers generally dislike added fees, and in particular 
dislike fees that appear to be hidden, arbitrary, or unfair. From the regulatory perspective, 
agencies want to ensure that fees are displayed in a way that is easy for consumers to 
understand. One issue that is of particular concern is whether the airline practice of 
blocking seats for preferred customers (i.e., showing certain seats as unavailable for non-
preferred customers without elite status in an airline’s frequent flier program and/or 
showing certain seats as unavailable for those customers who do not purchase tickets for 
higher yield fare classes) effectively “tricks” customers into thinking a plane is full when 
in fact it is not, leading customers to buy an upgraded premium coach seat.  However, 
answering this question is difficult, not only for regulatory agencies but also for the 
airlines themselves, because the majority of airlines only keep records of the customers’ 
final seat assignments.  Without more extensive data on the allocation of seat assignments 




customers at the time of booking (i.e., it is difficult to know what seat choices the 
customer had at the time of booking).  Airlines could certainly collect this information 
directly, but would need to make major investments in technology infrastructure to do so, 
and they are unlikely to make such an investment unless they have a high level of 
confidence that they will receive a decent return on their investment. Regulatory agencies 
also do not have access to proprietary carrier data, and would need to conduct any 
independent investigations into this issue using publically available data or stated 
preference surveys. 
 Our study contributes to the literature on ancillary fees by providing some of the 
first insights into the role of load factors and seat map displays on customers’ premium 
seat purchases. We investigate airline customers’ seat purchasing behavior using a 
database of revealed preference data that includes online prices and seat maps from 
JetBlue’s website. This data is used to investigate the probabilities that customers will 
pay between $15 and $65 to reserve a premium coach seat that includes extra legroom 
and early boarding privileges. By tracking seat maps and prices across the booking 
horizon, the JetBlue data provides the ability to estimate binary logit models of seat 
choice, which can be used to understand how demand for its premium coach seat product 
varies across the booking horizon, across markets, and as a function of load factors (as 
revealed through seat map displays). 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides additional 
background context on premium seat fees.  Sections 3 and 4 provide an overview of the 




results to assess different pricing and seat display policies.  The paper concludes with a 
discussion of major findings. 
 
4.3. Premium Seat Fees 
One of the more common types of ancillary fees is a premium seat fee, which is charged 
to customers wanting to reserve a “good” seat on the aircraft. As of 2013, all mainline 
carriers in the U.S. with annual operating revenues exceeding $1 billion are charging seat 
fees, with the exception of Alaska and Southwest. The implementation of these fees 
varies by carrier, and many of the airlines waive certain fees for elite customers and/or 
high yield tickets. Table 4.1 summaries U.S. airlines’ seat fee policies and charges. 
 Some airlines charge fees to reserve seats that do not provide extra legroom but 
instead allow customers to board early and gain early access to overhead bin space. With 
many airlines charging checked baggage fees even for the first bag, early access to 
overhead bin space is desirable. These priority boarding seats, often called “preferred” 
seats, typically include seats in popular locations on the plane that were once free to 
reserve, such as exit and bulkhead rows (which may offer a little extra legroom) and seats 
near the front of the aircraft, especially aisle and window seats near the front of the plane. 
Fees for preferred seats range from $4 to $45 per leg for domestic flights.   
 Other airlines charge fees to reserve seats that provide both extra legroom and 
often early boarding. These seats are often referred to as “premium” economy or 






Table 4.1: U.S. Airlines’ Seat Fee Policies as of June 2012 
Airline Extra Legroom? Fee Exemptions? Typical Domestic Fees 
AirTran No Yes $6-$20 
Alaska No N/A No charge 
American No Yes $4-$29 
Delta Yes Yes $19-$99 
Frontier Yes Yes $5-$50 
JetBlue Yes No $15-$65 
Southwest1 No Yes $10 
United Yes Yes $9-$89 
US Airways No Yes $15-$45 
 1Southwest charges $10 for early check-in which has a high probability of boarding with the first group 
and improving seat selection. 
 
 
4.3.1. The Airline Perspective 
Due to the need to quickly create additional revenue streams during the crisis, there was 
little to no research done by airlines to determine customers’ willingness to pay for 
premium and preferred seats prior to implementation of these fees. Further, technology 
constraints limited how airlines could charge fees.  For example, airlines did not have the 
ability to change seat upgrade fees across the booking horizon; that is, the same fee was 
charged to customers regardless of how far in advance of departure they booked. This 
limitation persists today for most airlines, although many are now in a position where 
they can make investments in revenue enhancing opportunities, including technology to 
get around these dynamic pricing limitations. There are also other opportunities to create 
marginal improvements in seat fee revenues. For example, if airlines have a better 
understanding of customers’ behavior and willingness to pay for certain amenities, they 
can make long range plans to acquire and configure new airplanes appropriately to 
capture more value from future customers: Are enough customers willing to pay enough 




regular coach seats from the plane? Should airlines invest in technology that will enable 
them to dynamically price ancillary fees over the booking horizon? If so, what are the 
optimal revenue-generating fees they should charge?   
 Although it has been 5 years since ancillary fees became a prominent part of the 
air travel landscape, few studies have examined customers’ willingness to pay for such 
fees, including premium seat fees. One study based on stated preference data from 
Resource Systems Group, Inc. found that the average customer was willing to pay $19 
more for a window seat and $18 more for an aisle seat without extra legroom (Weinstein 
and Keller, 2012).  However, that study did not control for other factors that influence 
willingness to pay, such as plane load factors. There is a research need to investigate the 
role of seat map displays on customers’ premium seat fee purchases, and to investigate 
revenue potential associated with dynamically pricing seat fees across the booking 
horizon. Our study contributes to this debate by investigating these two research 
questions.  This objective is consistent with prior studies published in Transportation 
Research Part A that have examined one or more aspects of air travel behavior (e.g., see 
Brey and Walker, 2011; Chen, 2008; Lee et al., 2012; Lu and Peeta, 2009; Peeta, Paz and 
DeLaurentis, 2008; Tsamboulas and Nikoleris, 2008).  
 To our knowledge, only one major airline (United) currently collects data about 
seat displays across the booking horizon, and uses it to improve yields from its premium 
coach product. In the quarter after implementing the “Shares” yield management system, 
which allows for dynamic pricing of Economy Plus seats, United reported a 25% increase 
in revenues associated with Economy Plus, with only about a third of that increase 




(Ranson, 2012). As one of the world’s largest airlines, United is better positioned than 
many other airlines to absorb the large fixed cost entailed in developing a dynamic 
pricing system for ancillary revenues. In contrast with a full rollout of a comprehensive 
integrated system, the data collection approach we employ in this paper represents a 
comparatively small investment, which can help an airline decide whether to undertake 
the larger investment to actually implement a dynamic pricing system. 
 
4.3.2. The Customer Perspective 
Seat fee and reservation policies have the potential to greatly impact customer 
satisfaction levels both positively and negatively. We are not aware of any empirical 
research that that examines how characteristics of seat fee policies influence customer 
satisfaction levels. However, searching online through comments that airline customers 
have posted on various news articles, travel blogs, and travel websites reveals that 
customers have a wide range of concerns and opinions about seat policies. For example, 
CNN recently published a series of four articles on their website which discuss seat 
reservations and how customers feel about seat fees (Hume, 2012a, 2012b; Patterson 
2012a, 2012b). One of these articles had nearly 2,000 comments posted by readers. 
Customer satisfaction with seat reservations seems to be impacted by many factors, 
including ease of reserving seats for a group traveling together and how seats are 
displayed on seat maps. 
 Seat policies that impose fees to reserve window and aisle seats decrease the 
number of contiguous seats available, which may make it more difficult for groups and 




accommodate families as well as they can, but if there are not extra seats available, then 
they may not always be able to work out a way for families to sit together. Due to 
widespread media coverage about this issue, Senator Charles Schumer recently (May 27, 
2012) requested that Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood issue rules preventing airlines 
from charging parents more to sit next to their children (Schumer Press Release, 2012). 
Senator Schumer also asked the industry’s trade group, Airlines for America, to try to 
persuade carriers to voluntarily waive the fee for families. A few days later at a Senate 
panel, Secretary LaHood responded by saying that he has been urging airlines against 
charging more for popular seats (without extra legroom). However, he also said that he 
“can't tell airlines what fees they can charge” (Jansen, 2012). Although charging fees for 
aisle and window seats may decrease customer satisfaction levels of groups traveling 
together, it could also negatively impact other travelers. Many customers have noted that 
people are asking them to trade seats more often now than in the past, and have posted 
comments on blogs describing scenarios where they paid for a window or aisle seat and 
someone asked them to trade seats so that they could sit by a family member. On the 
other hand, policies that reserve and/or charge for window and aisle seats may increase 
customer satisfaction levels of certain types of travelers. Many business travelers choose 
to fly coach instead of business class. These travelers often book a flight a few days in 
advance of the departure date when many seats are full and end up purchasing a ticket 
that is priced much higher than tickets purchased by people who booked far in advance. 
Policies that allow these customers to reserve a better seat may increase their satisfaction 





 Another major issue of concern that customers have raised is how seat 
availabilities are displayed on seat maps. Airlines often block certain seats and do not 
allow customers to reserve these seats in order to set aside a few seats for accommodating 
passengers with disabilities or special needs.  Now, with some airlines adopting policies 
that also reserve seats for elite members and higher-yield fares only, this means that other 
customers may be shown that these seats are “unavailable” on seat maps. This seems to 
have led to some confusion among passengers upon boarding. Some customers have 
complained that upon booking a ticket, the seat map showed that few regular seats were 
available, which caused them to consider purchasing an upgraded seat. However, upon 
boarding the plane, they noticed that many more seats were actually available. Bill 
McGee, a contributing editor to Consumer Reports and former editor of Consumer 
Reports Travel Letter, along with other columnists have expressed concerns about how 
available seats are displayed to customers (McCartney, 2011; McGee, 2012a, 2012b). 
Comments these columnists have received from customers indicate that some customers 
feel they have been misled by the information displayed on seat maps, but it could be that 
they do not completely understand the airlines’ seat policies. For example, many of the 
airlines open up preferred seats (without extra legroom) that can be reserved (sometimes 
for free) during check-in by non-elite customers, but some people may not understand 
that or think about that when looking at a seat map.  If customers feel like they have been 
tricked in to purchasing upgraded seats, then this could greatly decrease customer 
satisfaction with an airline. 
 In summary, the main concerns issued by customers and government officials 




to sit together, and misleading customers into making preferred or premium seat fee 
purchases through displaying seat maps that are difficult to understand and/or that give 
the impression a plane is near capacity through showing seats as being 
occupied/unavailable to reserve.  
 
4.4. Data  
This section describes the database that was compiled from online pricing and seat map 
information from JetBlue’s website. 
 
4.4.1. Overview 
To analyze how customers purchase premium coach seats with extra legroom, automated 
web client robots (or webbots) were used to query JetBlue’s website and obtain detailed 
itinerary, fare, and seat map information for nonstop flights on a daily basis. Our paper is 
one of many that have used airline webbot data to analyze pricing and/or demand trends 
(e.g., see Bilotkach, 2006; Bilotkach and Pejcinovska, 2012; Bilotkach et al., 2010; 
Button and Vega, 2006; Button and Vega, 2007; Horner et al., 2006; McAfee and Vera, 
2007; Mentzer, 2000; Mumbower and Garrow, 2010; Newman et al., 2013; Pels and 
Rietveld, 2004; Pitfield, 2008; Pope et al. 2009). The period of data collection ran from 
8/2/2010 through 10/2/2010. During this time period, queries were run to collect airfares 
and seat maps for a rolling set of departure dates. For example, when the data collection 
began on 8/2/2010, information for flights departing on 9/2/2010, 9/3/2010, ... , to 
10/2/2010 was obtained. For the next day of data collection, 8/3/2010, information for the 




information for each flight in a market for 30 departure dates and over a booking period 
from 1 to at least 28 days before flight departure. 
 The dataset includes 22 markets, across several different lengths of haul. Table 
4.2 provides a list of airport codes and airport names in our data. Table 4.3 provides a list 
of the markets collected, along with market characteristics and seat fees, average fares, 
and number of bookings. A total of 59,242 bookings were observed (46,920 regular 
coach seat bookings and 12,322 premium coach seat bookings). Thus, 20.8% of the 
observed bookings are for premium coach seats, hereafter referred to as Even More™ 
Space (EMS) seats12, which is the branding used by JetBlue. At the time of data 
collection, JetBlue’s EMS seats provided 4 to 5 more inches of extra legroom over their 
regular coach seats13, and also came with early boarding privileges. 
 After the online data was collected, seat maps for each day were used to compile 
daily booking (or demand) data for regular coach and premium coach seats. When a 
customer books a ticket with JetBlue, they have the option to purchase an EMS seat for 
between $15 and $65, or they can reserve a regular coach seat for free. For the most part, 
EMS seats are priced by length of haul with higher prices for longer flights. EMS seat 
prices are the same for every flight in a particular market, for all EMS seats on the 
aircraft, and over the entire booking horizon. 






12 At the time of data collection, JetBlue referred to these seats as Even More™ Legroom (EML) seats but 
subsequently rebranded these seats as Even More™ Space (EMS) seats.  We use EMS terminology 
throughout the paper. 
13 Note that JetBlue’s regular coach seats have more legroom than other airlines’ regular coach seats with a 






Table 4.2: Airport Codes and Names 
Airport Code Name of Airport, City and State 
AUS Austin-Bergstrom International Airport, Austin, Texas 
BOS Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts 
BQN Rafael Hernández Airport, Aguadilla, Puerto Rico 
BUF Buffalo Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York 
DEN Denver International Airport, Denver, Colorado 
EWR Newark Liberty International Airport, Newark, New Jersey 
FLL Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
IAD Washington Dulles International Airport, Washington D.C. 
JFK John F. Kennedy International, New York City, New York 
LAS McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada 
LAX Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California 
LGA La Guardia Airport, New York City, New York 
MCO Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida 
OAK Oakland International, Oakland, California 
ORD Chicago O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois 
PBI Palm Beach International Airport, West Palm Beach, Florida 
PDX Portland International Airport, Portland, Oregon 
SFO San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California 
SYR Syracuse Hancock International Airport, Syracuse, New York 
 
 








Table 4.3: Market Characteristics and Observed Fares/Bookings, by Market and Type Haul 
































JFKBQN E-PR 1,576 2 $30 $0.019 $147 2,133 112 5.3% 
MCOBQN E-PR 1,129 1 $25 $0.022 $118 975 54 5.5% 
E-C Averages/Totals: 1,437 2 $28 $0.020 $138 3,108 166 5.3% 
BOSIAD E-E 500 7 $15 $0.030 $92 6,082 1,086 17.9% 
BOSMCO E-E 1,121 5 $30 $0.027 $130 2,407 416 17.3% 
BUFMCO E-E 1,011 1 $25 $0.025 $122 297 55 18.5% 
EWRMCO E-E 937 4 $19 $0.020 $125 2,486 520 20.9% 
IADMCO E-E 758 1 $25 $0.033 $102 734 194 26.4% 
JFKFLL E-E 1,069 7 $35 $0.033 $122 8,998 1,705 18.9% 
JFKPBI E-E 1,028 4 $35 $0.034 $141 4,843 1,152 23.8% 
LGAFLL E-E 1,076 5 $35 $0.033 $126 5,543 1,291 23.3% 
SYRMCO E-E 1,053 1 $25 $0.024 $134 782 163 20.8% 
E-E Averages/Totals: 943 5 $29 $0.031 $120 32,172 6,582 20.5% 
BOSDEN E-MW 1,754 2 $40 $0.023 $183 1,950 376 19.3% 
JFKORD E-MW 740 3 $30 $0.041 $119 2,600 371 14.3% 
MCOAUS E-MW 994 1 $35 $0.035 $128 1,049 150 14.3% 
E-MW Average/Totals: 1,176 2 $35 $0.033 $144 5,599 897 16.0% 
BOSLAX E-W 2,600 2 $50 $0.019 $184 2,549 547 21.5% 
BOSSFO E-W 2,700 2 $55 $0.020 $232 2,071 609 29.4% 
FLLSFO E-W 2,580 1 $50 $0.019 $152 999 150 15.0% 
JFKLAS E-W 2,240 5 $50 $0.022 $252 3,761 980 26.1% 
JFKLAX E-W 2,470 4 $50 $0.020 $214 4,907 1,322 26.9% 
JFKOAK E-W 2,576 2 $60 $0.023 $211 2,109 562 26.6% 
JFKPDX E-W 2,454 1 $50 $0.020 $257 944 160 16.9% 
JFKSFO E-W 2,580 2 $60 $0.023 $285 1,023 347 33.9% 
E-W Averages/Totals: 2,494 3 $52 $0.021 $222 18,363 4,677 25.5% 
Avg/Total All Markets: 1,494 4 $37 $0.027 $157 59,242 12,322 20.8% 
1 E-PR = East coast to Puerto Rico flights, E-E = East coast to east coast flights, E-MW = East coast to 
Midwest flights, E-W = East coast to west coast flights (JFKLAS is included due to length of haul). 
2Average fare is the average fare that was paid when tickets/seats were booked. 
 
    





 We determined how many regular coach seats and EMS seats were sold on a 
particular day by determining when seats changed from being shown as “available” for 
one day but “reserved” for the next day. At this point, it is helpful to look at a seat map to 
see what kind of seat choices a customer can make. Figure 4.1 shows a seat map of how 
JetBlue’s Airbus A320 seats were configured at the time of data collection14. Darker-
colored seats are “available” and can be reserved, and lighter-colored seats have already 
been “reserved”. The plane has a total of 150 seats, which include 114 regular coach seats 
and 36 EMS seats. The seat configuration of the A320 is as follows: rows 1, 6B-E, and 
25D-F are always “blocked” and never available for customers to reserve online (blocked 
seats are typically set aside in order to provide advance seat assignments, as requested, to 
customers with disabilities); rows 2-5 are EMS seats in the front of the plane; rows 6-9 
are regular coach seats in front of the emergency exit rows; rows 10-11 are EMS seats in 
the emergency exit rows; and rows 12-25 are regular coach seats behind the emergency 
exit rows.  
  
  






14 At the time of data collection, JetBlue operated two types of aircraft: Airbus A320 and Embraer ERJ-
190. Because the Embraer aircraft only accounts for 29% of JetBlue’s fleet and contains just four premium 





Figure 4.1: Seat Map Display of a JetBlue Plane  
  
                




 We assume that any customer who booked a ticket also selected a seat, as regular 
coach seat selections were free and the website prompts the customer to select a seat 
during the reservation process. We exclude customers who may have reserved a blocked 
seat from the analysis, as we have no way to distinguish between instances in which the 




demand numbers from analysis, which occur when one or more customers cancel their 
reservations (and no new reservations occur on that booking date for that flight). In this 
sense, our demand estimates for regular coach and EMS seats can be viewed as lower 
bounds on demand, as they represent the minimum number of customers who reserved a 
seat for a given booking date and departure date.  The actual demand may be slightly 
higher than what we can observe from the seat maps, as we cannot account for cases in 
which new bookings and cancellations occur for the same booking date and departure 
date combinations.  Based on an assessment of the frequency of negative booking counts 
(which accounted for a small percentage of the observations in the data), we conclude 
that the assumptions used to create demand estimates are reasonable. 
 
4.4.2. Selection Bias 
Using JetBlue as the airline for our analysis enables us to control for potential sources of 
selection bias. Since JetBlue customers may reserve a regular coach seat for free (or a 
premium coach seat for a fee) at the time of booking, we expect the majority of 
customers to reserve seats at the time of booking. Further, JetBlue does not overbook its 
flights, which means that all customers have the option to select a seat at the time of 
booking.  Importantly, JetBlue is also the only airline in the U.S. that does not waive seat 
fees for certain customers, i.e., any individual who wants to sit in the premium coach 
section must pay to do so. Replicating this study on another airline would introduce 
selection bias, as customers who receive premium seat assignments for free or at a 




selection bias does not exist: all customers who reserve a premium seat must pay to do 
so. 
 The exact fee that customers pay to reserve a premium seat is known by the 
researcher and is charged on a per-flight basis. Thus, network-level effects are not 
relevant in the context of our problem, as connecting passengers would need to pay a 
separate premium seat fee for each flight on their itinerary. On the other hand, the exact 
basic fare paid by the customer is not known, as JetBlue offered both non-refundable and 
refundable fares. At the time of data collection, JetBlue’s default website search option 
displayed one non-refundable fare for each flight. However, customers could search for 
refundable fares by changing the search options (and one refundable fare for each flight 
would be displayed). Still, the data does include the price of the non-refundable one-way 
leg-based fare for the flight, which represents a floor on the actual fare paid, and is 
strongly correlated with the actual ticket fare. As we are studying price elasticity with 
respect to the seat upgrade fee and not the basic fare, the noise in the basic fare data 
represents a loss of some information, but will not trigger a fundamental bias in our 
results. 
 Finally, it is important to note that we have not included passengers who choose 
to purchase a premium seat at the time of check-in.  To do this, we would have needed to 
query JetBlue’s website multiple times within the 24 hours check-in period prior to flight 
departure. Moreover, some data would still be unobservable, as JetBlue does not sell 
tickets online in the final 90 minutes before departure, but they do sell seat upgrades at 
the airport during this time. The focus of our paper is on determining if seat map displays 




airlines have an incentive to make premium seat fees more complex by dynamically 
pricing them across the booking horizon.  Both of these problems require knowledge 
about bookings that happen prior to the day of check-in. The underlying behavioral 
problem for day of check-in premium seat purchases is distinct from the problem that 
looks at seat fee purchases at the time of the initial booking. At the time of booking, the 
addition of a $40 seat fee on top of a $200 fare may seem large whereas at the time of 
check-in, faced with sitting in the back of a full plane, a $40 fee may appear reasonable. 
The delay between the time of purchase and time of departure, in addition to more 
complete information on load factors at the time of check-in, may influence day-of-
departure upgrades. A distinct modeling approach may be advisable to examine day-of-
booking seat fee purchases versus day-of-departure seat fee purchases.  Examining day-







A binary logit model was used to calculate the probability of purchasing an EMS seat, 
given that a ticket was purchased. In this model, a customer can choose between two 
o ipt ons15
1,                                                                                     
0,            .             
:    
Several variables were compiled from the online itinerary displays and seat maps, which 
are summarized in Table 4.4.  For most of the variables, the definitions and descriptions 
are straight-forward to interpret. Variables related to seat availabilities, prices and group 
bookings merit additional discussion. 
 
  






15 Six observations (bookings) were removed from the data, as the customer did not have both regular 




Table 4.4: Variables and Descriptions 
Variable Definition 
Price Variables 
seatFeePerMile One-way EMS seat fee divided by the one-way market distance 
lowestPrice Value of one indicates booking was for the lowest priced flight available on itinerary screen 
differenceOverLowestPrice Price of booked flight minus lowest available priced flight on itinerary screen 
Seat Availability Variables1 
Regular Coach Front W/A Avail Value of one indicates regular coach window/aisle seats available in front of plane 
EMS W/A Seats Avail Value of one indicates EMS window/aisle seats available 
Regular Coach  Back1 W/A Avail Value of one indicates regular coach window/aisle seats available in back plane section 1 
Regular Coach  Back2 W/A Avail Value of one indicates regular coach window/aisle seats available in back plane section 2 
Regular Coach  Back3 W/A Avail Value of one indicates regular coach window/aisle seats available in back plane section 3 
Regular Coach Front Seats Avail Value of one indicates regular coach seats available in front of plane 
Regular Coach  Back1 Seats Avail Value of one indicates regular coach seats available in back plane section 1 
Regular Coach  Back2 Seats Avail Value of one indicates regular coach seats available in back plane section 2 
Regular Coach Back23 W/A 
Interaction 
Value of one indicates  regular coach window/aisle seats available 
in back plane sections 2 and 3 
Regular Coach Back123 W/A 
Interaction 
Value of one indicates  regular coach window/aisle seats available 
in back plane sections 1, 2 and 3 
Group Travel Variables 
NumberBookTogether1 Value of one indicates a booking made for an individual 
NumberBookTogether2 Value of one indicates a booking made for a pair traveling together 
NumberBookTogether3 Value of one indicates a booking made for three people traveling together 
NumberBookTogether4 Value of one indicates a booking made for four people traveling together 
NumberBookTogether5or6 Value of one indicates a booking made for five or six people traveling together 
Day of Week Variables 
ddow1, …., ddow7 Value of one indicates flight departs on a Sun, Mon.,…., Sat 
bdow1, …., bdow7 Value of one indicates flight was booked on a Sun, Mon.,…., Sat 
Number of Days from Flight Departure Dummy Variables 
dfd1, dfd2,…, dfd28 Value of one indicates a booking made 1, 2, …, 28 days from flight departure 
1Corresponding row numbers for each section of the plane are provided in Table 4.5. 






Table 4.4: Variables and Descriptions (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
Departure Time of Day Variables 
earlymorning Value of one indicates flight departs 5am-7:59am 
morning Value of one indicates flight departs 8am-11:59am 
afternoon Value of one indicates flight departs Noon-4:59pm 
evening Value of one indicates flight departs 5pm-8:59pm 
lateevening Value of one indicates flight departs 9pm-11:59pm 
Seat Fee and Days from Flight Departure (DFD) Interaction Variables 
seatFeePerMile_DFD1-7  seatFeePerMile for bookings made 1 to 7 days from flight departure, zero otherwise 
seatFeePerMile_DFD8-14  seatFeePerMile for bookings made 8 to 14 days from flight departure, zero otherwise 
seatFeePerMile_DFD15-28  seatFeePerMile for bookings made 15 to 28 days from flight departure, zero otherwise 
Other Variables 
Market Dummies Dummy variable for each market 
Note: EMS = Even More™ Space; 
 
 
4.5.1. Seat Availability Variables 
Seat availability variables account for seat choices available to customers when booking a 
flight. These variables divide the plane into sections and provide information on whether 
a given section has window, aisle, and/or middle seats available. The “Row/Section 
Description” column in Table 4.5 shows how we grouped each of the rows into five main 
sections of the plane. Creating a set of variables to describe seat maps proved to be 
challenging due to two underlying factors: (1) planes fill up in a systematic way, i.e., 
customers prefer seats in the front of the plane; and, (2) when a section of a plane fills up, 
window and aisle seats always sell out before middle seats, i.e., customers prefer window 
and aisle seats.  
 In order to capture these two underlying factors, two seat availability variables are 
associated with each section of the plane.  For example, when the Regular Coach Front 




the Regular Coach Front W/A Avail dummy variable is 0 (indicating that no window or 
aisle seats are available in this section), this indicates that only middle seats are available 
in the Regular Coach Front of Plane section. When both of the indicator variables are 1, 
this indicates that at least one window or aisle seat in addition to at least one middle seat 
are available in that section. When both indicators are zero, this means no seats are 
available to reserve in that section. Note that not all dummy variables for each section of 
the plane are included in the model specification due to the systematic way in which 
planes fill up. First, there were only six observations in which all EMS seats were sold; 
these observations were excluded from the analysis, thus we do not include an indicator 
for the EMS middle seats. Also, there were no observations in which a plane had all 
middle seats in the back of the plane section 3 sold, so we do not include an indicator for 
the middle seats of this section. 
 Table 4.5 shows mean seat occupancy rates calculated from seat maps observed 
the day before the flight departs. A value of 0.84 means that a seat was reserved before 
departing for 84% of the planes observed. Table 4.5 confirms that passengers prefer seats 
at the front of the plane and, in general, prefer window and aisle seats over middle seats, 
although middle seats towards the front of the plane have occupancy rates similar to 
window or aisle seats in the back of the plane. Middle seats in the EMS section have the 






Table 4.5: Mean Seat Occupancies the Day before Flight Departure  
Row 
Number 





















1 Blocked Blocked Blocked Blocked Blocked Blocked Blocked Row 
2 0.72 0.43 0.79 0.77 0.35 0.63 
EMS Seats 3 0.56 0.30 0.72 0.68 0.27 0.50 
4 0.44 0.26 0.62 0.60 0.22 0.39 
5 0.39 0.21 0.55 0.55 0.19 0.35 
6 0.98 Blocked Blocked Blocked Blocked 0.98 
Regular Coach 
Front of Plane 
7 0.99 0.92 0.98 0.99 0.91 0.97 
8 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.98 0.87 0.98 
9 0.95 0.78 0.98 0.98 0.77 0.93 
10 0.25 0.13 0.43 0.43 0.09 0.19 EMS- Exit 
Row 11 0.26 0.10 0.44 0.43 0.09 0.24 
12 0.97 0.81 0.98 0.98 0.79 0.96 
Regular Coach 
Back of Plane 
Section 1 
13 0.96 0.75 0.97 0.97 0.72 0.95 
14 0.96 0.75 0.96 0.97 0.72 0.95 
15 0.95 0.71 0.96 0.97 0.69 0.94 
16 0.94 0.69 0.95 0.95 0.68 0.94 
17 0.94 0.64 0.94 0.93 0.64 0.92 
Regular Coach 
Back of Plane 
Section 2 
18 0.92 0.63 0.92 0.92 0.61 0.90 
19 0.90 0.59 0.91 0.90 0.55 0.88 
20 0.86 0.56 0.87 0.88 0.53 0.85 
21 0.83 0.51 0.86 0.84 0.51 0.83 
22 0.81 0.46 0.82 0.82 0.45 0.80 
Regular Coach 
Back of Plane 
Section 3 
23 0.79 0.43 0.79 0.78 0.40 0.75 
24 0.75 0.36 0.75 0.75 0.35 0.69 
25 0.58 0.10 0.63 Blocked Blocked Blocked 
 
 
4.5.2. Flight Price Variables 
We included two variables in the model that provides information as to whether the 
customer purchased a ticket for a nonstop flight that had the lowest fare available. These 
variables do not imply that all customers purchased the lowest fare. These variables do, 




a lower fare was available for the same departure date, but at a different departure time. 
Intuitively, we expect customers who purchase a fare on a flight that does not have the 
lowest fare to be more willing to also purchase seat upgrades. 
 A total of 10,699 itinerary screens (which provide a list of available flight choices 
and fares to customers) are observed in this dataset. Over all of the observed itinerary 
screens, tickets were booked for flights with fares ranging between $39 and $654 (with 
mean $157 and median $129). Out of these screens, 57% of the screens offer customers 
the same price for every flight, and 43% of the screens have at least one flight with a 
different price. LowestPrice is a dummy variable that indicates whether the booking was 
for the lowest priced flight[s] available on the itinerary screen.  
 For the screens that offer customers flights with different prices, the fare 
difference between the highest and lowest priced flights offered on the screen ranges 
from a difference of $4 to a difference of $417 (with mean difference of $40 and median 
difference of $15). DifferenceOverLowestPrice provides information on how much more 
expensive the booked flight was relative to the lowest priced flight available to purchase.  
For itinerary screens with varied flight prices, 59% of the observed bookings were made 
for the lowest priced flights. A priori, it is expected that customers who purchase tickets 
on higher priced flights are less price elastic (less price-sensitive) and may be more likely 






4.5.3. Group Booking Variables 
Dummy variables (NumberBookTogether1, NumberBookTogether2,…, NumberBook- 
Together5or6) were created to represent groups of people booking flights together. To do 
this, a few assumptions had to be made. If only one seat in a row was booked, then the 
booking is assumed to be made by an individual. If two seats were booked together in a 
row, then the booking is assumed to be a pair traveling together. The same logic is used 
to determine whether three, four, five, or six people booked together. We also assume 
that people traveling together do not book seats in different rows. Since there are six seats 
in a row, any groups larger than 6 would not be counted as the same group16.   
 An estimated 53% of the bookings are for individuals traveling alone, 32% of the 
bookings are made for two people traveling together, 9% of the bookings are made for 
three people together, 4% are for four people together, and the remaining 2% of bookings 
are made for groups of five or six people. 
 
4.6. Model Results 
Model coefficients, shown in Table 4.6 are intuitive and indicate that EMS seat purchases 
are influenced by seat fees and seat displays, along with flight and passenger 
characteristics.  
 






16 Although these assumptions are not perfect, they are necessary because no customer information could 




Table 4.6: Binary Logit Model Results 
  Coefficient z P>z1 
Price and Travel Time 
seatFeePerMile_DFD1-7 Interaction -32.5201 -10.24 0.000 
seatFeePerMile_DFD8-14 Interaction -38.0552 -12.37 0.000 
seatFeePerMile_DFD15-28 Interaction -44.7677 -11.25 0.000 
lowestPrice -0.3471 -5.45 0.000 
differenceOverLowestPrice 0.0011 1.91 0.056 
Seat Availability Variables  
Regular Coach Front W/A Avail 0.0972 2.30 0.021 
EMS W/A Seats Avail 0.3045 3.16 0.002 
Regular Coach  Back1 W/A Avail 0.2493 3.57 0.000 
Regular Coach  Back2 W/A Avail 0.1304 1.06 0.290 
Regular Coach  Back3 W/A Avail -0.4214 -6.03 0.000 
Regular Coach  Front Seats Avail -0.0609 -2.04 0.042 
Regular Coach  Back1 Seats Avail -0.1694 -3.04 0.002 
Regular Coach  Back2 Seats Avail -0.2027 -2.03 0.042 
Regular Coach Back23 W/A Interaction -0.4153 -3.30 0.001 
Regular Coach Back123 W/A Interaction -0.3001 -3.39 0.001 
Group Travel Variables (reference variable is NumberBookTogether5or6) 
NumberBookTogether1 (Individual) 0.6736 2.43 0.015 
NumberBookTogether2 (Pair) 0.9388 3.57 0.000 
NumberBookTogether3 0.7990 3.00 0.003 
NumberBookTogether4 0.6083 1.98 0.048 
Departure Day of Week Variables (reference variable is ddow7-Saturday Departure) 
ddow1 (Sunday Departure) 0.2619 3.16 0.002 
ddow2 (Monday Departure) 0.0806 1.86 0.063 
ddow3 (Tuesday Departure) 0.1902 2.74 0.006 
ddow4 (Wednesday Departure) 0.2095 2.65 0.008 
ddow5 (Thursday Departure) 0.2750 4.29 0.000 
ddow6 (Friday Departure) 0.2043 2.76 0.006 
Booking Day of Week Variables  
bdow1 (Book on Sunday) -0.1094 -2.01 0.045 
Number of Days from Flight Departure Dummies (reference variables are dfd19-dfd28)2 
dfd1 0.7607 6.19 0.000 
dfd2 0.3998 2.16 0.031 
dfd3 0.5096 3.56 0.000 
dfd4 0.4883 3.05 0.002 
dfd5 0.5387 3.64 0.000 
dfd6 0.2216 1.59 0.112 
dfd7 0.3108 2.05 0.041 
dfd8 0.4461 2.96 0.003 
dfd9 0.3991 2.59 0.010 
dfd10 0.1677 1.14 0.253 
dfd11 0.1640 1.15 0.249 
dfd12 0.3175 2.25 0.025 
Departure Time of Day (reference variable is evening-depart 5pm-8:59pm) 
earlymorning (depart 5am-7:59am) -0.1370 -1.01 0.311 
morning (depart 8am-11:59am) 0.2027 3.22 0.001 
afternoon (depart Noon-4:59pm) 0.2132 3.64 0.000 
lateevening (depart 9pm-11:59pm) -0.3478 -3.47 0.001 
1Reported z-statistics and p-values are based on clustering standard errors by market. 






4.6.1. Seat Availabilities 
The coefficients associated with the seat availability dummy variables show that 
premium coach seat purchases are influenced by seat displays.  To visualize the influence 
of seat availabilities on premium seat purchases, we identified 13 representative seat map 
displays or “scenarios” from the data.  Because customers tend to make free seat 
reservations systematically (closer to the front of the plane is preferred over further back, 
and widow and aisle seats are preferred over middle seats), these 13 scenarios represent 
86% of the seat map displays viewed by customers at the time of booking.   
 Descriptive statistics for these 13 seat map displays are shown in Table 4.7, along 
with the partial utilities calculated from the seat availability variables from the binary 
logit results.  One interesting finding of note is that the utility associated with purchasing 
an EMS seat varies quite little among the first six scenarios, when there are still plenty of 
window and aisle seats available in the front and back of the plane (especially back 
sections 1 and 2). On the other hand, the utility of the upgrade increases dramatically 
after there are no window and aisle seats left (Scenarios 10-13), and large increases are 
observed with every block of middle seats that fills. Customers who book 1 to 3 days 
from departure (DFD) are two times more likely to purchase an EMS seat when faced 
with a full plane (Scenario 13) vs. an empty plane (Scenario 1) (i.e., 37.9% of bookings 
made 1 to 3 days from departure include an EMS seat for Scenario 13 vs. 18.7% for 
Scenario 1). Comparing seat availabilities scenarios for each DFD category indicates that 
customers are between 2 and 3.3 times more likely to purchase EMS seats when faced 






ability of JetBlue to collect seat reservation fees is strongly tied to seat map displays and 
corresponding load factors.   
 
4.6.2. Premium Seat Fees 
Table 4.7 also allows us to investigate price sensitivities of bookings made closer to 
departure while also controlling for load factors at the time of booking. For example, 
those customers who book a flight on an empty plane (Scenario 1) between 1 and 3 DFD 
are 1.7 times more likely to purchase an EMS seat than those customers who book further 
in advance (DFD 22 to 28) on an empty plane (18.7% vs. 10.8% of observed bookings 
include an EMS purchase). Comparing bookings made closer to departure (DFD 1 to 3) 
to bookings made further in advance (DFD 22 to 28) for each scenario indicates that 
customers are between 1.1 and 2.1 times more likely to purchase EMS seats when they 
book closer to departure. This is also reflected in the coefficients associated with the 
premium seat fees, i.e., the seatFeePerMile for purchases made 15-28 days from 
departure is more negative (-44.77) than the coefficients associated with purchases made 
8-14 days from departure (-38.05) and 1-7 days from departure (-32.5). These 
coefficients show that customers who purchase closer to flight departure are less price-
sensitive. This suggests that airlines may be able to dynamically price seat fees and 
charge higher seat fees closer to the departure date.  
 
Table 4.7: Percent of EMS Bookings by Seat Availability Scenarios and Days from Flight Departure (DFD) 
Scenario 
Number 
Are Window and/or Aisle Seats 
Available? 
Are Middle1 Seats 
Available? 
Percent EMS Bookings by DFD 
Partial
Utility 
EMS Regular Coach Sections DFD  1 to 3 
DFD  
4 to 7 
DFD 
 8 to 14 
DFD  
15 to 21 
DFD  
22 to 28 
Over all 
DFD Front Back1 Back2 Back3 Front Back1 Back2 
Scenario with regular coach window and/or aisle seats available in Front, Back 1, Back 2, Back 3 
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18.7% 16.8% 13.2% 13.1% 10.8% 12.7% -0.788 
Scenarios with regular coach window and/or aisle seats available only in Back 1, Back 2, Back 3 
2 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 21.7% 18.7% 13.6% 12.0% 11.9% 13.7% -0.886 
3 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 18.5% 19.0% 16.3% 12.3% 14.7% 15.1% -0.825 
Scenarios with regular coach window and/or aisle seats available only in Back 2, Back 3 
4 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 23.2% 19.3% 15.7% 14.9% 12.6% 16.4% -0.835 
5 Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 24.9% 17.5% 16.6% 15.8% 11.5% 16.7% -0.774 
6 Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 30.1% 22.3% 18.9% 18.6% 22.3% 21.1% -0.604 
Scenarios with regular coach window and/or aisle seats available only in Back 3 
7 Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 29.8% 26.4% 21.9% 20.8% 17.6% 23.5% -0.550 
8 Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes 29.3% 24.2% 24.7% 20.0% 20.1% 24.3% -0.489 
9 Yes No No No Yes No No Yes 37.3% 35.0% 22.3% 32.4% 20.0% 31.1% -0.320 
Scenarios with no regular coach window and/or aisle seats available in any section of the plane 
10 Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 38.2% 41.5% 40.7% 30.9% 31.3% 38.4% -0.129 
11 Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 40.3% 34.0% 35.0% 26.8% 32.1% 35.1% -0.068 
12 Yes No No No No No No Yes 40.8% 44.1% 34.0% 32.6% 36.5% 38.9% 0.102 
13 Yes No No No No No No No 37.9% 47.7% 42.3% 43.3% 26.3% 42.2% 0.304 
Note: EMS = Even More™ Space. See Table 4.5 for details about the row numbers that correspond to each section.   




4.6.3. Nonstop Flight Characteristics 
EMS seat purchases are influenced by many itinerary characteristics including the price 
that paid for the flight, departure day of week and time of day, and market effects. 
 The model coefficients for lowestPrice and differenceOverLowestPrice show that 
customers who purchased a ticket on a flight with a higher fare when a lower fare was 
available on a flight departing at a different time of the day are more likely to purchase an 
EMS seat. Moreover, the higher the fare difference that customers paid over the lowest 
priced flight, the more likely they are to purchase a seat. This corroborates our intuition 
that customers who purchase a fare on a flight that does not have the lowest fare are less 
price-sensitive. 
 Flight day of week and time of day effects also impact EMS seat purchases. 
Customers are more likely to purchase EMS seats for Sunday and Thursday departures, 
which are days in which business customers are likely to travel. With respect to departure 
time, customers who book flights with departure times between 8:00 am and 4:59 pm are 
more likely to purchase EMS seats than other flight times. 
 Market level fixed effects (dummy variables) are included in the model and are 
significant, but are not included in the table for space purposes. Coefficients on the 
markets showed that two markets were especially different than the other markets. For 
the two markets with destinations in Puerto Rico, customers were much less likely to 
purchase EMS seats. Seat fees are already priced particularly low in these markets. 
Flights from JFK to Rafael Hernández Airport (BQN) in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico have an 
EMS seat fee of $30, which is 1.9 cents per mile and is the lowest seat fee per mile out of 
all the markets collected. Flights from Orlando International Airport (MCO) in Florida to 
117 
 
BQN have an EMS seat fee of $25, which is 2.2 cents per mile and is the third lowest seat 
fee per mile out of all the markets collected. The low price of the seat fees in these 
markets, coupled with model results indicating that customers are far less likely to 
purchase EMS seats in these markets shows that customers flying to Puerto Rico are 
highly price-sensitive. The demographics of New York and Orlando also suggest that 
these flights may have a larger percentage of customers who are visiting friends and 
family and neither traveling on business nor splurging on a vacation.  
 
4.6.4. Passenger Characteristics 
EMS seat purchases are influenced by several passenger characteristics including group 
bookings, booking day of week, and how far in advance of departure the customer books 
a flight.  
 The group booking variables indicate that two people traveling together are more 
likely to purchase EMS seats than individuals and larger groups. Also, a group of three 
people booking together are more likely to purchase EMS seats than individuals and 
larger groups. The results show that groups of four or more are the least likely to 
purchase EMS seats, which seems to reflect price sensitivity of families traveling 
together. A family of four who purchases EMS seats could expect to pay an extra $60 to 
$260 one-way, or $120 to $520 round-trip, for the family to sit in an EMS section. These 
prices may be too high for many families who are already paying for multiple plane 
tickets. 
 With respect to the booking day of week, customers who book on Sunday are less 






4.6.5. Prediction Accuracy 
The results related to days from departure, price sensitivities, and seat map displays may 
be confounded in the sense that the least desirable seat maps occur closer to flight 
departure when we expect price-insensitive business travelers to book.  This suggests that 
the estimated binary logit model could really be capturing different passenger mixes 
across the booking horizon, and not the effects of seat map displays. To test the 
robustness of results, we compared predicted EMS seat purchase percentages across the 
booking horizon to observed predicted EMS seat purchase percentages, shown in Table 
4.8. In general, the model performs well, particularly at the aggregate level over all days 
from departure and over all scenarios. For example, the predicted percentage of EMS seat 
purchases over all DFD for Scenario 1 has an error of 0.23. Table 4.7 showed that 12.7% 
of bookings were observed to include an EMS seat purchase. Thus, the model predicts 
that 12.93% of bookings include an EMS seat purchase. 
 
Table 4.8: Prediction Accuracy of EMS Seat Purchases for Seat Availability Scenarios and Days from Flight Departure (DFD)   
Scenario 
Number1 
Difference Between Predicted and Observed Percent of EMS Purchases  
(Number of Bookings Made Under Each Scenario) for: 
DFD 1 to 3 DFD 4 to 7 DFD 8 to 14 DFD 15 to 21 DFD 22 to 28 Over all DFD 
1  1.54 (386)  0.15 (871)  1.15 (2,457) -1.02 (3,614)  0.63 (4,748)  0.23 (12,076) 
2 -0.20 (503) -1.63 (921)  0.66 (2,309)  0.26 (2,325)  0.05 (2,372)  0.08 (8,430) 
3 -0.29 (173) -1.76 (305) -1.33 (882)  0.49 (927) -2.59 (832) -1.11 (3,119) 
4 -1.25 (715)  0.29 (1,414)  0.84 (2,757) -0.01 (1,967)  1.13 (1,102)  0.39 (7,955) 
5 -3.39 (394)  0.91 (750)  0.55 (1,637) -0.46 (1,009)  2.80 (513)  0.29 (4,303) 
6 -8.49 (73)  0.49 (148)  0.33 (254) -0.66 (145) -6.04 (94) -1.58 (714) 
7 -1.14 (449)  0.41 (656)  0.63 (1,116)  0.33 (475)  0.79 (284)  0.28 (2,980) 
8 -0.83 (501)  1.59 (920) -1.78 (965)  0.23 (444) -1.47 (189) -0.28 (3,019) 
9 -6.10 (212) -6.77 (223)  4.11 (233) -10.31 (68)  0.60 (20) -3.35 (756) 
10  1.76 (314) -3.83 (489) -8.12 (548) -1.26 (262) -5.8 0(96) -3.90 (1,709) 
11  1.17 (760)  3.28 (995) -1.95 (882)  1.95 (306) -7.56 (81)  0.80 (3,024) 
12  3.94 (610) -0.87 (576)  2.38 (579)  1.32 (175) -2.80 (63)  1.67 (2,003) 
13  10.85 (264) -0.74 (241) -0.53 (241) -2.02 (67)  15.39 (19)  3.26 (832) 
Over all 
Scenarios:  0.00 (7,118)  0.00 (10,414)  0.00 (17,316) -0.17 (13,088)  0.20 (11,306)  0.30 (59,242) 
1See Table 4.5 for the seat availabilities of each scenario and observed probabilities 
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4.7. Policy Analysis  
In this section, we investigate revenue potentials associated with optimizing the current 
static seat fee structure, dynamically pricing seat fees, and by changing seat displays by 
showing seats as being unavailable to customers.  The latter would occur if an airline 
decided to reserve additional seats for its premier customers. 
 
4.7.1. Optimizing Static Seat Fees 
We can use the results from our binary logit model to determine optimal seat fees by 
calculating the expected revenue for each customer. This is found by multiplying the 
upgrade fee by the probability that a customer will actually purchase an upgrade.  
Although customers’ price sensitivities are seen to vary as a function of days from 
departure, most airlines currently do not have the technological capability to charge 
different fees across the booking horizon.  Thus, it is interesting to examine whether the 
static seat fees currently charged by JetBlue are optimal.  
 The optimal static seat fees derived from our model are shown in Table 4.9.  With 
the exception of two markets (JFKORD and MCOAUS), JetBlue’s seat fees are currently 
underpriced, particularly in the east coast to west coast markets.  Charging optimal static 
fees would increase expected revenues by 8.0% (from $476,245 to $514,530) for the 
observed data. 
 To test the sensitivity of the seat fee optimization results, we generated a 
distribution for the revenue forecast by using the variance-covariance matrix of parameter 
estimates from the binary logit model. The estimated seat fee revenue that the optimal 
seat fees would generate at the 25th percentile of the distribution is $509,740 and at the 
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75th percentile is $519,145, which represents a 7.0% and 9.0% revenue increase, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4.9: Optimal Seat Fees by Market 
Market 







Haul1 DFD  
1 to 7 
DFD  
8 to 14 
DFD  
15 to 28 
JFKBQN $52 $44 $36 $44 $30 E-PR 
MCOBQN $37 $31 $26 $33 $25 E-PR 
BOSIAD $20 $16 $13 $17 $15 E-E 
BOSMCO $45 $37 $30 $37 $30 E-E 
BUFMCO $39 $32 $26 $34 $25 E-E 
EWRMCO $38 $30 $24 $31 $19 E-E 
IADMCO $35 $28 $22 $38 $25 E-E 
JFKFLL $44 $35 $28 $38 $35 E-E 
JFKPBI $46 $37 $30 $37 $35 E-E 
LGAFLL $47 $37 $30 $40 $35 E-E 
SYRMCO $43 $35 $28 $34 $25 E-E 
BOSDEN $69 $57 $45 $57 $40 E-MW 
JFKORD $32 $25 $20 $25 $30 E-MW 
MCOAUS $40 $32 $26 $33 $35 E-MW 
BOSLAX $104 $82 $67 $85 $50 E-W 
BOSSFO $116 $95 $76 $96 $55 E-W 
FLLSFO $93 $76 $63 $80 $50 E-W 
JFKLAS $94 $76 $62 $79 $50 E-W 
JFKLAX $106 $86 $68 $87 $50 E-W 
JFKOAK $110 $90 $71 $89 $60 E-W 
JFKPDX $93 $77 $62 $76 $50 E-W 
JFKSFO $116 $92 $76 $99 $60 E-W 
1E-PR = East coast to Puerto Rico flights, E-E = East coast to east coast flights, E-MW = East coast to Midwest flights,     
E-W = East coast to west coast flights (JFKLAS is included due to length of haul). 
 
4.7.2. Dynamically Pricing Seat Fees 
Since the binary logit model results indicate that customers who book tickets closer to the 
date of flight departure are less price sensitive, we examine a pricing strategy which sets 




each route and DFD category, prices are set to maximize expected revenue based on the 
actual observations in the data. The optimal dynamic seat fees for each market are shown 
in Table 4.9. 
 The seat fees calculated using this dynamic pricing approach appear reasonable. 
Optimal seat fees for 15 days from departure and up are similar to the current seat fees 
that JetBlue is charging in each market. However, our results show that there is potential 
to charge higher prices closer to departure. Optimal dynamic seat fees would increase 
expected seat fee revenues by 10.2% (from $476,245 to $524,875) for the observed data.  
Compared to the baseline that optimizes static seat fees, this represents an additional 
2.0% increase in expected seat fee revenues. A sensitivity analysis of these dynamic fees 
shows that the estimated seat fee revenue that the optimal seat fees would generate at the 
25th percentile of the distribution is $518,510 and at the 75th percentile is $531,075, 
which represents an 8.9% and 11.5% revenue increase, respectively. Compared to the 
baseline that optimizes static seat fees, optimal dynamic seat fees represent an additional 
0.8% to 3.2% increase in expected seat fee revenues. 
 Our results suggest that future increases in seat fees are likely; however the 
revenue gains associated with dynamically pricing fees across the horizon are not at a 
level that will likely justify technological investments for an airline the size of JetBlue. 
The expected revenue gains from dynamic pricing are only on the order of about $1-4 
million, set against a cost of upgrading reservations and data systems that may well 
exceed that. Larger airlines, on the other hand, whose seat fee revenues are several times 





4.7.3. Influence of Seat Map Displays that Block Seats 
We can also use our model to examine the revenue potential of strategically blocking 
certain regular coach seats from reservations during the booking process, effectively 
making the plane appear more fully reserved than it is at the time of booking. We apply 
the same simulation technique as described above for determining optimal static seat 
fees, but artificially close certain seating positions for all new reservations. When all 
regular coach seats in the front of the plane (rows 6-9) and back of the plane section 1 
(rows 12-16) are indicated as “unavailable” for every traveler making a new reservation, 
using the actual seat fees offered by JetBlue, the model indicates that the interquartile 
range of expected revenue is $523,250 to $550,290, with a mean of $537,350 (which 
represents a 9.9% to 15.5% revenue increase, with a mean of 12.8%). In other words, if 
JetBlue were to leave their seat fees unchanged and instead blocked certain rows of seats 
for premier customers, they could potentially increase revenues by 9.9% to 15.5%. 
 Of course, implementing such a reservation system is a complex change, and the 
effects would reach far beyond the seat fee revenues. Once the rear sections of the plane 
filled, either regular coach seats in these sections (front of the plane and back of the plane 
section 1) would need to be released (improving free seat availability in the late DFD 
times when willingness to pay is higher) or JetBlue would need to abandon its policy of 
allowing all travelers to choose seats at the time of booking (altering an important 
branding feature and potentially negatively impacting other revenues). Moreover, if 
passengers learn to expect that those seats are vacant and/or will be filled before 
departure, some of them (especially frequent fliers, who may have a higher willingness to 




seats) may shop for EMS upgrades more strategically, with results that cannot be 
predicted using the current data and model. However, the results suggest that, with or 
without other pricing changes, by blocking some seats from the reservation process it 
may be possible to nudge some customers into purchasing EMS seats when they would 
not otherwise do so.  
 
4.8. Discussion 
The results of this study are based on a subset of JetBlue markets and equipment types.  
This prevents us from extrapolating our results to different markets, different equipment 
types, and different airlines.  However, this does not prevent us from quantifying the 
relative importance of two questions that are at the core of tensions among customers, 
regulatory agencies, and airlines: customers and regulatory agencies are focusing on the 
importance of fee transparency and fairness, but airlines want to add complexity to 
further differentiate fees across customer groups (e.g., by blocking seats for preferred 
customers) so as to capture more of the consumer surplus. 
 The results from our study suggest that in the future, we can expect to see further 
increases in premium seat fees as airlines begin to better understand customers’ 
willingness to pay for seat products. However, changing an airline’s technological 
infrastructure to facilitate dynamic pricing imposes relatively high fixed costs. These 
costs are probably reasonable and recoupable for the mega-carriers emerging from the 
past few years of airline mergers, but we do not anticipate seeing dynamic pricing of 




 Further, it is interesting to note that blocking seats (and leaving current seat fees 
unchanged) has as much revenue potential as optimizing current static fees. That is, by 
reducing the number of “good” seats that are available to reserve for free to all 
passengers, it is possible to increase seat fee revenues overall. Some airlines already 
implement some form of this system, such as British Airways, which limits all seat 
reservations before check-in to premier and fee-paying customers. This underscores the 
importance of ensuring customers are not inadvertently misled into purchasing premium 
seats by seat map displays that block seats for premier customers. 
 At the industry level, our study provides some insights into potential strategic 
directions of airlines. As airlines make plans to acquire and configure new aircraft, they 
must make decisions about cabin layout and amenities, and ideally these decisions should 
seek to provide the best return on investment over the long term. Although there have 
been some limited stated-preference studies into customer behavior (Weinstein and 
Keller, 2012), it is unclear what customers really value in a premium product. Further, 
airlines currently use two basic approaches to designing a premium product. They can 
create a product that is appealing to customers based on the attributes that it offers, or 
they can make the basic coach experience so unpleasant that customers will be willing to 
pay to escape to the upgraded offering. From a customer’s perspective, it is obvious 
which the preferred approach is, but when considered simply as a business decision taken 
by an airline, it is less clear. There is an obvious tradeoff between the revenue from seats 
that provide extra legroom and the number of seats that can be put on a plane. As noted in 
our findings, there are many price sensitive customers that are not willing to pay more for 




relatives (e.g., Puerto Rico) and for vacation markets (e.g., Orlando), and the airline 
might be better off with more tickets/seats to sell. This may lead airlines to consider two 
different configurations with the same fleet type, one with more premium seats and one 
with more coach seats.  
 The industry is still trying to figure out the best model for seat upgrades, and the 
landscape continues to change. For example, Spirit makes no claim to have a more 
comfortable experience then their competitors, and they do not have a premium product, 
yet their business model is viable. That could, and likely would, change if industry 
capacity increases, but for now their business model is paying off. Virgin America has 
the opposite model.  They have first class seats that are quite appealing, but they have not 
been able to get a price premium that justifies the opportunity cost and are currently in 
dire financial straits. Looking ahead, we can expect to see premium seat fee models 
evolve and potentially change as a function of industry load factors. 
 
4.9. Conclusion 
This paper has provided one of the first studies of airline customers’ premium coach seat 
purchasing behavior. This is also the first study we are aware of that uses an online 
database of airline fares and seat maps. All prior studies using online airline data have 
been based solely on fare information and have excluded seat maps.   
 Our study provides several new behavioral insights.  As planes fill up, customers 
are more likely to purchase a premium coach seat, regardless of how far in advance they 
purchase a ticket.  Results indicate that JetBlue (and other airlines) can dynamically price 




gains associated with dynamically pricing seat fees are expected to be modest, and likely 
insufficient for smaller airlines to justify the large fixed costs of technology investments 
required to implement dynamic seat fees.  
 The results of this study also suggest that the willingness of customers to pay seat 
fees is strongly tied to load factors (as revealed through seat maps). This has several 
implications. First, concerns expressed by customers and government officials about the 
importance of clearly communicating airlines’ seat policies appear valid. It is important 
to ensure that customers are not being misled into making premium seat fee purchases by 
the information displayed on seat maps. Second, the U.S. airline industry is currently 
going through a series of mergers and acquisitions, and has seen a reduction in overall 
domestic capacity, which has led to record-high load factors.  In an environment in which 
load factors are high, the airlines’ ability to generate revenues from seat fees is strong, 
and several industry pricing models related to seat fees are viable.  However, if load 
factors decrease in the future, we would expect that the incremental revenues generated 
from seat fee reservations would also decrease. 
 There are several extensions of our work that could be addressed by using stated 
preference surveys. Currently, it is unclear what specific attributes of premium coach 
seats are valued by customers, and how these valuations may differ across customer 
segments.  For example, do customers purchasing JetBlue’s premium coach seats value 
extra legroom?  Do they value the ability to board first and store luggage in overhead 
bins?  Do they value the ability to deplane first and have more time to make connecting 
flights?  Do they value having an empty middle seat next to them?  Determining the value 




provide the most value for customers. It will also help airlines determine whether they 
should invest in adding sections in coach that offer extra legroom, or simply sell existing 
coach seats that provide early boarding and alighting privileges.  This is a particularly 
important decision for carriers, as removing planes from service to remove row(s) of 
seats to add extra legroom is costly, particularly when planes are flying near record-high 
load factor levels.  The revenues generated by selling extra legroom seats needs to 
outweigh any revenues lost by removing seats from the aircraft.  As suggested by our 
analysis, carriers should consider a range of load factors in any break-even analysis 
related to adding extra legroom seats to coach.  
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CHAPTER 5: REVIEW OF PRICE ENDOGENEITY 
 
5.1. Abstract 
Price endogeneity occurs when correlation exists between price and the error term (or 
unobserved factors) in a model. In demand models, prices are generally considered to be 
endogenous because prices are strongly influenced by demand and demand is, in turn, 
strongly influenced by prices. Price endogeneity is well documented in economics 
literature and is known to cause problems when analyzing data, as endogeneity can lead 
to unrealistic and misleading model coefficient estimates. Although price endogeneity 
has been shown to be prevalent in many industries, few studies of air travel demand have 
explored endogenous airline prices. In this chapter, we explain the causes of endogeneity 
and review literature that has corrected for price endogeneity, focusing on empirical 
studies that have demonstrated endogeneity bias in coefficient estimates. Instrumental 
variable methods, which are used to correct for endogeneity, are discussed. Also, several 
different types of instruments are reviewed, and studies that have utilized each type of 
instrument are cited as examples. Finally, tests for endogenous regressors, valid 
instruments, and weak instruments are discussed, and corresponding Stata® codes are 








An explanatory variable is called endogenous when there is correlation between that 
variable and the error term (or unobserved factors) in a model. In Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression models, this correlation means that the conditional expectation of the 
error term on the explanatory variable will not be equal to zero, which violates a main 
assumption required to ensure estimator consistency (Greene, 2003). Similarly, in 
discrete choice models, this correlation will lead to inconsistent estimators. Thus, models 
that are estimated without correcting for endogeneity will lead to inconsistent parameter 
estimates where some level of unobserved bias will exist.   
 In this chapter, we explain the causes of endogeneity and review some of the 
literature that has corrected for price endogeneity, focusing on empirical studies that have 
demonstrated endogeneity bias in coefficient estimates. Instrumental variable methods, 
which are used to correct for endogeneity, are discussed and different types of 
instruments are reviewed. Finally, tests for endogenous regressors, valid instruments, and 
weak instruments are discussed, and corresponding Stata® codes are provided.  
 This chapter provides an overview of the main concerns related to endogeneity 
and provides a literature review of some of the most cited papers. Where appropriate, 
applications in travel demand are discussed. Readers are referred to books by Greene 
(2003) and Train (2009) and a dissertation by Guevara-Cue (2010) for excellent 







5.2.1. Causes of Endogeneity 
 There are several known causes of endogeneity. One of the main causes of price 
endogeneity is referred to as simultaneity of supply and demand, which occurs when 
price influences demand, and demand influences price. As an example, airline revenue 
management strategies change prices in response to demand (ticket purchases). Also, 
consumers are expected to change their purchasing behavior in response to price. Thus, 
airfares are expected to be endogenous.    
 Omitted variables can also cause endogeneity when one or more relevant 
explanatory variables have been omitted from the model. Endogeneity occurs when the 
omitted variable (often unobserved attributes of the product) affects demand and is also 
correlated with price. Theoretically, airline demand models could suffer from omitted 
variable bias if there are unobserved attributes of flights that influence customer choice 
and are also correlated with price.  For example, variables that are not often captured in 
discrete choice models are variables related to entertainment (such as free Wi-Fi on some 
flights or equipment types). If free Wi-Fi influences customer choice of a flight and is 
also correlated with the price of a flight, then Wi-Fi would be an example of an omitted 
variable that causes endogeneity. 
 Endogeneity can also occur as a result of measurement error when an independent 
variable is not measured perfectly. This could occur in airline demand models if we do 







5.2.2. Endogeneity Bias 
When models are estimated without correcting for price endogeneity, parameter estimates 
are not consistently estimated, i.e., the model suffers from endogeneity bias. The 
endogeneity bias will be present in the coefficient of the endogenous variable, but is often 
present in the coefficients of the exogenous variables as well. When variable coefficients 
are biased, other common measures calculated from the coefficients, such as price 
elasticities and value-of-time (VOT) estimates, will also be biased.  
 To understand the direction of the bias better, it is helpful to think through the 
problem. In supply and demand models, when demand for a product is high firms often 
increase prices, and customers are willing to pay the higher prices to have access to the 
inventory. As a result, traditional modeling techniques will underestimate the influence of 
price on demand. In fact, sometimes traditional modeling techniques may even estimate 
that price positively impacts demand, which is counterintuitive. 
 
5.2.2.1. Evidence of Endogeneity Bias in Air Travel Demand Literature 
Within the airline literature, few studies have corrected for price endogeneity in models 
of air travel demand. Hsiao (2008) estimates discrete choice models of aggregate 
quarterly air passenger demand using aggregate quarterly data from DB1B and T100.  
Hsiao finds that without correcting for endogeneity, fare coefficients are underestimated, 




example, in three uncorrected models, VOT is estimated to be between $614 and $726 
per hour (between 39 and 46 times larger than the median wage rate of 2004)17. After 
correcting for endogeneity, VOT is estimated to be $16.7 and $21.3 per hour, which is 
much more reasonable. Additionally, Hsiao shows that in models which did not account 
for endogeneity, mean fare elasticity estimates of market demand were inelastic (between 
-0.154 and -0.365), whereas in models that corrected for endogeneity the mean fare 
elasticity estimates of market demand were elastic (between -1.052 and -2.662). 
  In a more recent study, Granados, Gupta and Kauffman (2012) estimate log-
linear regression models and estimate price elasticity of demand for air travel booked 
through online and offline channels. The authors use a dataset of airline bookings sold by 
travel agencies through global distribution systems (GDSs)18. In a model estimated on the 
whole dataset, price elasticity of demand is estimated to be inelastic (-0.14) in an OLS 
regression model that did not correct for endogeneity. However, in a model that corrected 
for endogeneity, fare elasticity of demand is estimated to be approximately unit elastic 
(-1.03).  
 Berry and Jia (2009) estimate the impact of demand and supply changes on airline 
profitability using a random-coefficient discrete choice model of demand and aggregate 
quarterly data from DB1B. Gayle (2004) uses aggregate quarterly data from DB1B to 






17 Hsiao (2008) notes that these percentages are based on the U.S. median wage rate of 2004, which was 
$15.96 per hour (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). 
18 GDSs include ticket sales made via online and offline channels through travel agencies but exclude 




investigate air passenger itinerary choice behavior. Both studies correct for price 
endogeneity but do not report the change in parameter estimates for uncorrected models.    
 
5.2.2.2. Evidence of Endogeneity Bias in Other Travel Demand Literature 
In an empirical study of demand for high speed rail travel (Pekgün, Griffin and 
Keskinocak, 2013), price elasticity estimates across several models of different passenger 
segments are consistently shown to be biased towards zero when endogeneity is 
unaccounted for. For example, in a model of advanced purchasers (booked at least 21 
days in advance) who booked economy class tickets with a Saturday night stay, price 
elasticities of demand are estimated to be -0.407 in an OLS model which did not correct 
for endogeneity, and -1.972 in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model which corrected 
for endogeneity.  
 
5.2.2.3. Evidence of Endogeneity Bias in Other Industry Demand Literature 
Although there are few studies within the airline industry that have corrected for price 
endogeneity, there are many empirical studies of demand that have corrected for price 
endogeneity using data from other industries. Most studies have shown that price 
coefficients are underestimated if endogeneity is not corrected. Examples of recent 
empirical studies that have demonstrated that price coefficients are underestimated if 
endogeneity is not corrected include the following: household choice of television 
reception options (Goolsbee and Petrin, 2004; Petrin and Train, 2010), household choice 
of residential location (Guevara and Ben-Akiva, 2006; Guevara-Cue, 2010), choice of 




aggregate product demand for the make and model of a new vehicle (Berry, Levinsohn 
and Pakes, 1995, 2004; Train and Winston, 2007), and brand-level demand for 
hypertension drugs in the U.S. (Branstetter, Chatterjee and Higgins, 2011). 
 
5.3. Methods to Correct for Price Endogeneity 
Instrumental variable (IV) methods can be applied to models to take into account 
endogeneity, which allows consistent parameter estimation when endogenous 
explanatory variables are present. The modeling methods differ depending on whether 
models being estimated are linear or non-linear.  
 For linear models, such as least squares regression, IV methods have been used 
for many years, with the first application dating back to 1928 (see Stock and Trebbi, 2003 
for a history of the first applications in IV methods). Most statistical programs provide 
functions which easily implement IV methods, such as two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression.   
 However, discrete choice models are non-linear and other methods must be used 
to account for endogeneity. Dealing with endogeneity in discrete choice models is a 
newer problem and most statistical programs do not have built-in functions to do this. At 
a conference workshop, Bhat (2003) identifies the endogeneity problem as an emerging 
methodological issue in discrete choice models.   
 There are several approaches for dealing with endogeneity in discrete choice 
models. Readers are referred to Train (2009) for a more detailed description of these 
methods, along with derivations, advantages, and disadvantages of each method. One 




1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995) has been used in several studies. However, the 
BLP approach is often not appropriate when observed shares for some products in some 
markets are zero or nearly zero (Petrin and Train, 2010; Train, 2009). When modeling 
daily demand for flights, we observe days when no tickets were sold. Thus, the BLP 
approach may not be appropriate for modeling daily flight-level demand.  
 Another approach is called the control function approach (Blundell and Powell, 
2004; Guevara and Ben-Akiva, 2009; Petrin and Train, 2010; Villas-Boas and Winer, 
1999), which can be used for datasets with observations of zero demand. Essentially, a 
regression on price is estimated using a set of instruments, and then the residuals are used 
in the discrete choice model as a new variable. This approach is easy to implement and is 
appropriate for modeling daily flight-level demand. 
  
5.4. The Search for Instrumental Variables 
The search for and identification of a valid set of instruments is not easy and is often 
controversial. In general, most researchers agree that any set of instruments that satisfy 
the following two conditions will generate consistent estimates of the parameters, subject 
to the model being correctly specified (Rivers and Vuong, 1988; Villas-Boas and Winer, 
1999): 
  1.) Instruments should be correlated with the endogenous variable (price), and  
 2.) Instruments should be independent of the error term in the model.  
Therefore, we need to find instruments that are correlated with price but are not 
correlated with the error term. The error term in the choice of an itinerary represents all 




model, which means that we need instruments that are correlated with price but do not 
influence customer choice of a flight (or customer purchase). 
 There are several types of instrumental variables that have been used in the 
literature. In the following sections, we describe these different types of instruments. 
Table 5.1 summarizes each of the types of instruments that will be discussed in the next 
sections and offers a few possible instruments that have been used (or could be used) in 
air travel demand models. 
 
5.4.1. Cost-Shifting Variables as Instruments 
Variables that shift cost and are uncorrelated with demand shocks are common 
instruments that have been used in many applications of aggregate demand. For example, 
within the airline industry, Hsiao (2008) used route distance multiplied by unit jet fuel 
cost as instruments in discrete choice models of aggregate quarterly air passenger 
demand. Both route distance and unit jet fuel cost can be thought of as cost shifters 
because they are expected to impact the price of tickets. Theoretically, these make sense 
to use as instruments if one believes that route distance and unit jet fuel cost are 
correlated with ticket prices, but not with customer decisions to travel (uncorrelated with 
demand). 
 Hausman (1996) estimates empirical models of brand choice in the ready-to-eat 
cereal industry. When aggregate demand for cereal is estimated, he uses factors which 
shift the cost of cereal (such as ingredients, packaging, and labor) as instruments. 
However, in his more disaggregate model of brand choice (such as Cheerios) he notes 




may be an insufficient number of input prices, or they may not be reported with high 
enough frequency.” This is the same problem that we expect to encounter in estimating 
disaggregate models of flight-level demand (which will be further discussed in Chapter 
6). Cost-shifting instruments (such as route distance or unit jet fuel cost) would be unable 
to capture day-to-day fluctuations in price, which are more likely to be driven by revenue 
management practices and competitor price matching.  
 The first row of Table 5.1 summarizes these instruments, and the remaining rows 
of this table will be described in the following sections. 
 
5.4.2. Hausman-Type Price Instruments 
Hausman (1996), discussed in the previous section, estimates disaggregate empirical 
models of brand choice in the ready-to-eat cereal industry where cost-side instruments are 
not appropriate. Hausman’s solution for finding instruments is to exploit the panel 
structure of the data, in which quantities and prices are observed in several different 
cities. In this context, the price instrument for the city of interest is the prices of the same 
brand in other cities (many researchers now refer to this type of instrument as “Hausman-
type price instruments”). The basic idea is that after eliminating city-specific and brand-
specific effects (by including fixed-effects in the model), the price of a brand in city j will 
be correlated with the prices of the brand in other cities due to the common marginal 
costs, but the price of a brand in city j will (ideally) be uncorrelated with common 
demand shocks. Nevo (2000b, 2001) further explores similar sets of instruments in the 
ready-to-eat cereal industry (price instruments are averaged across all twenty quarters of 




Table 5.1: Summary of Instrument Types and Examples of Instruments in the Airline 
Context 
Instrument Type  
and Reference Instrument Description 






Berry and Jia (2009); 
Granados, Gupta and 
Kauffman (2012) 
Variables that impact a 
product’s cost but that are 
uncorrelated with demand 
shocks 
Hsiao (2008) uses route distance and unit jet 
fuel costs. 
Berry and Jia (2009) and Granados, Gupta, 
and Kauffman (2012) use a hub indicator. 




Hausman, Leonard and 
Zona (1994);  
Hausman (1996);  
Nevo (2000b, 2001); 
Guevara and Ben-Akiva 
(2006);  
Guevara-Cue (2010); 
Petrin and Train (2010) 
Prices of the same brand 
in other geographic 
contexts are used as 
instruments of the brand 
in the market of interest 
Gayle (2004) uses an airline’s average prices 
in all other markets with similar length of haul 
(also used in this dissertation in Chapter 6). 
Measures of 
Competition and 
Market Power-  
Stern (1996); 
Berry and Jia (2009); 
Granados, Gupta, and 
Kauffman (2012) 
Measures of the level of 
market power by 
multiproduct firms, and 
measures of the level of 
competition 
Berry and Jia (2009) use the number of all 
carriers offering service on a route. 
Granados, Gupta, and Kauffman (2012) use 
the degree of market concentration, calculated 
as the Herfindahl index. 
Number of daily nonstop flights in the market 
operated by the airline of interest and by 
competitor airlines (used in this dissertation in 
Chapter 6). 
Measures of Non-Price 
Characteristics of 
Other Products-  
Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes (1995, 2004);  
Train and Winston 
(2007); 
Berry and Jia (2009) 
Average non-price 
characteristics of the other 
products supplied by the 
same firm in the same 
market 
Average flight capacity of other flights 
operated by the airline of interest in the same 
market. 
Average non-price 
characteristics of the other 
products supplied by the 
other firms in the same 
market. 
Berry and Jia (2009) use the percentage of 
rival routes that offer direct flights, the 
average distance of rival routes, and the 
number of rival routes. 
 
 
 Many other studies have used Hausman-type price instruments. For example, 
Petrin and Train (2010) model household choice of television reception options (antenna, 




average price in other markets that are served by the same multiple-system operator as 
market m”.  
 In discrete choice models of household residential location choice, a price 
instrument for dwelling unit d is calculated as the average prices of other similar dwelling 
units located within the same vicinity (between 500 and 2,500 meters away for one 
instrument, and between 2,500 and 5,000 meters away for a second instrument) (Guevara 
and Ben-Akiva, 2006; Guevara-Cue, 2010).  
 In an airline context, Hausman-type price instruments for a market are an airline’s 
average prices in all other markets with a similar length of haul. Gayle (2004) uses 
aggregate quarterly data from DB1B to investigate air passenger itinerary choice 
behavior and uses this formulation of instruments, along with cost-shifting instruments.   
  
5.4.3. Measures of Competition and Market Power as Instruments 
Stern (1996) introduces measures of the level of market power by multiproduct firms and 
measures of the level of competition as instruments. Stern (1996, p.18) notes that “Unless 
consumers value products sold by a particular firm because it is a multiproduct firm, 
measures of multiproduct ownership will be correlated with price and advertising, but be 
uncorrelated with unobserved quality.” Levels of market power focus on the number of 
products in the market and also the time since a product (and/or firm) was introduced into 
the market.  In the context of pharmaceutical drugs, he measures the level of market 
power by multiproduct firms as the number of products produced within a drug category 
by the firm which produces product j, and the sum of the time since entry over each of all 




 Stern (1996, p.18) also notes that “measures of the level of competition in the 
market, such as the number and characteristics of other products, will also affect price 
but, under the assumption that entry is exogenous, be uncorrelated with unobserved 
quality”. For example, one instrument Stern uses to capture measures of the degree of 
competition facing product j is the number of manufacturers in the market. 
 Many other studies have used similar types of instruments (for examples see 
Branstetter, Chatterjee, and Higgins, 2011; Cleanthous, 2003; Dick, 2008; Dutta, 2011). 
 Based on Stern’s approach, in the airline context, the number of flights in a 
market or the number of carriers in a market could be used as instruments. Berry and Jia 
(2009) use the number of all carriers offering service on a route as an instrument. 
Granados, Gupta, and Kauffman (2012) include an instrument that measures the degree 
of market concentration, calculated as the Herfindahl index.  
 
5.4.4. Non-Price Product Characteristics of Other Products as Instruments 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) derive a set of instruments using observed exogenous 
product characteristics, where price and other potentially endogenous variables are 
excluded.  The instruments are: 1.) observed product characteristics for a firm, 2.) if the 
firm produces more than one product, the sums of the values of the same product 
characteristics of other products offered by that firm, and 3.) the sums of the values of the 
same characteristics of the same products offered by other firms. Instruments of this type 
have been used in many applications, including choice of an automobile (Berry, 
Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, 2004; Train and Winston, 2007) and demand for 




 Nevo (2000a) provides a clear description of how these instruments have been 
used within the automobile industry: “Suppose the product has two characteristics: 
horsepower (HP) and size (S), and assume there are two firms producing three products 
each. Then we have six instrumental variables: The values of HP and S for each product, 
the sum of HP and S for the firm’s other two products, and the sum of HP and S for the 
three products produced by the competition.” 
 
5.4.5. Other Types of Instruments 
 There are a few other sets of instruments that have been used in the literature. 
Ater and Orlov (2010) investigate the relationship between Internet access and flight on-
time performance (a measure of flight quality). As an instrument for the log of average 
quarterly airfares, the authors use an airline’s average segment fare on all other segments 
of a similar distance, which is a Hausman-type price instrument. However, as a second 
instrument, they use an airline’s rivals’ average fare on the reverse segment, which is a 
price characteristic of other products. The authors do not test for validity of instruments 
or explain the logic behind using the second instrument.  
 In a working paper by Pekgün, Griffin and Keskinocak (2013), data from a high 
speed rail operator is used to estimate price elasticities of demand. The authors note that 
since inventory reading days (or inventory check points) are control points where supply 
and demand interact through the revenue manager’s decisions, they aggregate the data by 
inventory reading days (instead of over the number of days left until train departure). 
Then, for each departure date and fare classification group, the price instruments are 




5.5. Tests for Instruments 
There are three tests that instruments should pass to be considered valid instruments. For 
linear IV models, most statistical programs provide tests that can be used to easily check 
to see if a set of instrumental variables is valid. These methods are well known and 
documented in past literature. The following three tests can be run in Stata® (SE version 
10) as post estimation commands after running a 2SLS regression using the command 
ivregress 2sls: 
1. Test for weak instruments 
    Post-estimation command: estat first stage 
 Interpretation: If “Prob > F” is insignificant and/or the F statistic is less than 
10, then the set of IV’s are considered to be weak instruments. 
2. Test for an endogenous regressor 
 Post-estimation command: estat endog  
 Interpretation: The null hypothesis is that the variable being tested is 
exogenous. A significant p-value indicates the variable is endogenous. 
3. Test for validity of instruments 
 Post-estimation command: estat overid  
 Interpretation: The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid. A 
significant p-value indicates the instruments may not be valid. So, the goal is to 
find a set of instruments with an insignificant p-value for this test. 
 
 For non-linear models, there are currently no Stata® functions to perform these 




Guevara-Cue (2010) proposes a new test, called the Direct Test, which is simple to 
calculate from the log likelihoods of two discrete choice models, one in which 
endogeneity has not been controlled for and one in which endogeneity has been 
controlled for. Guevara-Cue shows that this simple test out performs other more 
complicated tests (see Guevara-Cue, 2010 for details about the test).  
 Since most statistical programs currently provide modules for running IV models 
and testing for validity of instruments in linear models but not non-linear models, when 
searching for a valid set of instruments it may be easier to first use linear models and tests 
readily available in Stata® and later move to non-linear models.  
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CHAPTER 6: FLIGHT-LEVEL DAILY DEMAND MODELS WITH 
CORRECTION FOR PRICE ENDOGENEITY 
 
6.1. Abstract 
Due to a lack of publically available data, few studies within the airline industry have 
used daily pricing and demand data to investigate the impact of price fluctuations on 
customer purchases. At the same time, many airline demand models have not corrected 
for price endogeneity, which is known to lead to biased coefficient estimates. In this 
chapter online pricing and seat map data, collected from JetBlue’s website, is used to 
build models of daily flight-level demand. An instrumented variable approach (two-stage 
least squares regression) is used to control for price endogeneity, allowing consistent 
parameter estimation. A set of instruments are found to pass all validity tests, and are 
offered as instruments that can be used in disaggregate air travel models of demand. The 
price coefficient of a model corrected for price endogeneity is found to be 2.9 times more 
negative than the price coefficient for an uncorrected model, demonstrating the 
importance of correcting for endogeneity. Further, models that do not correct for 
endogeneity find inelastic demand estimates whereas models that do correct for 
endogeneity find elastic demand. Price elasticities are then estimated from the corrected 
models as a function of advance purchase, showing that customers are less price-sensitive 






Within the airline industry, there is an interest in better understanding how airfares (or 
prices) influence bookings and customer purchasing behavior. A better understanding of 
how customers make tradeoffs among price and itinerary characteristics (such as 
departure time of day and departure day of week) can potentially influence scheduling 
decisions, revenue management strategies, and the design of website screen displays. 
There are two main factors that have hindered the ability to fully understand the influence 
of price on customer purchasing behavior. First, due to a lack of publically available data 
for researchers, few models have been built using detailed flight-level pricing data. Thus, 
relationships between daily airfares and daily demand are not well understood. Second, 
within the airline industry, most studies have failed to address price endogeneity and have 
assumed that prices are exogenous, which contradicts basic economic theory of supply 
and demand. Thus, the objectives of this research are to: 1.) determine whether it is 
possible to use online prices and seat maps to build detailed flight-level models of daily 
bookings, and 2.) determine whether price endogeneity can be corrected by finding a 
valid set of instrumental variables (IVs) and using IV estimation methods such as two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regression. 
 In the next section, an overview of the current literature on the topic of demand 
modeling and price elasticity estimation is provided. Next, the data and markets are 
described and descriptive statistics are presented (focusing on the relationship between 
demand and price across variables such as advance booking, departure day of week and 
time of day, booking day of week, and competitor promotional sales). Methodology and 




daily online prices and seat maps from airline websites. By tracking the seat maps across 
the booking horizon, we estimate daily bookings (a measure of demand) for airline tickets 
and seats at the flight-level. Using this data, we estimate airfare price elasticity using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression without correcting for price endogeneity and 
2SLS regression, accounting for price endogeneity. To our knowledge, this is the first 
time online seat maps have been used to estimate price elasticities, and this is also one of 
the first studies to correct for price endogeneity in models of airline demand. 
Additionally, this is one of the only studies in models of airline demand that performs 
formal tests for validity of instruments19.     
 
6.2.1. Demand Forecasting 
Traditionally, quality of service index (QSI) models, developed by the U.S. government 
in 1957, were used during the regulation era to evaluate carriers’ requests to increase 
fares on specific routes (Civil Aeronautics Board, 1970).  These QSI models allocated 
demand across different routes as a function of three quality of service attributes (aircraft 
equipment type, number of stops, and flight frequency) in order to estimate market shares 
and passenger volumes. Later, after airline deregulation in 1978, quality of service 
attributes were expanded to include attributes such as departure and arrival times, 
departure day of week, carrier preference, and average airfares. QSI models are still used 






19 Most published studies do not report tests for validity of instruments. In these studies, it is unclear 
whether they performed tests, but did not report results, or whether they did not perform tests (which means 




extensively in the airline industry. Most QSI models use Origin and Destination Data 
Bank 1A or Data Bank 1B (DB1A or DB1B)20 data. These databases do not contain 
detailed pricing information, but instead contain average quarterly prices per 
airline/market. Due to a lack of detailed pricing information in these datasets, there is a 
limited ability to use QSI models to understand how prices impact customer choices.   
 More recently, discrete choice models (or air passenger itinerary share/choice 
models) have been used to forecast demand. Depending on how the discrete choice model 
is designed, the model can incorporate different types of competition patterns among 
itineraries. For example, a discrete choice model can incorporate increased competition 
among flights that depart during similar times of the day, such as morning flights as 
compared to afternoon and evening flights.  
 A dissertation by Coldren (2005) was the first to model demand at the itinerary 
level. Computer reservation system (CRS) bookings data for over 24,000 markets, 
multiple carriers, and several levels-of-service21 were used to compare airline demand 
forecasts produced from QSI and discrete choice models. The study used multinomial 
logit (MNL) models to investigate the impact of air carrier service attributes on passenger 
choice and also used more advanced discrete choice models (multi-level generalized 
nested logit and ordered generalized extreme value models) to investigate underlying 






20 DB1A and DB1B are maintained by the U.S. Department of Transportation and represent a ten percent 
sample of flown tickets collected from passengers as they board aircraft operated by U.S. airlines. 
21 The levels-of-service included were for nonstop and direct flights, as well as connecting flights with a 




competitive dynamics (substitution patterns) across itineraries. Importantly, the study 
found that the discrete choice models performed significantly better than the QSI models, 
reducing the magnitude of forecast errors by 10 to 15 percent (Coldren, et al., 2003). 
Strengths of the study included the large number of markets included in the data, the 
advanced model specifications that were investigated, and the ability to compare 
forecasts with those of an actual airline’s QSI model. A limitation of the study is that 
detailed itinerary-level fare information was not available, so average quarterly fare data 
was used22. 
 A later dissertation was the first to model the joint choice of an itinerary and fare 
product (Carrier, 2008). Carrier’s work combined booking data with fare rules and seat 
availability data for 3 short-haul markets in Europe (for one airline’s nonstop, outbound 
itineraries only). Strengths of the study include the availability of disaggregate fare data23 
(the lowest fares available for each alternative), the ability to base alternatives in a choice 
set on seat availabilities data so that flights without any available seats were not included 
in a customers’ choice set, and a latent class choice model which accounted for 
heterogeneity of passenger behavior (business versus leisure passengers). The main 
limitations of the study were that data was available for only 3 markets and due to the 
small sample size, advanced logit model specifications were not estimated. 






22 “Superset” data (Data Base Products, Inc. 2000, 2001), a cleaned version of DB1A/B data was used for 
fare information. Fares are based on averages for each carrier across all itineraries for each airport-pair 
within a quarter.  
23 Fares offered and their fare rules were obtained from Sabre® global distribution system and accessed 




 To sum up the studies by Coldren and Carrier, both have different strengths and 
weakness that are quite opposite. As shown in Table 6.1, Coldren had a comprehensive 
airline dataset with over 24,000 markets, 10.6 million bookings, several airlines, and 4 
levels-of-service, which allowed the estimation of advanced discrete choice models. 
However, he only had aggregate fare information for average quarterly fares paid for 
each airline/market. Carrier, on the other hand, did not have a comprehensive airline 
dataset. Instead, he had a dataset of 3 markets, one airline, and nonstop flights only, 
which did not allow the estimation of advanced discrete choice models. However, he had 
disaggregate fare information for actual offered fares of each fare product in a choice set. 
In both of these studies, price endogeneity was not explored. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of Studies Investigating Demand at the Itinerary Level 
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 From a discrete choice modeling perspective, there is still an open research need 
for exploring advanced discrete choice model specifications using disaggregate flight-
level fare data. This could help decision-makers better understand the impact of prices on 
itinerary share, and could lead to new behavioral insights about the underlying 
competitive dynamic between itineraries. In these models, however, there is also a need 
to correct for endogeneity of airfares in order to estimate the unbiased effect of prices on 
customer purchasing decisions. Given the rather small sample size of our dataset, the 
objective of this chapter is to focus on the second research question: correcting for 
endogeneity of airfares. More advanced model specifications are left for future research. 
 
6.2.2. Price Elasticity of Demand 
Although Coldren and Carrier’s work focused on building discrete choice models of 
demand capable of better understanding customer tradeoffs and decisions, there are many 
other studies that have focused on estimating price elasticity of demand, which is the 
percent change in demand caused by a percent change in price (a measure of how 
responsive customers are to changes in price). Estimated elasticities in past literature 
have varied widely depending on the data used, the modeling methodology, and the 
markets and time period used. Some studies have corrected for price endogeneity, and 
others have not. Most studies have used aggregate data to estimate price elasticity.   
 InterVISTAS (2007) reviews 22 papers on airfare elasticities published between 
1986 and 2006, including two meta analyses of multiple publications, and finds that 
estimated price elasticities differ across many dimensions of air travel, including: 




(airline, market, national, and pan-national levels). Business travelers are generally less 
elastic (less price sensitive) than leisure travelers because people traveling for business 
have less flexibility to postpone or cancel their trip. Travelers in short-haul markets are 
generally more elastic (more price sensitive) because of the availability of more inter-
modal substitutes (such as driving or taking a bus).   A meta-study by Gillen et al. (2002) 
found that market-level price elasticities in the literature have ranged from -0.198 in long-
haul international business markets to -1.743 in short-haul leisure markets. 
 The level of aggregation of the data also impacts estimated price elasticities. 
Airline-level price elasticities are generally estimated to be more elastic than market-level 
elasticities, and market-level elasticities are generally estimated to be more elastic than 
national or pan-national price elasticities (InterVISTAS, 2007).   InterVISTAS (2007) 
developed price elasticity estimates at the route, national, and pan-national levels using 
DB1B and corrected for price endogeneity using 2SLS. They find an average elasticity of 
-1.4 at the route/market-level, -0.8 at the national-level, and -0.6 at the pan-national level 
(airline specific price elasticities were out of the scope of their project).  
 Hsiao (2008) estimates discrete choice models of aggregate quarterly air 
passenger demand using aggregate quarterly data from DB1B and T100 and corrects for 
price endogeneity.  Hsiao finds price elasticity estimates of market demand that range 
between -1.052 and -2.662. 
  In a more recent study, Granados, Gupta, and Kauffman (2012) estimate log-
linear 2SLS regression models that correct for price endogeneity to investigate price 
elasticities of demand for air travel booked through online and offline booking channels. 




distribution systems (GDSs)24. In a model on the whole dataset, price elasticity of 
demand is estimated to be approximately unit elastic (-1.03). The authors further break 
price elasticity estimates out by leisure versus business travel and by bookings made 
through three channels (offline, transparent online travel agents, and opaque online travel 
agents). The price elasticities for the business travel booked through the three channels 
are -0.34, -0.89, and -1.29, respectively. For the leisure travel booked through the three 
channels, price elasticity estimates are -1.33, -1.56, and -2.28, respectively. 
  
6.3. Description of Data 
Automated web client robots (or webbots) were used to query the websites of JetBlue and 
one online travel agent (OTA). The webbots collected detailed itinerary, fare, and seat 
map information for nonstop flights on a daily basis from 8/5/2010 through 9/21/2010. 
During this time period, queries were run to collect airfares and seat maps for a rolling set 
of 21 departure dates. For example, when the data collection began on 8/5/2010, 
information for flights departing on 9/2/2010, 9/3/2010, ... , to 9/22/2010 was obtained. 
For the next day of data collection, 8/6/2010, information for the same flight departure 
dates was obtained. Collecting data in this way provides information for each flight in a 
market for 21 departure dates and over a booking period from 1 to 28 days before flight 
departure. 






24 GDSs include ticket sales made via online and offline channels through travel agencies but exclude 




6.3.1. Selection of Markets 
In selecting the sample of markets to use in this study, we control for several factors. We 
control for differences in market competition by selecting four markets where JetBlue 
and Virgin America compete head-to-head, with both offering nonstop flights. These 
markets are all long haul markets with similar flight times and lengths of haul. All of the 
markets are transcontinental flights that originate on the East coast. In selecting these 
markets, we are also controlling for equipment type. Specifically, both Virgin America 
and JetBlue mainly use Airbus 320 planes. In these markets, JetBlue flies the A320 
exclusively, and Virgin America flies the A320 in all flights in all markets with one 
exception. In JFKSFO, Virgin America offered flights on their smaller plane, the Airbus 
319, for six departure dates. 
 Table 6.2 provides a list of airport codes and airport names in our data. Table 6.3 
provides a list of the airline codes and names, and Table 6.4 contains a list of the 4 
markets included in this study, along with nonstop competitors, average fares, and 
number of bookings. A total of 7,522 bookings were observed for JetBlue. 
 
Table 6.2: Airport Codes and Names 
Airport 
Code Name of Airport, City and State 
BOS Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts 
FLL Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
JFK John F. Kennedy International, New York City, New York 
LAS McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada 
LAX Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California 












AA American Airlines Major 
B6 JetBlue Airways Low Cost 
DL Delta Airlines Major 
UA United Airlines Major 




Table 6.4: JetBlue Descriptive Statistics: Markets, Competitors, Bookings and Prices 











BOSLAX AA, B6, UA, VX 
473 8 844 $114 $205 $586 
483 18 927 $114 $191 $466 
JFKLAS AA, B6, DL, VX 
187 7 451 $129 $254 $463 
191 18 405 $129 $231 $463 
197 10 458 $129 $282 $586 
199 21 313 $129 $225 $463 
711 14 481 $129 $251 $526 
JFKLAX AA, B6, DL, UA, VX 
671 11 691 $129 $257 $586 
673 16 671 $129 $244 $586 
675 7 974 $129 $205 $526 
677 19 747 $129 $223 $466 
JFKSFO AA, B6, DL, UA, VX 
641 8 339 $129 $300 $586 
647 17 221 $129 $287 $586 
Totals/Averages: 7,522 $114 $233 $586 
1DTOD= Flight Departure Time of Day, in military time. For example, a DTOD of 18 means the flights 






6.4. Descriptive Statistics 
The level of observation is the number of daily bookings at the flight-level. In the sample, 
we observe between 0 and 16 bookings per flight per day, with a mean of 1.9 bookings 
and a median of 1 booking25. Demand and prices are observed to vary based on several 
factors, such as advance booking, departure day of week, departure time of day, booking 
day of week, during promotional sales of low cost competitor Virgin America, and during 
Labor Day Holiday. The next several sections take a closer look at how average prices 
and average demand are influenced by these variables.   
 
6.4.1. Correlation Between Demand, Prices, and Advance Booking 
As the flight departure date approaches, average prices are observed to increase, which is 
typical in the airline industry due to revenue management practices. Additionally, 
average demand increases as the date of departure draws nearer. This means that when 
prices are high, demand is also high. This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 6.1.  
 Table 6.5 shows the correlation between average bookings, average prices and 
days from departure (DFD). Looking at the correlation coefficients also shows moderate 
to high correlations between these variables. As the day of flight departure approaches, 
average prices increase, with a correlation coefficient of -0.76. As the flight departure 






25 Throughout this chapter, we use the terms “number of bookings” and “demand” interchangeably, 
although we realize that the two measures are not exactly the same. JetBlue’s flights rarely sellout, so in 




date approaches, average bookings increase, with a correlation coefficient of -0.56. We 
observe higher demand for higher prices, with a correlation coefficient of 0.52.   
  
Table 6.5: Average Bookings, Average Price and DFD Correlation Coefficients 
  Mean Bookings Mean Prices DFD 
Mean Bookings 1 
Mean Prices 0.52 1 
DFD -0.56 -0.76 1 













































6.4.2. Correlation Between Demand, Prices, and Departure Day of Week 
Average daily demand and average prices are observed to differ by a flight’s departure 
day of week, as shown in Figure 6.2. Looking at the figure seems to show an inverse 
relationship between average prices and demand. Departures on Saturdays have the 
lowest prices, and departures on Mondays have the highest prices. This is intuitive, as 
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6.4.3. Correlation Between Demand, Prices, and Departure Time of Day 
Average daily demand and average prices are also observed to differ by a flight’s 
departure time of day, as shown in Figure 6.3. Flights departing at 10am and 5pm have 
the highest average prices but also have some of the lower average demands. Flights 
departing at 7am have one of the lower average prices, but also have the highest observed 
average demand. Once again, looking Figure 6.3 seems to show an inverse relationship 
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6.4.4. Correlation Between Demand, Prices, and Booking Day of Week 
Average daily demand and average prices are also observed to differ by booking day of 
week, as shown in Figure 6.4. The figure shows that prices stay relatively constant for 
each booking day of the week (with a range of only $215-$258), which makes sense. 
Airlines generally do not charge significantly higher or lower prices for booking a flight 
on a Saturday versus on a Monday. The price differences would be expected to vary more 
by DFD and departure day of week. Although prices are observed to stay relatively 
constant for each booking day of the week, there does seem to be a difference in average 
demand. The figure seems to show that significantly fewer tickets are sold on Saturdays 
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6.4.5. Promotions, Sales, and Holidays 
During the time of data collection, low cost competitor Virgin America had three 
promotional sales. Promotional sales were identified from both the Virgin America 
website and from Travelzoo® emails.  
 As an example, one sale included a largely advertised three day system-wide fare 
sale when Virgin America announced plans to launch new service to Los Cabos and 
Cancun, Mexico. Virgin America teamed with Loopt® to offer customers a special 
promotion if they checked-in (with the free Loopt® Star App on their iPhone) at SFO, 
LAX or one of Virgin America’s mobile taco truck locations during a four hour time 
period. Customers could get a $1 two-for-one taco deal along with a two-for-one ticket 
offer valid on Virgin America’s new flights to Los Cabos and Cancun (Virgin America, 
August 31, 2010). Virgin America is quoted as saying “….significant online buzz 
circulating about the promotion, helped make it the fifth highest sales day” in Virgin 
America’s history (Arrington, 2010). 
 The data shows a significant decrease in JetBlue bookings during Virgin 
America’s promotional sales. We control for Virgin America promotions by introducing 
dummy variables into the following models for bookings made during the sale dates. 
 During the time of data collection, there was one holiday. Labor Day holiday was 
observed on Monday, September 6, 2010. We control for the holiday by introducing 
dummy variables for bookings made for flights departing on Labor Day (September 6) 






6.5. Methodology and Results 
Regression models were run on daily bookings at the flight-level, across 21 departure 
dates (3,952 observations). In order to correct for price endogeneity, 2SLS was used with 
a set of valid instruments. Table 6.6 below provides variable definitions for all variables, 
and the last three rows of the table are the instrumental variables. The price variable is the 
one-way price captured from JetBlue’s website. 
 The set of instruments includes three variables. The main instrument is based on 
Hausman-type price instruments, which uses a firm’s own prices in other markets as 
instruments for a market of interest (Hausman, 1996; Hausman, Leonard and Zona, 
1994). We build these instruments by using JetBlue’s equivalent one-way price from the 
OTA website (round-trip prices divided by two). The second instrument is based on Stern 
(1996), which introduces measures of the level of market power by multiproduct firms 
and measures of the level of competition as instruments. Based on Stern’s approach we 
use the number of daily flights in a market as a proxy for multiproduct firms.  The third 
instrument is the square of the number of days from departure that a flight is booked. 
 In order to compare OLS to 2SLS coefficient estimates, all observations missing 
an instrumental variable were dropped. This decreased the total number of bookings by 
2.3%, for a total number of bookings of 7,352. Table 6.7 below shows the results of the 
OLS and 2SLS regressions; both use robust standard errors clustered by market. Notice 
that the price coefficient for the 2SLS regression becomes more negative, as expected. 
Another point of interest is that many of the coefficient estimates in the OLS regression 
are insignificant. However, after correcting for endogeneity, most of the coefficient 




 The set of instruments used were tested against the three tests discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 4, and requirements of all tests were satisfied. The test for weak 
instruments, rejected the null hypothesis that instruments are weak, with a p-value of 
0.04. The adjusted R-square of the first stage regression on price is 0.49. The null 
hypothesis that price is actually an exogenous regressor was rejected, with a p-value of 
0.006, and the test for instrument validity did not reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are not valid, with a p-value of 0.10. 
 
Table 6.6: Variables and Descriptions 
Variable Variable Description 
Price Price of the flight (JetBlue's one-way price) 
vxsaledum Indicates a date that Virgin America was offering promotional sales 
travelsep6 Indicates bookings made for travel on Labor Day holiday  
travelsep7 Indicates bookings made for travel the day after Labor Day holiday 
earlymorning Indicates flight departure is 5am-7:59am 
morning Indicates flight departure is 8am-11:59am 
afternoon Indicates flight departure is Noon-4:59pm 
evening Indicates flight departure is 5pm-8:59pm 
dfd1 Indicates a booking made 1 day from flight departure 
dfd2 Indicates a booking made 2 days from flight departure 
dfd3 Indicates a booking made 3 days from flight departure 
dfd4 Indicates a booking made 4 days from flight departure 
dfd5 Indicates a booking made 5 days from flight departure 
dfd6 Indicates a booking made 6 days from flight departure 
dfd7 Indicates a booking made 7 days from flight departure 
dfd8_14 Indicates a booking made between 8 and 14 days from flight departure 
dfd15_21 Indicates a booking made between 15 and 21 days from flight departure 
dfd22_28 Indicates a booking made between 21 and 28 days from flight departure 
ddow1, …., ddow7 Indicates flight departs on a Sun, Mon,…., Sat 
bdow1, …., bdow7 Indicates flight was booked on a Sun, Mon,…., Sat 
Market Dummies Dummy variable for each market 
lnmeanb6priceothermkt  Instrumental variable: Natural log of JetBlue’s mean prices in other markets 
avgflts_vx  Instrumental variable: The average number of nonstop flights in a market offered by Virgin America 





Table 6.7: OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
  
OLS 2SLS 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
price -0.0051 0.025 -0.0148 0.000 
vxsaledum -0.2765 0.162 -0.3456 0.009 
travelsep6 -0.6780 0.022 -0.8827 0.045 
travelsep7 -0.0266 0.901 0.6145 0.000 
Departure Time of Day (reference variable is evening-depart 5pm-8:59pm) 
earlymorning (depart 5am-7:59am) 0.2929 0.295 0.2853 0.000 
morning (depart 8am-11:59am) 0.1391 0.175 0.4302 0.057 
afternoon (depart Noon-4:59pm) 0.0167 0.661 0.2320 0.070 
Number of Days from Flight Departure Dummies (reference variable is dfd22_28) 
dfd1 1.3405 0.094 3.2414 0.000 
dfd2 1.9657 0.016 3.8990 0.000 
dfd3 1.1688 0.014 2.0446 0.000 
dfd4 0.9298 0.074 1.6683 0.000 
dfd5 0.6374 0.055 1.1600 0.000 
dfd6 0.9048 0.088 1.3096 0.000 
dfd7 0.5484 0.010 0.6695 0.000 
dfd8_14 0.4870 0.069 0.7072 0.001 
dfd15_21 0.2888 0.112 0.3440 0.022 
Departure Day of Week Variables (reference variable is ddow7-Saturday Departure) 
ddow1 (Sunday) 0.1446 0.182 0.4442 0.000 
ddow2 (Monday) 0.4711 0.059 1.0689 0.000 
ddow3 (Tuesday) 0.2861 0.018 0.2505 0.035 
ddow4 (Wednesday) 0.2384 0.102 0.3052 0.000 
ddow5 (Thursday) 0.1558 0.085 0.6312 0.024 
ddow6 (Friday) 0.3050 0.086 0.4338 0.125 
Booking Day of Week Variables (reference variable is ddow6-Friday Departure) 
bdow1 (Sunday) -0.8179 0.049 -0.6684 0.016 
bdow2 (Monday) 0.2920 0.398 0.5821 0.009 
bdow3 (Tuesday) 0.4089 0.040 0.5044 0.000 
bdow4 (Wednesday) 0.3700 0.113 0.3015 0.075 
bdow5 (Thursday) 0.2536 0.034 0.3230 0.000 
bdow7 (Saturday) -0.8112 0.023 -0.7332 0.000 
Market Dummies (reference is jfklas) 
boslax 0.0811 0.158 -0.3536 0.049 
jfklax 0.5272 0.000 0.4047 0.000 
jfksfo 0.0869 0.294 0.4335 0.000 
_cons 2.1420 0.002 3.7022 0.000 
  R-Square=0.133     







6.5.1. Average Price Elasticities for Corrected and Uncorrected Models 
Table 6.8 shows the comparison between the price elasticities of demand estimated by the 
OLS and 2SLS regression models. For the OLS regression model, the estimated price 
elasticity of demand evaluated at the mean price is -0.64, which represents inelastic 
demand. After correcting for endogeneity using 2SLS, the estimated price elasticity of 
demand is -1.84, which represents elastic demand. This difference is important, as pricing 
recommendations differ for inelastic and elastic models. Specifically, inelastic models 
suggest that prices should be raised whereas elastic models suggest prices should be 
lowered. Evaluating the price elasticities at the median price gives similar results, as 
shown in Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.8: OLS and 2SLS Price Elasticity Results (At the Mean of Price) 
  At Price=$232 (mean) 95% Confidence Interval 
OLS -0.64 -0.94 -0.34 
2SLS -1.84 -2.71 -0.98 




Table 6.9: OLS and 2SLS Price Elasticity Results (At the Median of Price) 
  At Price=$199 (median) 95% Confidence Interval 
OLS -0.50 -0.72 -0.29 
2SLS -1.25 -1.71 -0.79 






6.5.2. Price Elasticities as a Function of Advance Booking 
Price elasticities were calculated from the 2SLS model as a function of number of days 
from flight departure. Table 6.10 provides the price elasticities of demand at both the 
mean of price and also the median of price. The table shows that JetBlue’s customers are 
less price sensitive closer to flight departure. This is intuitive, as leisure passengers 
generally book further in advance of departure and business passengers often book closer 
to departure.  
 
Table 6.10: 2SLS Price Elasticity Results as a Function of Days from Departure 
DFD Price = $232 (mean) Price = $199 (median) 
1 to 7 -1.14 -0.84 
8 to 14 -2.06 -1.37 
15 to 21 -2.59 -1.62 
22 to 28 -3.40 -1.97 






6.6. Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
 
An instrumented variable approach (two-stage least squares regression) is used to control 
for price endogeneity, allowing consistent parameter estimation. A set of instruments are 
found to pass all validity tests, and are offered as instruments that can be used in 
disaggregate air travel models of demand. The instruments are based on Hausman-type 
price instruments, which use a firm’s own prices in other markets as instruments for a 
market of interest, as well as measures of the level of market power by multiproduct 
firms (as in Stern, 1996). We build the instruments by using prices and flight frequencies 




 The price coefficient of the 2SLS regression model, which corrected for price 
endogeneity, is found to be 2.9 times more negative than the price coefficient for an 
uncorrected model, demonstrating the importance of correcting for endogeneity. For the 
OLS regression model, the estimated price elasticity of demand (evaluated at the mean of 
price) is -0.64, which represents inelastic demand. After correcting for endogeneity using 
2SLS, the estimated price elasticity of demand is -1.84, which represents elastic demand. 
 It would be interesting to aggregate our data and/or to mis-specify the model 
using average prices instead of disaggregate prices. A priori, it is expected that price 
elasticities from an aggregated model would be less elastic than the price elasticities of 
our model.  This is because on a daily basis, airline customers can choose to purchase 
departure dates with lower prices, or they can choose a different airline with a lower price 
offering for the day, or they can wait to purchase when a lower price is offered. This 
dynamic would not be captured in aggregate data. 
 We find that the total number of bookings is decreased during ongoing 
promotional sales of JetBlue’s low cost competitor Virgin America.  In future research, it 
would be interesting to model JetBlue and Virgin America demand together in the same 
model using a nested logit model to capture the degree of substitution between the 
airlines. JetBlue and Virgin America are likely to be close substitutes. Incorporating a 
major carrier into the models could add insight about the substitutability of LCCs versus 
major carriers.  
 Also, there is a future research need for incorporating competitor prices into 
revenue management forecasts. Within the airline industry, there has been growing 




more accurately represent how customers make decisions in today’s online environments. 
The development of these next-generation “choice-based” RM systems require 
information about the prices (or “choices”) viewed by customers at the time of booking – 
both on the carrier of interest and, potentially, across several different competitors.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This dissertation accomplished four main research objectives, each related to leveraging 
online data to better understand airline pricing and product strategies, and how these 
strategies impact customers, as well as the industry in general. The chapters of this 
dissertation are written in journal format, with each chapter focusing on one of the 
objectives. Chapter 2 investigated the relationship between airline prices and competitive 
market structures. Chapter 3 identified and reviewed product debundling trends that 
recently occurred in the U.S. airline industry. Chapter 4 focused on one debundling trend: 
seat reservation fees. We investigated factors that influence airline customers’ premium 
coach seat purchases and estimated revenue impacts of different seat pricing strategies. 
Chapter 5 reviewed the subject of price endogeneity, and Chapter 6 used online prices 
and seat maps to model daily flight-level bookings and price elasticities. A valid set of 
instrumental variables were found and used to correct for price endogeneity. This 
dissertation also includes Appendix A, which provides more detailed information about 
an online dataset of competitor prices that was compiled using automated web client 
robots. Finally, this last chapter (Chapter 7) summarizes major findings related to each 






7.2. Major Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
 
7.2.1. Competitive Airline Pricing Policies 
The first research objective of this dissertation explored airline pricing policies in markets 
with different types of competitive market structures using a dataset of online prices from 
2007 (Chapter 2). Several observations were made using the disaggregate pricing dataset. 
In contrast with findings of past research on price dispersion, we found that low price 
dispersion can be associated with both low and high market concentration, depending on 
the characteristics of the market and the specific carriers offering flights. The presence of 
low cost carriers (LCCs) was seen to have an impact on pricing of other carriers.  
 We also found that pricing strategies in low cost carrier monopoly routes are 
different than major carrier monopoly routes. Even in a monopoly situation, low cost 
carriers (especially Southwest) demonstrate flat pricing and price dispersion as the day of 
departure approaches. These differences in monopoly routes highlight the importance of 
understanding price dispersion at the detailed, disaggregate level when analyzing the 
impact of future mergers and acquisitions. 
 An additional finding was that markets with codeshares (specifically codeshares 
between US Airways and United Airlines) sometimes exhibit unusually high price 
dispersion on the airline that is selling tickets for a flight operated by another airline. 
There is a need for more research, at the disaggregate level, on how codesharing affects 
pricing within a market. As more and more airlines begin to use codeshares, 




 Additionally, two markets where two nonstop LCCs compete (which occurs 
rarely in the U.S.) were investigated. Competition between LCCs is increasing in the 
U.S., so an important area of future research is to better understand competition in these 
markets. We offer a database of markets where low cost carriers compete in Appendix A, 
which can be used in future research.  
 Most importantly, this part of the dissertation demonstrated the importance of 
disaggregate data that describe individual airline behavior, as aggregate data can hide 
important details in the data. In future research, there is a need for publically available 
sources of disaggregate demand and pricing data, which could lead to new insights into 
the impact of mergers and acquisitions on consumer welfare. 
 
7.2.2. Product Debundling 
The second research objective of this dissertation identified and reviewed product 
debundling trends that occurred in the U.S. in 2009-2010 (Chapter 3). We estimate the 
debundling phenomenon has diluted revenues to the U.S. Airport and Airways Trust 
Fund (AATF) by at least five percent. This is important as the AATF finances 
investments in the airport and airway system. The AATF was established as a source of 
funding that would increase concurrently with the use of the system, and assure timely 
and long-term commitments to capacity increases. The finding that debundling has 
diluted revenues to the AATF means that policy-makers may need to tax ancillary fees in 
the future in order to maintain the viability of the fund. 
 We anticipate that the “ancillary revenue” phenomenon is likely to continue in the 




better understand how ancillary fees impact customer satisfaction and loyalty. There is 
also a need to understand what factors drive customers to purchase add-on services, what 
aspects of the services that they value, and how these valuations may differ across 
customer segments. 
 
7.2.3. Premium Coach Seat Purchasing Behavior 
The third research objective of this dissertation investigated factors that influence airline 
customers’ premium coach seat purchases, and also estimated revenue impacts of 
different seat pricing strategies (Chapter 4). Several new behavioral insights into seat 
reservation fees were found. As planes fill up, customers are more likely to purchase a 
premium coach seat (with extra legroom and early boarding), regardless of how far in 
advance they purchase a ticket. This suggests that the ability of airlines to charge seat 
fees is strongly tied to load factors, which has several implications. First, concerns 
expressed by customers and government officials about the importance of clearly 
communicating airlines’ seat policies appear to be valid. It is important to ensure that 
customers are not being misled into making premium seat fee purchases by the 
information displayed on seat maps.  Second, the U.S. airline industry is currently going 
through a series of mergers and acquisitions, and has seen a reduction in overall domestic 
capacity, which has led to record-high load factors.  In an environment in which load 
factors are high, the airlines’ ability to generate revenues from seat fees is strong, and 
several industry pricing models related to seat fees are viable.  However, if load factors 
decrease in the future, we would expect that the incremental revenues generated from seat 




 We also find that customers who purchase tickets closer to the departure date are 
willing to pay higher seat fees, and that JetBlue could increase profits by optimizing 
prices. We find that JetBlue’s seat fees are currently underpriced in many markets; an 
optimal static fee would increase revenues by 8 percent whereas optimal dynamic fees 
would increase revenues by 10.2 percent. In addition, if JetBlue were to leave their seat 
fees unchanged and instead blocked certain rows of seats for premier customers, they 
could potentially increase revenues by 12.8%.  This finding underscores the importance 
of ensuring customers are not inadvertently misled into purchasing premium seats by seat 
map displays that block seats for premier customers.   
 There are several extensions of this work that could be addressed by using stated 
preference surveys. Currently, it is unclear what specific attributes of premium coach 
seats are valued by customers, and how these valuations may differ across customer 
segments.  For example, do customers purchasing JetBlue’s premium coach seats value 
extra legroom?  Do they value the ability to board first and store luggage in overhead 
bins?  Do they value the ability to deplane first and have more time to make connecting 
flights?  Determining the value of each of these components will help airlines better 
design products and bundles that provide the most value for customers. It will also help 
airlines determine whether they should invest in adding sections in coach that offer extra 
legroom, or simply sell existing coach seats that provide early boarding and alighting 
privileges.  This is a particularly important decision for carriers, as removing planes from 
service to remove row(s) of seats to add extra legroom is costly, particularly when planes 





7.2.4. Flight-Level Demand Models with Correction for Price Endogeneity 
 The last objective of this dissertation was to model daily flight-level bookings and 
estimate price elasticities using methods that correct for price endogeneity. Daily online 
prices and seat maps from airline websites were used to compare airfare price elasticity 
estimates using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression without correcting for price 
endogeneity and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression which corrects for 
endogeneity. Results show the importance of correcting for price endogeneity. For the 
OLS regression model, the estimated price elasticity of demand is -0.64, which represents 
inelastic demand. After correcting for endogeneity using 2SLS, the estimated price 
elasticity of demand is -1.84, which represents elastic demand. This difference is 
important, as pricing recommendations differ for inelastic and elastic models, i.e., 
inelastic models suggest prices should be raised whereas elastic models suggest prices 
should be lowered. Further, a set of instruments are found to pass validity tests and can be 
used in future models of daily flight-level demand. To our knowledge, this is the first 
time online seat maps have been used to estimate price elasticities. This is also one of the 
first studies to correct for price endogeneity in models of airline demand and to test for 
validity of instruments.  
 We also find that the total number of bookings is decreased during ongoing 
promotional sales of JetBlue’s low cost competitor Virgin America.  In future research, it 
would be interesting to model JetBlue and Virgin America demand together in the same 
model using a nested logit model to capture the degree of substitution between the 




major carrier into the models could add insights about the substitutability of LCCs versus 
major carriers. 
 For future research it would be interesting to aggregate our data and/or to mis-
specify the model using average prices instead of disaggregate prices. A priori, it is 
expected that price elasticities from an aggregated model would be less elastic than the 
price elasticities of our model.  This is because on a daily basis, airline customers can 
choose to purchase departure dates with lower prices, or they can choose a different 
airline with a lower price offering for the day, or they can wait to purchase when a lower 
price is offered. This dynamic would not be captured in aggregate data. 
  Also, there is a future research need for incorporating competitor prices into 
revenue management forecasts. Within the airline industry, there has been growing 
interest in developing the next generation of revenue management (RM) systems that can 
more accurately represent how customers make decisions in today’s online environments. 
The development of these next-generation “choice-based” RM systems require 
information about the prices (or “choices”) viewed by customers at the time of booking – 
both on the carrier of interest and, potentially, across several different competitors.  
 
7.3. Concluding Thoughts  
Although this disssertation has shown how online data can be leveraged to better 
understand airline and air passenger behavior, it is important to note that the use of 
competitive price information is somewhat controversial, despite the fact that today the 
majority of large U.S. carriers purchase competitive price information from firms such as 




 The pricing and seat maps we collected from the internet allowed us to explore 
questions that airlines themselves would not be able to explore using their own data. For 
example, JetBlue is not able to recreate the seat maps viewed by customers at the time of 
purchase. To do this, they would need to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
collect this information through their website. Our approach offers a more cost-efficient 
way to examine this problem and provides some of the first insights that are needed for 
airlines to justify investments required to collect more detailed online data.  Our approach 
is also one that can be replicated by government agencies or public advocacy groups 
interested in understanding the role of seat map displays on customer purchasing 
behavior.   
 Looking ahead, we expect online data to play an even more critical role in 
aviation studies. We also expect continued discussions around maintaining privacy of 
individual-level consumer data, and the ultimate benefit to firms and consumers of using 
competitive price information.  Using competitor information could lead to lower price 
offerings in markets as carriers match fares. It could also lead to spiral down of profits for 
carriers, and an attempt to return to more opaque pricing through debundling product 
attributes and recreating bundles from these separate products.  In turn, this would likely 
lead to increased tensions among carriers and global distribution systems, the latter of 
which currently do not have the ability to distribute detailed debundled products 
themselves.  
 Ancillary fees are often tied to different fares and/or frequent flyer status, which 
may encourage customers to book on airline websites rather than travel agency websites. 




customers first log in to the website using their frequent flyer account. By requiring that 
customers log in, the airline is able to tailor seat selections to each customer. The airline 
also indirectly benefits from encouraging customers to log in at the beginning of the 
search process (versus when a ticket is ultimately purchased) in the sense that it can 
unobtrusively observe the sequence of screens across a single or multiple website session, 
which can provide valuable marketing information. However, the ability to track 
individuals during their online search process may also raise new privacy concerns that 
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This section describes a database of online airline prices collected from a major online 
travel agent and one low cost carrier. The database provides detailed pricing data for all 
nonstop flights offered in a market. Data are provided for 42 domestic U.S. markets 
across a 28-day booking horizon for 21 departure dates. Each of the 42 markets is served 
by one or more low cost carriers. These data can be used to investigate the evolution of 
prices and price dispersion for monopoly, duopoly, and oligopoly markets.  The data can 
also be used to create simulated datasets for benchmarking the performance of revenue 
management algorithms that consider competitors’ prices. We hope to address research 





A.2. Introduction  
The U.S. airline industry is fiercely competitive market and one in which it has 
historically been difficult to raise fares.  According to the Air Transport Association 
(2010), in the first 30 years after passenger deregulation (which occurred in the U.S. in 
1978), domestic airline prices fell 41.2% in real terms. This decline is due to multiple 
factors, including the increased use of the internet as a major distribution channel and the 
increased market penetration of low cost carriers (LCCs).  For example, in 2007, 
approximately 55 million (or one in four) U.S. adults traveled by commercial air and 
were internet users (PhoCusWright, 2008). In 2009 Southwest Airlines was the largest 
U.S. domestic carrier, carrying over 101.3 million passengers; 81% of these passengers 
made their bookings via southwest.com (Southwest Airlines 2009, 2010). 
 Since deregulation, there has been continued interest in understanding how 
competitive factors and industry consolidation influence ticket prices.  However, the 
majority of these studies have been based on aggregate quarterly fare data that is 
publically available in the T100 or DB1A/1B databases (Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics 2010a, 2010b). Examples include studies by Borenstein (1989) Borenstein and 
Rose (1994), Dai, Liu and Serfes (2012), Gerardi and Shapiro (2007), Hayes and Ross 
(1998), Verlinda (2005) and Verlinda and Lane (2004).  Only a few pricing studies have 
been based on disaggregate data, including one study by Giaune and Guillou (2004) that 
used ticket observations from 20 routes from a global central reservation system, and a 
second study by Bilotkach (2006) that used pricing information for three routes collected 
from Travelocity®.  The lack of detailed pricing data across the booking horizon has 




different service attributes (e.g., departure time and carrier preferences).  Researchers’ 
ability to fully evaluate consumer welfare benefits associated with deregulation, mergers 
and acquisitions, and alliances has also been limited because the T100 and DB1A/1B 
databases do not provide information about the distribution of ticket prices and number of 
lower-priced tickets sold to consumers.  
 Within the airline industry, there has been growing interest in developing the next 
generation of revenue management (RM) systems that can more accurately represent how 
customers make decisions in today’s online environments. This interest is driven by the 
recognition that today’s market conditions are distinct from those seen during the first 
two decades following deregulation when the first generation of RM systems was 
developed. The development of these next-generation “choice-based” RM systems 
require information about the prices (or “choices”) viewed by customers at the time of 
booking – both on the carrier of interest and, potentially, across different competitors. It 
is becoming more common for aviation and other service firms to systematically collect 
pricing information by programming webbots and/or by purchasing the services of firms 
that specialize in the extraction of unstructured internet data.  For example, Travelocity® 
reported that it used webbots to query its competitors’ sites to investigate how often (and 
why) it was not price competitive (Smith et al., 2007).  
 Although pricing data is routinely collected by industry, the amount of data 
available to researchers for empirical testing and benchmarking of different RM 
algorithms has been limited. There are only a few studies that have used industry data for 
choice-based RM applications, including one by Vulcano, van Ryzin and Chaar (2010) 




single hotel property, one by Farias, Jagabathula and Shah (forthcoming) that uses data 
from a car dealership and data from Amazon on DVD sales, and one by Gaur, 
Muthulingam and Swisher (2013) that is based on sales of college textbooks.  Although 
these studies have used industry data, they are limited in the sense that they exclude 
pricing effects or only consider a single firm’s prices.   
 The objective of this appendix is to help address these research gaps by providing 
pricing information over a four week booking horizon for 42 U.S. markets and 21 
departure dates.  This airline pricing database contains over 228,000 price observations 
and can be used to investigate the evolution of prices across flights for a range of 
competition structures. The database can also be used to create simulated datasets for 
benchmarking the performance of RM systems, including those that incorporate 
information about competitor prices and consider the impact of low cost carriers. The 
datasets are available to all researchers as long as the researcher cites this document as 
the source.  In the following sections, we describe the data, the data collection process 
(accomplished through the use of daily automated queries, or webbots) and highlight 
potential limitations in the data. 
 
A.3. Description of Datasets 
Pricing data was collected in 42 markets for all nonstop flights departing between 
September 2, 2010 and September 22, 2010. A booking horizon of four weeks was 
collected for each departure date. This section describes the fields available for analysis, 
the process used to select the markets included in the database, and basic descriptive 




A.3.1. Data Fields 
Round-trip prices for nonstop flights were obtained from a major online travel agency 
(which we refer to as OTA). These round-trip prices represent the lowest price (or fare) 
available for a particular outbound flight for a trip that involves a one-night stay; the 
inbound flight that would be required to obtain this lowest fare is not known. Equivalent 
round-trip prices for nonstop flights were obtained from one low cost carrier’s website 
(which we refer to as LCC1). The “equivalent round-trip price” is obtained by 
multiplying LCC1’s one-way fare by two and is comparable to the “round-trip price” 
obtained for other carriers through the OTA.   
 There are two databases: one for the OTA prices and one for LCC1 prices. 
Descriptions of the fields available in these databases are provided in Table A.1, and a 
list of airport codes are provided in Table A.2.  Both databases include the same 
variables. The majority of the fields are self-explanatory; however, those related to 








Table A.1: Fields Available in Dataset 
Name Definition 
Market 
Indicates the origin and destination airports associated with the nonstop flight.  
For example, BOSLAX represents a flight that originated at Logan International 
Airport in Boston and landed at the Los Angeles International Airport.  Table A.2 
provides a list of airport codes. 
Price 
For the OTA dataset this is the round-trip price, excluding taxes.  
For the LCC1 dataset this is the one-way price, excluding taxes, multiplied by 
two. 
FlightNumber Flight number assigned by airline. 
DepartureTime Scheduled departure time (In military hours and based on the local time at departure airport). 
DepartureTime_hr Hour of scheduled departure time (In military hours and based on the local time at departure airport). 
DepartureTime_min Minutes past the hour of scheduled departure time (based on the local time at departure airport). 
CaptureDate Date the pricing query was made. 
DepartureDate Departure date (based on the local time at departure airport). 
DFD Number of days from flight departure that the query was made (defined as departuredate minus capturedate). 
MarketingAirline Code associated with the marketing airline that is selling a ticket for the flight.  
OperatingAirline Code associated with the airline that operates the flight.  
Affiliate Value of 1 indicates a flight in which an affiliate carrier operates on behalf of a parent airline. Only the parent airline markets the flight. 
Dcapturedate Day of capture date. 
Mcapturedate Month of capture date. 
Ddeparturedate Day of departure date. 
Mdeparturedate Month of departure date. 
Ddow Departure day of week, 1=Sunday, … 7=Saturday 
Cdow Capture day of week, 1=Sunday, … 7=Saturday 
 
 
 Airlines can own other airlines or establish operating contracts with regional 
airlines. These wholly-owned subsidiaries and regional (or affiliate) carriers operate 
flights on behalf of the parent airline.  For example, American Eagle is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary that operates flights on behalf of American Airlines, and SkyWest is a regional 
carrier that operates flights on behalf of Alaska and Delta.  In an affiliate relationship, the 
parent airline is the one that markets (or sells seats on) that flight whereas the affiliate 
carrier is the one that operates the flight.  A flight that is operated by an affiliate carrier is 




will be populated with a code for the parent airline and the Operating Airline will be 
populated with a code for the affiliate partner. Lists of parent and affiliate airline codes 
are listed in Tables A.3 and A.4 (note that actual airline codes have been masked). An 
example is given in Table A.5, which gives a sample of observations from the OTA data 
(first four rows) and LCC1 data (last four rows). The unit of observation in the databases 
is an outbound flight that is uniquely identified by the market, capture date, departure 
date, marketing airline, and flight number. The third row of Table A.5 shows that flight 
number 3131 is marketed by parent airline M4 and operated by affiliate airline A8. 
 
Table A.2: Airport Codes and Names 
Airport Code Name of Airport, City and State 
ATL Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia 
AUS Austin Bergstrom International Airport, Austin, Texas 
BOS Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts 
BUF Buffalo Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York 
BWI Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, Baltimore, Maryland 
CAK Akron Canton Airport, Green, Ohio 
DEN Denver International Airport, Denver, Colorado 
FLL Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 
IAD Washington Dulles International Airport, Washington D.C. 
ICT Wichita Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 
IND Indianapolis International Airport, Indianapolis, Indiana 
JAX Jacksonville Airport, Jacksonville, Florida 
JFK John F. Kennedy International, New York City, New York 
LAS McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada 
LAX Los Angeles International Airport, Los Angeles, California 
LGA La Guardia Airport, New York City, New York 
MCO Orlando International Airport, Orlando, Florida 
MDW Chicago Midway International Airport, Chicago, Illinois 
OAK Oakland International, Oakland, California 
ORD Chicago O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois 
PBI Palm Beach International Airport, Palm Beach, Florida 
PDX Portland International Airport, Portland, Oregon 
PHL Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
PIT Pittsburgh International Airport, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
ROC Greater Rochester International Airport, Rochester, New York 
SAN San Diego International Airport, San Diego, California 
SEA Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington 
SFO San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California 
SNA John Wayne Airport, Orange County, Santa Ana, California 
















L1 One-way LCC 
L2 One-way LCC 
L3 One-way LCC 
L4 One-way LCC 
L5 One-way LCC 
M1 Round-trip Major 
M2 Round-trip Major 
M3 One-way Major 
M4 One-way Major 
M5 Round-trip Major 
 
 




















Table A.5: Sample Observations 
Market Price Flight Number 
Departure 







PHLMCO $249 863 18:15 2010-09-01 2010-09-04 3 M4 M4 0 
PHLMCO $220 629 18:30 2010-09-01 2010-09-04 3 L2 L2 0 
PHLMCO $249 3131 20:35 2010-09-01 2010-09-04 3 M4 A8 1 
PHLMCO $220 627 20:40 2010-09-01 2010-09-04 3 L2 L2 0 
PHLMCO $318 364 10:20 2010-09-01 2010-09-04 3 L1 L1 0 
PHLMCO $278 2061 15:30 2010-09-01 2010-09-04 3 L1 L1 0 
PHLMCO $278 2609 8:25 2010-09-01 2010-09-04 3 L1 L1 0 
PHLMCO $318 3408 12:55 2010-09-01 2010-09-04 3 L1 L1 0 
193 
 
A.3.2. Market Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Data was collected for a sample of U.S. markets in which at least one low cost carrier 
(LCC) provided daily nonstop service. A stratified sample was used to select a minimum 
of four markets for each competitive structure, shown in Table A.6. However, some 
competition structures appeared less than four times in the U.S. network, and thus less 
than four markets were included for these cases. The markets included in the dataset are 
described in Table A.6, along with the market structure (number of low cost and major 
carriers offering nonstop flights) and median prices for each competitor.  
 The database of OTA prices contains a total of 186,268 unique prices that 
correspond to a specific market, search date, departure date, marketing airline, and 
nonstop flight number. The database of LCC1 prices contains a total of 42,434 unique 
prices. These prices can be used for a range of different analyses. Figure A.1 shows an 
example of median lowest fares that each carrier offered for each unique departure date 
and search date. The median prices are for one market (BOSLAX) across the 28 day 
booking horizon.  The variation in fares across the booking horizon highlights one of the 
key strengths of the database, namely the ability to investigate the evolution of fares 







Table A.6: Median Prices, by Market and Competition Structure 
Market 
Structure Market 
Median Ticket Price (U.S. Dollars) 
Low Cost Carriers Network Carriers 
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 M1 M2 M4 M3 M5 
1 LCC, 
0 Major  
BWILAS $458 - - - - - - - - - 
BWIMDW $254 - - - - - - - - - 
JFKOAK - - $390 - - - - - - - 
JFKPBI - - $232 - - - - - - - 
LGACAK - $178 - - - - - - - - 
SYRMCO - - $222 - - - - - - - 
1 LCC, 
1 Major 
ATLICT - $153 - - - $225 - - - - 
BOSIAD - - $118 - - - $174 - - - 
BOSMCO - - $217 - - $212 - - - - 
IADSFO - - - $455 - - $433 - - - 
JFKFLL - - $212 - - $176 - - - - 
JFKPDX - - $476 - - $467 - - - - 
LGAIND - $161 - - - $190 - - - - 
SNASFO $202 - - - - - $202 - - - 
1 LCC, 
2 Major 
IADLAX - - - $388 - - $313 - - $278 
JFKORD - - $235 - - $255 - - - $225 
LGAATL - $228 - - - $272 - - - $258 
SEALAX - - - $224 - - $269 - $244 - 
SEASFO - - - $220 - - $203 - $180 - 
1 LCC, 
4 Major LASLAX $194 - - - - $194 $175 $175 - $175 
2 LCC, 
0 Major 
BWIJAX $228 $148 - - - - - - - - 
BWIMCO $190 $168 - - - - - - - - 
FLLAUS $280 - $218 - - - - - - - 
FLLSFO - - $268 $292 - - - - - - 
MCOAUS $218 - $211 - - - - - - - 
PITMCO $226 $178 - - - - - - - - 
ROCMCO - $178 $198 - - - - - - - 
2 LCC, 
1 Major 
BOSDEN $288 - $308 - - - $478 - - - 
FLLLAX - - - $271 $290 $248 - - - - 
IADMCO - $163 $180 - - - $173 - - - 
LGAFLL - - $206 - $169 $181 - - - - 
PHLMCO $220 $162 - - - - - $162 - - 
SANSFO $154 - - $132 - - $116 - - - 
2 LCC, 
2 Major 
BOSLAX - - $308 $298 - - $298 - - $298 
BOSSFO - - $378 $375 - - $369 - - $345 
JFKLAS - - $417 $496 - $382 - - - $370 
LASSFO $178 - - $210 - - $188 $184 - - 
2 LCC, 
3 Major 
JFKLAX - - $358 $390 - $338 $380 - - $380 
JFKSFO - - $460 $457 - $363 $447 - - $408 
2 LCC, 
4 Major LAXSFO $118 - - $128 - $114 $108 - $156 $108 
3 LCC, 
0 Major 
BOSBWI $124 $78 $101 - - - - - - - 











































A.4. Additional Data Details 
This section describes in more detail the process used to create a database of airline 
prices from the websites of the OTA and LCC1, and also discusses the strengths and 
limitations of the data. 
 
A.4.1. Overview of the Data Collection Process 
Web client robots (or webbots) written in PHP were used to collect airfares for a rolling 
set of departure dates. The period of data collection ran from 8/5/2010 through 
9/21/2010. When the data collection began on 8/5/2010, information for flights departing 
on 9/2/2010 (or 28 days in advance) were collected.  On 8/6/2010, information for flights 
departing on 9/2/2010 (or 27 days in advance) as well as information for flights departing 
on 9/1/2010 (or 28 days in advance were collected).  The process completed until 28 days 
of pricing information were collected for flights departing on 9/2/2010 to 9/22/2010. 
After the webpages were collected, PHP scripts were written to extract (or parse) 
itinerary and fare information.   
 We collected round-trip prices from the OTA and one-way prices from LCC1.  
This is because airlines use different pricing methods.  Round-trip pricing is used by 
many major airlines, including American, Continental, Delta, and United.  Round-trip 
pricing enables an airline to offer different prices for customers who are traveling over a 
Saturday night and/or for customers who are traveling for a minimum number of days.  In 
combination with advance purchase restrictions, round-trip pricing enables airlines to 
tailor prices for more price-sensitive (and often leisure) travelers who could purchase 




price is generated for each unique combination of an outbound (or departing) and 
inbound (or returning) itinerary.  A one-day round-trip price refers to a price that is 
generated when the length of stay is equal to one night away from home (this occurs 
when the inbound date minus the outbound date is equal to one).  
 Due to computational constraints, we could not collect round-trip prices for every 
possible combination of outbound and inbound flights. Nor could we collect round-trip 
prices for multiple lengths of stay.  We restricted the data collection to one-day round-trip 
prices. Our database associates a round-trip price for each outbound nonstop flight 
displayed on the OTA.  This round-trip price reflects the minimum price that would be 
available to the customer if he/she selected that outbound flight; however, the inbound 
flight that generates this lowest fare is not recorded.   
 Although major carriers offer both round-trip and one-way fares, we did not 
collect one-way fares through the OTA, as the sum of the one-way fares was much higher 
than the equivalent round-trip fares for those carriers that used round-trip pricing.  It was 
thus necessary to associate a one-day round-trip fare with each outbound itinerary in 
order to create a database of “comparable” fares across carriers. 
 Because we were not able to capture LCC1 prices from the OTA, we collected 
LCC1 fares directly from their website. LCC1 uses one-way prices (i.e., each flight has a 
unique price). An ideal data collection would have been to run two one-way queries for 
each LCC1 market, one for the outbound departure date and airport pair and the second 
for the inbound departure date and airport pair.  Then, an equivalent one-day round-trip 
price for each outbound flight could have theoretically been obtained.  However, this 




Instead, we generate an “equivalent round-trip” fare, using the one-way price for a 
market multiplied by two. 
    
A.4.2. Limitations  
The pricing data contained in the online database is representative of airline prices that 
were available to consumers, but they may not always represent the actual prices viewed 
by or purchased by consumers.  For example, the prices displayed on the OTA’s website 
may differ from prices displayed on different online travel agency websites, carrier 
websites, or other distribution channels. In addition, for data collected through the OTA, 
it may not be possible to track prices for a given flight across the booking horizon, as 
OTA displays (and specifically which flights they choose to show) can be influenced by 
online travel agencies’ profit-maximizing strategies (Smith et al., 2007). This includes the 
practice of providing more display space for itineraries operated by a specific carrier in 
order to drive sales to that carrier, thereby enabling online travel agencies to reach sales 
volume hurdles that result in substantial commission revenue (Smith et al., 2007). 
 An additional limitation is that the “equivalent round-trip” LCC1 price in the database 
is not exactly the same as the OTA round-trip prices. Although the prices should be 
similar, there is potential measurement error when directly comparing LCC1 prices to 
other competitor prices collected from OTA.   
 
A.4.2.1. Completeness of Data 
 The database is approximately 80 percent complete.  This is due to the fact that, 




return information. These types of problems can occur for various reasons and may be 
more prevalent when demands on the OTA and LCC1 sites are high, i.e., when many 
individuals are searching for information. 
 The final dataset for the OTA (representing 40 markets) should contain 23,520 
unique market, departure date, and capture date observations; 15.2 percent of these 
observations were not collected.  The final dataset for LCC1 (representing 16 markets) 
should contain 9,408 unique observations; 21.2 percent of these observations were not 
collected.  For the OTA, missing data is approximately randomly distributed across the 
different days from departure.  However, for LCC1, the distribution of missing data is not 
random; the data is more complete for those flights that are closer to their departure date 
(or have smaller days from departures).  For example, for data collected at days from 
departure 28, a total of 32 percent is missing whereas for data collected at days from 
departure one, only six percent of the data is missing. When the data from the OTA and 
LCC1 is merged, there are a total of 24,696 possible unique observations, of which 21.5 
percent are missing.  
 Despite these limitations, to the best of our knowledge, this dataset represents the 
largest, dataset of detailed airline prices that is publically available and the only one that 
can be used to look competitive pricing of different types of low cost carrier competition. 
This database should provide new insights that will be of interest to researchers from 








To summarize, the datasets contain one-day round-trip fares for all outbound nonstop 
flights departing between September 2, 2010 and September 22, 2010 in a market that is 
served by at least one low cost carrier. A minimum booking horizon of four weeks for 
each departure date is included. The OTA fares represent the lowest available round-trip 
fare for a particular outbound flight for a trip that involves a one-night stay; the inbound 
flight that would be required to obtain this lowest fare is not known. The LCC1 fares 
represent an “equivalent round-trip” fare, which is the one-way fare multiplied by two. 
 This airline pricing database is unique in that it provides detailed daily pricing 
data that is not publicly available through government data sources such as T100 and 
DB1A/1B (which provide average fare information over a quarter). The datasets can be 
used to create simulated datasets for benchmarking the performance of RM systems, 
including those that incorporate information about competitor prices. The data can also 
be used to investigate the evolution of prices across a range of competition structures to 
answer questions related to which airline(s) are price leaders (e.g., who drops prices first 
and which airlines follow?). The data can be used to investigate how an airline’s pricing 
policies differ when facing various airline competitors and market structures. This data is 
also unique in that it provides detailed pricing information in a subset of markets where 
two or more low cost carriers offer nonstop flights, which can be used to investigate how 
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